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On June 15, 2017, the European Commission initiated infringement procedures against three States: 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for refusing to accept refugees from two EU-directed 
emergency relocations schemes.1 Out of 10,000 refugees mandated reallocation from Greece and Italy to 
Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic, only 12 had been accepted. To this effect, Hungarian 
president, Viktor Orban remarked that “It is an infringement of our sovereignty that we should not be 
allowed to decide whom we are going to live with” and, rather than absorb refugees, Orban, along with 
Visegrád partners Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Poland, pledged 35m Euro, to bolster Italy’s seaborne 
                                                             
1EU Council Decision 2015/1523 and 2015/1601, mandating the relocation of 160,000 humanitarian migrants from Italy and 
Greece.   
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coastal operations.2 Orban’s position was seemingly echoed by Slovak prime minister Robert Fico at a 
December 14, 2017 EU Summit, claiming that “There is no human right to travel to the European Union 
and the European Union must protect itself.”3 Even Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen has 
suggested revising the 1951 Refugee Convention to protect the sovereignty of EU States.4 
Such responses within Europe to the refugee crisis of 2015-2017 highlight the central theme of this 
dissertation: that many of the legal mechanisms guiding refugee protection are out of step with sovereign 
preferences. The Dublin Regulations −stipulating that the first country an asylum seeker enters is 
responsible for determination and protection without implications for distributive concerns− has perhaps 
been the most infamous example of this phenomenon. Yet the Dublin Regulations are only one of many 
EU legal instruments unable to account for social and economic forces.  
The root of this disequilibrium appears to be temporal. Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention places 
no numerical ceiling on the definition of protection. Signatory States must determine if an asylum seeker 
is a refugee, and if so, protect her.5 Critically, as per Customary International Law, an asylum seeker must 
not be sent back to a country where she might be subject to persecution.6 This may mean a given State 
must protect 12 refugees. It also may mean 2 million.7  
                                                             
2 EU Observer. ‘Commission takes Orban’s Hungary to court’. (December 7, 2017). Last retrieved December 7, 2017 from < 
https://euobserver.com/political/140197 >. 
3 EU Observer. ‘Slovak PM: Human Rights are not a travel pass to the EU.’ (December 14, 2017). Last Retrieved December 17, 
2017 https://euobserver.com/migration/140291. 
4 Reuters.  ‘Denmark wants Geneva Convention debate if Europe cannot curb refugee influx’. (December 28, 2015). Last 
accessed December 17, 2017 from < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-denmark/denmark-wants-geneva-
convention-debate-if-europe-cannot-curb-refugee-influx-idUSKBN0UB10020151228 >. 
5 The customary international law obligation stems from non-refoulment, not offering asylum. This means that protection is an 
erga omnes obligation, but not necessarily offering asylum. Still, the requirement to not refoul places a burden of protection on 
States. See infra n46. Also, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
(Hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention].  
6 Allain, J. (2001). The jus cogens Nature of non‐refoulement. International Journal of Refugee Law, 13(4), 533-558; UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. 
Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 
BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, (UNHCR, 31 January 1994). Moreover, A breach of CIL for non-refoulment, an 
erga omnes obligation, will lead to responsibility under 2001 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (Art 1) and restrictions (Art. 31). International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1. 
7 A clear distinction lies between a refugee and applicants who receive subsidiary protection, the latter given to those who don’t 
fall under the §meters of definition of a refugee, but who, under the EU Qualification Directive (recast, hereafter), Article 2(f), 
would face a real risk of serious harm, defined in Article 15 of the Recast. Rules on subsidiary protection, however, show 
considerable variation. In the German example, refugees receive a three-year residency permit that is converted to permanent 
residency if there are no reasons for revocation. Subsidiary status awardees, in contrast, receive a one-year permit, which can be 
extended until seven years, after which permanent residency can be obtained under a gamut of conditions. European Union: 
Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted 
(recast), 20 December 2011, OJ L 337; December 2011, pp 9-26, preamble, recital 33, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f197df02.html (“EU Qualification Directive (recast)”). For the European Court of Justice’s 
opinion on this, see Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-175/08; C-176/08; C-178/08 & C-179/08, 
ECJ, 2 March 2010, §. 78. 
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It is unlikely that States predicted such high numbers nearly seven decades ago when they weighed their 
incentives to sign the Convention. The Travaux Préparatoires of the 1951 Geneva Convention indicate 
that signatory States did not anticipate bridges in logistical impediments and informational asymmetries 
that have permitted the Global South access to mainland Europe in historically large numbers, nor the 
development of the positive rights regime to its current extent.8 Accordingly, States who signed and 
ratified the 1951 Convention did not establish ex ante distributive ramifications for both private and 
public goods. Neither did they calculate potential impacts of the refugee protection regime to their labor 
market, internal security, and social cohesion. 
Unsurprisingly, refugee law, established over half a century ago, has frequently fallen out of step with 
non-static social and economic forces. This is particularly true during times of external shock, for 
example, mass migration caused by civil war. Reconciling these forces, though, is far from 
straightforward. As David Miller has noted in several texts (2008, 2015) because refugees are assumed to 
obtain full rights in their adopted country, absorption of refugees into a sovereign nation presupposes a 
long-term commitment, not just economically, but in the domains of social cohesion, internal security, 
and national identity.9 From a State-centric point of view, then, the absorption of refugees is either 
beneficial or costly depending not only on the State’s commitment to legal norms, but its ability to 
integrate refugees into its economic, social, and political community.  
Where States have perceived an inability to properly integrate individuals fleeing persecution, they have 
often taken measures to deter protection responsibilities. Over 1000km of fencing has been erected along 
the borders of Bulgaria, Greece, Austria, Greece, Hungary, and Slovenia.10 The rhetoric from EU leaders 
has followed in tow.  Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen’s threat to amend the1951 
Convention is just one of many comments European leaders have made in opposition to their legal 
obligation to protect. Under Chancellor Sebastian Kurtz, for example, Austria has made protecting its 
borders from asylum seekers a frontline issue. Kurtz was quoted as advocating that border agents “stop 
illegal migrants on the external borders, tend to them, and then ideally send them immediately back to 
their home country or transit country.”11 Unfortunately, what constitutes an illegal and a legal migrant is 
often blurred, threatening to violate the right to asylum before refugee status has been determined. To 
                                                             
8 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux prépetoires analysed with a 
Commentary by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53e1dd114.html [accessed 2 January 2018]. 
9 Miller, D. (2008). National responsibility and global justice. Critical review of international social and political 
philosophy, 11(4), 383-399; Miller, D. (2015). Justice in immigration. European Journal of Political Theory, 14(4), 391-408.  
10 The New York Times. ‘The European border is still open. But for how long? Katrin Bennhold. (July 24 2018). Last accessed 
20 February 2019 from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/world/europe/austria-slovenia-border-migrants-spielfeld-
schengen.html. 
11 EuroNews. ‘Austria’s crackdown on migrants’ (28 May 18) p2. Last accessed 20 Februar 2019 from 
https://www.euronews.com/2018/05/28/austria-s-crack-down-on-migrants. 
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further a protectionist agenda, Austrian Freedom Party defense spokesman, Reinhard Bösch, suggested 
that “Europe should send troops to North Africa to occupy land where asylum seekers could be held 
before sending them back to their countries of origin”.12 
Accordingly, the refugee crisis referred to in this dissertation’s title does not refer to the inflow of 
refugees, primarily from Syria, during 2014-2017. Rather, the crisis is more general and will not 
permanently dissipate with the end of the Syrian or Afghan conflicts. This crisis is the inability for 
refugee law to remain in step with the protection preferences of European States. To bring social and 
economic preferences in equilibrium with the law, European States will need to create more than 
additional housing units or hire more border agents. States will require a way forward that allows them to 
regulate the amount of protection they bestow, without violating treaty-based obligations. Or, in economic 
terms, preventing amendments or derogations to refugee law may require that the State-calculated 
marginal benefit of protection, to include norm commitments, is higher than the corresponding economic 
and social marginal cost.   
Research Questions and Roadmap 
This monograph analyzes refugee protection from a Law & Economics perspective. It attempts to answer 
the research question: how can social and economic forces be brought into equilibrium with the laws 
governing refugee protection? In order to answer this question several smaller, yet nonetheless important 
questions are tackled. These questions can be divided into two domains: allocation and integration.  
Allocation refers to ways in which refugee protection is distributed. Often, in the context of allocating 
protection, the terms immigrant, asylum seeker, and refugee are conflated. An immigrant is somebody 
who moves to another country for any number of reasons. Asylum seekers seek protection from 
persecution. A refugee is an asylum seeker who has been recognized as being subject to persecution under 
the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. The distinction is crucial towards States assessing the long-term 
social and political costs of absorption. For instance, upon request, an economic migrant or denied asylum 
seeker may be expected to return to his home country (infra 2.3); a refugee, however, can be expected to 
remain and obtain full citizenship rights. 
The status quo is currently one where the majority of refugees and asylum seekers waiting for refugee 
determination status are hosted outside of EU borders. In fact, as of 2018, 85% of displaced persons and 
over 90% of refugees were living outside European Union countries.13 However, once asylum seekers 
reach EU territory, most often Italy, Greece, and Spain, they either apply for refugee status in the first EU 
                                                             
12 SBS News. ‘The country that has overturned its promise to refugees’ (22 October 2018) p3. Last accessed 20 February 2019 
from https://www.sbs.com.au/news/the-country-that-has-overturned-its-promise-to-refugees. 
13UNHCR. Figures at Glance. Last accessed 20 February 2019 from  https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html. 
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country they reach, or, defying the law, move northwards to an EU country of their choice. At these 
second countries, reasons for secondary movements are be reviewed, but may result in the asylum seeker 
being returned to the responsible Member State.14 
There have been several attempts by the European Union to make burden sharing −fairness in allocating 
protection− more equitable. Unsurprisingly, intra-EU reallocation has frequently met with fierce 
opposition. Several countries, notably Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have been opposed to 
hosting more refugees than their preferences dictate.15Even EU countries that initially welcomed refugees 
en masse, such as Germany and Sweden, have wavered between an unlimited welcome and expressing 
concern over the number of asylum seekers and their length of stay.16 Figure 1 shows recognition rates for 
asylum seekers for Q1 of 2017. While many factors must be accounted for before drawing in-depth 
conclusions, still, the recognition rates do not vary considerably after controlling for the asylum seeker’s 
country of origin, religion and age.17 They may thus be taken as a snapshot into each State’s asylum 
system, and by extension, its preferences for hosting refugees. 
                                                             
14 European Parliament (2016). Secondary movements of asylum seekers in the EU asylum system; Skov, G. (2016). Transfer 
Back to Malta: Refugees’ Secondary Movement Within the European Union. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 14(1), 66-
82. For a legal framework see: UNHCR, Legomsky, Stephen H, (2003) Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of 
Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection. For an empirical study into institutional catalysts for 
secondary movement, see: Brekke, J. P., & Brochmann, G. (2015). Stuck in transit: secondary migration of asylum seekers in 
Europe, national differences, and the Dublin regulation. Journal of Refugee Studies, 28(2), 145-162. 
15 Moore, C., Ricker, A., Forbes, J. M., & Ayer, A. (2017). Discrimination Based Upon Race, Religion, and Ethnicity When 
Filing for Asylum in the European Union (Policy Paper); For an analysis of the Polish response to refugees through the viewpoint 
of religion, see: Narkowicz, K. (2018). ‘Refugees Not Welcome Here’: State, Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee 
Crisis in Poland. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 31(4), 357-373. 
16 Gerhards, J., Hans, S., & Schupp, J. (2016). German public opinion on admitting refugees. DIW Economic Bulletin, 6(21), 246; 
Momin, S. (2017). A Human Rights Based Approach to Refugees: A Look at the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Responses from 
Germany and the United States. Duke FL & Soc. Change, 9, 55. 
17 Author’s calculations. 
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FIGURE 1: FIRST INSTANCE DECISIONS BY OUTCOME AND RECOGNITION RATES, 1ST QUARTER 2017 - SOURCE: EUROSTAT 
 
Recognition rates and whether refugees have been welcome em masse have often depended on State-level 
incentives to protect. How then might refugees be allocated within the EU in a manner that ensures that 
States are not incentivized to reject them outright or make determination criteria too difficult to fulfill?  
As mentioned above, the law requires that signatory States to the 1951 Convention determine whether an 
asylum seeker is persecuted under Article 1, and if so, grant refugee status; the law does not allow an 
asylum seeker to be returned to a place where she might be tortured or subject to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment. Economic or national identity concerns do not figure into the Article 1 definition.  
Yet States do figure economic and national identity concerns into their refugee policies. Allocating 
protection then begins with a discussion of relevant economic theory: explanations why States choose to 
protect against their rational self-interest and at other times, avoid, obfuscate, or outright refuse. Without 
understanding State incentives to protect and their associated costs, it is difficult to propose an efficient 
institutional solution. Chapter I takes up this chore and analyzes State-level incentive structures to 
participate in the refugee regime. It also discusses why centralized regulation may mitigate many of the 
disincentives to protect. Based on this discussion, reassignment of protection responsibilities is discussed 
within the framework of joint public goods with the goal of ascertaining conditions that will result in an 
14 
 
efficient allocation of protection, and when it will lead to excess agency, raising transaction costs, 
blurring accountability, and miring distribution with multi-level legal hurdles. Distribution, in this thesis, 
is guided by a two-prong definition of efficiency: that European Union Member States host within their 
preferences and that all refugees are protected per treaty-based obligations. 
Allocation in this thesis is presented within the framework of social welfare maximization. States try to 
optimize the costs and benefits of protecting refugees in order to maximize social welfare. If States view 
protection as too costly, they will not willingly host. Any successful allocative proposal must therefore 
lead to the State-perceived benefits of protection being greater than its perceived costs. Examining the 
nature of protection −its costs and benefits− is therefore crucial towards understanding allocation. The 
Public Choice and Fiscal Federalism literature guide this portion. Chapter I also extrapolates the lex lata 
of EU refugee protection, particularly in light of enforcement issues. Enforcement is tied to incentive 
structures in order to clarify which ways the law impacts an efficient allocation. 
Grounded in refugee protection from an economic perspective, Chapter II offers an intervention: a 
market-mechanism between the European Union and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation that 
allocates refugee protection. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is the second largest 
intergovernmental organization after the United Nation (UN), consisting of 57-Member States with a 
collective population of 1.5 billion. This market mechanism, this thesis argues will efficiently allocate 
protection for individual EU States, the Union as a whole, as well as individual refugees. Problems of 
transboundary externalities, matching State and refugee preferences, and allocating potentially large 
numbers of persecuted human being during times of crisis all are addressed in the mechanism. 
Operation wise, the market mechanism allocates quotas for 85 participating States, then allows for 
transferring protection responsibilities to select EU or OIC States. Transfers enable treaty-based 
protection obligations to be satisfied when norm commitments to host additional refugees are less than 
perceived costs. States unable to host (i.e., due to refoulement concerns) fulfill their quota by supporting 
the protection commitments of hosting States. In addition, to better align refugee and State interests, a 
matching mechanism is included. Once the market mechanism has been extrapolated, Chapter III 
analyzes the legality of refugee transfers. This analysis takes an evolutionary approach that attempts to 
presage developments in the law, and, in doing so, lower the risk of costly legal challenges to transfers. 
Below, Figure 2 maps out the questions which are addressed in Part I. These questions aim to clarify 
whether an OIC-EU market mechanism will more efficiently distribute refugee protection. 
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FIGURE 2: ROADMAP OF PART I QUESTIONS 
 
 
Part II builds off the allocation analysis. It addresses efficiency of protecting through cost of protection. If 
Member States are willing to protect when the marginal benefit of protection is positive, lowering the cost 
of protecting refugees (or raising the benefit) should increase the number of refugees hosted. Or, looking 
at it from a different angle, the greater a population’s perception that refugees are successfully integrating, 
the less pressure they may place on politicians to limit refugees (infra 5.3). The way in which this thesis 
tackles cost is through integration. 
Chapters IV and V propose an EU-level mentoring program to promote successful integration and lower 
the cost of hosting refugees. Using a new dataset collected by the author, Chapter IV evaluates the labor 
market success of Arabic-speaking refugees who have been mentored in three EU countries: Germany, 
Allocation
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Italy, and Greece. It aims to show whether mentoring has positively impacted refugees’ employment. The 
choice of labour market as an integration outcome is guided by that fact that employment is often cited as 
the bedrock of successful integration.18Chapter V focuses not on refugees being mentored, but the host 
population’s perception of mentoring as an integration mechanism. Public support has frequently aided 
positive integration program outcomes; the opposite is also true, and the inability to satisfy local 
preferences has negatively impacted integration programs (Bloemraad & De Graauw, 2012).19Using a 
second original dataset collected by the author, the analysis seeks to discover how a host population’s 
perception, in this case Germany’s, perceives the impact of a refugee participating in a mentoring 
integration program. To do this, a conjoint causal inference tool randomly places attributes shown in the 
Labor Economics, Acculturation, and Sociology literature to impact integration alongside participation in 
a mentoring integration program. It asks respondents to choose which individual is ‘more desirable’ as an 
immigrant, desirability here proxying integration. This empirical design attempts to answer whether 
participation in a mentoring integration program is likely to be perceived as an effective integration tool, 
and, furthermore, whether such participation will mitigate attributes perceived as making a refugee 
undesirable. The results have implications for crafting a mentoring intervention, and, more generally, 
lowering the cost function of hosting refugees through enrollment in specific integration programs.  
Chapters IV and V examine integration solely within the European context. This is validated by the 
difficulty many EU countries have had difficulty integrating refugees and the fact that broadening the 
discussion to include the Middle East and Africa would make incorporating social and legal forces 
unmanageable. Figure 3 illustrates the questions raised in Part II. These questions are needed to answer 
the question: Will a mentoring program positively impact refugee integration within European Union 
Member States thereby lowering the cost of hosting? Figure 4 recaps the thesis’ primary research 
questions. 
                                                             
18 Sniderman, P. M., Hagendoorn, L., & Prior, M. (2004). Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to 
immigrant minorities. American political science review, 98(1), 35-49. 
19 Bloemraad, I., & De Graauw, E. (2012). Immigrant integration and policy in the United States: A loosely stitched 
patchwork. International perspectives: Integration and inclusion, 205-232. 
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FIGURE 3: ROADMAP OF PART II QUESTIONS 
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FIGURE 4: PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
Original Contribution to the Literature 
The two spheres of analysis, allocation and integration, address gaps in the literature and constitute this 
monograph’s primary contributions. Although the market-based literature maintains a rich strand of 
scholarship suggesting refugee transfers on a market, proposals fail to adequately address the legality of 
such mechanisms or are unable to account for a relative versus absolute allocation. Chapter II, An EU-
OIC Market for Refugee Protection, fills the second of these gaps. The proposed EU-OIC market-
mechanism reconciles the conundrum of allocating above an annual absolute quota by involving Global 
South actors in an incentive-compatible manner, thereby increasing the scope of burden-sharing. Rather 
than avoiding, as many studies do (infra 2.2), the possibility that an exclusively EU-market will become 
glutted during times of crisis, OIC participation enables EU States to intake refugees in line with their 
labour market needs and integration infrastructures. When integration measures can no longer absorb 
additional refugees, third-party transfers allow States to ensure protection outside of their own territory. In 
turn, this disincentivizes a race to the bottom in admission standards, shirking EU directives, or 
derogating from international legal instruments.  
Another contribution of Chapter II is detailing the role of non-hosting States (NHS), those States who are 
unable to host refugees due to international law or domestic politics. Chapter II delineates how OIC States 
already overburdened with large refugee populations can receive consistent funding from non-hosting 
Research QuestionThesis
• How can social and economic forces be brought into equilibrium with the laws 
governing refugee protection? 
Research QuestionPart I
• How can refugee protection be efficiently allocated within the European Union?
Research QuestionPart II
• Will a mentoring program positively impact refugee integration within European 
Union Member States and lower the cost of hosting refugees?
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States, have firm commitments to resettle existing populations, whilst non-hosting OIC States can fulfill 
their legal commitments and maintain legitimacy as regional leaders with minimal domestic 
repercussions. None of these measures have been sufficiently addressed in the market-based literature. 
Of course, a market mechanism for protection requires not only satisfying market concerns, but legal ones 
as well. Failure to predict legal challenges to refugee transfers would makes market-associated transaction 
costs prohibitive. Chapter III, The Legality of Refugee Transfers, takes up this very issue. Frequently, a Law 
and Economics approach involves predicting legal challenges to an otherwise efficient economic solution. 
In this case, transferring refugees may be subject to an array of challenges from extant international legal 
instruments, but also, potential challenges grounded in dignity-based readings of the law. The difficulty 
arises in forecasting the angles by which a refugee’s dignity might be adjudged violated by European courts. 
This is primarily due to the multitude of ways dignity has been interpreted on national, supranational, and 
international levels. To bypass the opacity by which dignity has been applied juridically, Chapter III does 
not confine its analysis to refugee-related caselaw but looks at how courts have ruled on human dignity in 
three areas that frequently define the refugee’s journey from persecution to safe haven: spatial dislocation, 
maintaining identity, and individual versus societal clashes. Elucidating judicial responses in these three 
spheres may better predict future dignity-based challenges to refugee transfers. In turn, transaction costs for 
a refugee protection quota market can be more reliably maintained. 
 
The second strand of contribution takes aim at the integration literature. While several studies (infra 4.1) 
advance arguments pertaining to the impact of integration programs on labor market success, very few 
have been able to evaluate empirically how specific integration programs impact employment, and none 
have done this for the current wave of refugees and a mentoring intervention. Chapter IV, Mentoring as 
an Integration Strategy, fills this gap. A new dataset collected in 2017 from Arabic-speaking refugees in 
Greece, Italy, and Germany suggests that mentoring has positively impacted refugees searching for 
gainful employment by fostering increased flow of information, higher levels of social cohesion and 
generalized trust. 
Chapter V, Public Opinion & Integration, approaches integration from the perception of the refugee 
hosting population. The analysis measures the response of a European population (Germany) towards a 
specific integration mechanism (mentoring) and controls for characteristics shown to be salient to 
perception of successful integration (e.g., education); to the author’s knowledge, no study has measured a 
specific type of integration program in such a way. The results show the degree to which location-specific 
preferences interact with a mentoring integration program. If, for example, education, religion or ethnicity 
proves salient in making refugees more ‘desirable’ among certain demographics of the German 
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population, an integration program may have to account for these concerns in its program design. Both 
Chapters IV and V therefore make noticeable contributions to the literature on integration. 
Limitations and Challenges   
Despite having the luxury of a dissertation length format, several strands of thought are not included. The 
reasons for non-inclusion involve not so much length and scope, as focus. For example, why States entered 
into the 1951 Convention is a fascinating and related topic. Yet treaty ratification has little bearing on de 
facto levels of protection, the focus of the research question. To add the ratification story would be to digress 
from the central narrative. Neither is a detailed analysis of de facto treaty compliance a priority. While 
Chapters I and II detail the incentive structures to comply with treaty-based obligations, a full analysis 
would likely include in-depth case studies or empirics that include a range of international human rights 
treaties with very different dynamics than the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. Instead, the stream of 
analysis focuses on compliance with the Refugee Convention, whilst touching upon general compliance 
only briefly. 
 
Secondly, the question of State-level legal obligations to integrate refugees is not dealt with in this 
dissertation. Whilst it is a fascinating topic, it is well outside the scope and focus of this study. Thirdly, 
while Chapters IV and V evaluate the impact and potential impact of a mentoring integration mechanism, 
neither chapter accounts for ex ante preferences for protecting, neither at the individual nor country level. 
This may mean that Germans calculate treaty-grounded norms as more valuable than individual refugee 
characteristics. It also may not. The results of both analyses only speak to the status quo, not the pathways 
from which these realities are derived. Lack of ability to generalize across time arises from such studies. 
So, for instance, that Germany may have certain preferences at this time does not precisely speak to 
preferences a year from now. What it does do, however, is underlie the non-static nature of perceived costs 
and benefits of refugee protection and why non-static solutions are necessary. 
 
Fourthly, there have been several limitations imposed by funding. Chapter IV is not a randomized control 
study. Though measures were taken to randomize the sample pool (infra 4.3.1), refugees were not randomly 
selected then placed in a controlled environment. Whether the latter would change the results is highly 
doubtful in the author’s opinion for reasons discussed in Chapter IV, nevertheless, it is possible that self-
selection may have played a part. Also, Chapter V’s analysis was initially slated to evaluate 8 countries, 
not only Germany. However, although the author spent months translating and coding the conjoint survey 
into all 8 languages (Greek, Georgian, Hungarian, Norwegian, Dutch, German, Polish and Turkish), lack 
of funding disallowed obtaining the necessary Qualtrics responses to undertake such an operation. This 
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may limit the ability to generalize the German population’s preferences across the EU-28, as the above 
countries fell into three groups, each group with its own theoretical predictions. 
 
A final limitation involves the scope of title’s first two words: Institutional Solutions. The solutions 
provided here are certainly not the only options to address refugee protection. However, they provide 
policymakers with legally consistent and empirically tested alternatives to the status quo and beckon 
consideration. 
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Part I 
 
Chapter I The Economics of Refugee Protection 
 
Chapter I discusses the economics of refugee protection. Having accepted treaty-based commitments to 
protect individuals fleeing persecution, EU Member States have implicitly agreed to absorb both the 
benefits and costs of protection. Importantly, while the treaty-derived obligation to protect is static −it 
doesn’t change over time− State perceived costs and benefits derived from refugee protection are non-
static. This means that incentives to protect, including adhering to international treaties, must be 
calculated in light of fluctuating costs, typically economic and sociocultural in nature.  
The importance of grounding the discussion in the costs and benefits of protection cannot be 
underestimated: this thesis’ central research question is whether social and economic forces can be 
brought into equilibrium with the laws governing refugee protection. Without a clear understanding of 
what constitutes a cost and a benefit, and how they interact with incentives to protect, there is no way to 
ascertain whether the law can be reconciled with non-static social and economic forces. However, before 
explicating the costs of protection, the analysis begins with a review of International and European laws 
governing refugee protection and their ability to be effectively enforced. This will help shed light on how 
the costs of protection interface with norm-based obligations. It will also help paint an accurate landscape 
of the status quo: how State-level preferences to protect clash with legal forces.  
After clarifying both the de jure and de facto state of protection, the discussion shifts to an economic 
analysis and outlines State-level incentives to protect refugees, as well as their associated costs and 
benefits. If the costs of protection are greater than their benefits, to include treaty-based commitments, 
and if the law is unable to be enforced, then social and economic forces will supersede the law in the form 
of deterrent measures for refugees entering European Union territory, more stringent determination of 
refugee status proceedings, or even amendments to legal instruments. In such cases, an institutional 
solution to this disequilibrium may therefore be necessary. On the other hand, if benefits outweigh the 
costs or the law is effectively enforced, then the costs of protection may be lower than their corresponding 
marginal benefit. In such cases, the law may align itself with social and economic forces without an 
institutional solution.  
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1.1 Lex Lata  
 
Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, defines a refugee as an individual whose “well-founded fear of 
persecution” drive her outside her country without the ability to return in safety.20 The legal authority for 
refugee law is the 1951 Convention, along with the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the UNHCR Statute.21 The 1951 Refugee Convention defines protection without an ex ante numerical 
threshold. Asylum seekers are permitted to arrive at EU borders in any number and may not be penalized 
for doing so.22 They also must be protected from being refouled –sent back to a country where they might 
be tortured or subject to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment– for the duration of their risk. Non-
fundamental rights are granted at an incremental pace to refugees, conditional on levels of economic and 
social attachment.23 These are inescapable obligations enshrined in international instruments.24 
 
From an EU perspective, although the ECJ does not hold jurisdiction to interpret the 1951 Convention, 
respecting its content is derived from primary law (Article 78(1), TFEU) and may be interpreted through 
secondary law (i.e., Qualification Directive).25In addition, the EU has its own jurisprudence. Article 78 of 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for a common refugee policy,26 with 
uniform asylum status,27 subsidiary protection,28 and partnership with third countries to manage inflows of 
applicants.29  This umbrella framework, aptly titled the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)30 is 
                                                             
20 Refugee Convention, (n5). 
21 It is essential to note that the 1951 and 1967 refugee conventions bind States, while the UNHCR Statute does not. 
Nevertheless, Article 35(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention beckons cooperation with the UNHCR is matters of the 
Convention’s provisions. Statute of the Office of UNHCR, G.A. Res. 428 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 325th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/428 (1950) [hereinafter Statute of UNHCR]. It is essential to note that the 1951 and 1967 refugee conventions bind States, 
while the UNHCR Statute does not. Nevertheless, Article 35(1) of the 1951 Convention states that contracting States should 
cooperate with the UNHCR. Courts have taken this to mean that a limitation is placed upon how UNHCR documents can be 
interpreted as binding. The English Court of Appeal, for instance has found that the UNHCR is to be regarded as “a source of 
assistance and information” that “although without binding force in domestic or international law…is a useful recourse on 
doubtful questions” [T. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UK House of Lords, 22 May 1996, [1996] 2 All ER 865, 
[1996] 2 WLR 766]. 
22 Refugee Convention (n5) art 3.1 
23Hathaway, J. C. (2005). The rights of refugees under international law. Cambridge University Press. 
24 Among others: 1951 Refugee Convention, at art 33(1); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 7; Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) Art 14.  
25 Thym, D., & Hailbronner, K. (2016). Introduction: EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Constitutional Framework and 
Principles for Interpretation. published in: Kay Hailbronner and Daniel Thym (eds.): EU Immigration and Asylum Law. 
Commentary, 2nd edition (CH Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2016), p2. 
26 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326/18), at Article 
78(1). 
27 Ibid at Article 78(2)(a). 
28 Ibid at Article 78(2)(b). 
29 Ibid at Article 78(2)(g). 
30 As per the TFEU (n26) the CEAS, which has a multi-billion-euro budget through 2020. Also, European Union: Council of the 
European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999 [hereafter Tampere], at Article 14. 
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guided by “the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility”31which under Article 80 TFEU, 
permits for “appropriate measures” to realize these principles. A failsafe mechanism exists for “an 
emergency situation”32and was activated in September 2015 to relocate refugees from for Italy and Greece 
to other EU countries.  
 
In addition to primary law, several EU instruments aim at harmonizing levels of refugee protection.33 
These include the Asylum Procedures Directive, 34 the Reception Conditions Directive,35 the 
Qualification Directive,36 the Dublin Regulation,37 and the EURODAC Regulation.38 These 
Regulations have been implemented, and Directives transposed into domestic laws to varying 
extents.39 One noteworthy consequence of transposition is that the procedures regulating determining 
refugee status is not harmonized. Individual Member States determine which asylum seekers will be 
given refugee status, subsidiary status, and which will be asked to return to their home countries. This 
impacts where asylum seekers apply for refugee status. While Dublin clearly indicates that asylum 
seekers should apply in their first safe country of entry, in reality they may try and circumvent 
regulations and apply in a more favorable EU State irrespective of EU law. (Gil-Bazo, 2015).40 It is 
noteworthy that directives and regulations are interpreted within the same parameters as other 
secondary EU legislation; since the EU legal order is not bound by the principles by which public 
international law is interpreted, these directives and regulations must be interpreted through their 
wording, general scheme, international law, in addition to unwritten Union law principles.41 
 
                                                             
31 TFEU, (n26) Art. 80. 
32 Ibid at Article 78(3). Currently not applicable to Denmark. Requires opt-in right for application in the United Kingdom & 
Ireland. See European Commission. COM (205) 240 final at pages 3, 4. 
33 Also, several Ministerial Conclusions, for example: Council (of Ministers) of the European Union, Conclusions on a Common 
Framework for Genuine and Practical Solidarity Towards Member States Facing Particular Pressures on their Asylum Systems, 
Including Through Mixed Migration Flows, 8 March 2012. 
34 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (Asylum Procedures Directive) [2013] OJ L180/60. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted. 
37 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the |European Parliament and of the council of 26 June 2013 (hereafter “Dublin III”).  
38 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of 
'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU). 
39 The ECJ has implemented effet utile in order to ensure effective transposition (i.e., in the case of charging migrants fees that 
impede the realization of statutory rights. ECJ, Commission vs. Netherlands, C 508. 
10, EU:C:2012:243, §65 as footnoted in Hailbronner & Thym (n25) p9. The mandate for transposition is derived from Article 
288 TFEU (n26). 
40 Gil-Bazo, M. T. (2015). The Safe Third Country Concept in International Agreements on Refugee Protection Assessing State 
Practice. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 33(1), 42-77. 
41Hailbronner & Thym 2016, (n25) p6. 
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Despite these irregularities, a comprehensive EU refugee framework exists in consonance with 
international law, which aims at Community-wide harmonization, recognizes the importance of 
considering national preferences,42 and is in the process of being refined. It is noteworthy that many 
of these EU instruments have been widely criticized by scholars as being ineffective.43The Dublin 
Regulations figure prominently into principle this criticism. Southern European States have opposed 
accepting asylum seekers based on of the first country of origin to which they are disproportionately 
responsible. And yet, germane to our discussion, Dublin has been harshly criticized for its lack of 
fairness vis-à-vis EU primary law, not on the basis of transferring refugees. Challenges to Dublin 
thus represent challenges to the how of refugee transfers, not the legality of transfers themselves. 
 
The Pen and the Sword 
The above discussion laid out the legal obligations EU States have committed to by signing and ratifying 
treaties. Yet signing (de jure) and upholding (de facto) are two very different matters. A wide corpus of 
literature has investigated incentives for treaty compliance. While an exegesis of this literature would lead 
our analysis far astray, still, examining several points is critical for advancing our discussion on 
incentives for protecting refugees. This is especially the case since calculating a social welfare function 
requires inputting the benefits that EU Member States receive, some of which may be accrued as a direct 
result of fulfilling treaty-based obligations. So, why do States comply with human rights treaties in the 
face of mixed incentives? 
Orienting our discussion from the rational choice optic, States should neither sign nor uphold 
international treaties. Even if States ratify a human rights treaty, from a Realist point of view, they should 
not uphold their norm commitments. 44Treaty compliance often curbs the ability of States to act like a 
benevolent dictator and maximize their social welfare function. Then why sign in the first place? One 
reason is disingenuity: leaders may enter into treaties with little intention of complying. Nielson and 
Simmons (2015) articulate this window-dressing “as a low-cost opportunity to express support for a 
                                                             
42 67(2) TFEU; Thym, D. (2013). EU migration policy and its constitutional rationale: A cosmopolitan outlook. Common Market 
L. Rev., 50, at 723 
43Hatton, T. (2014). The Slump and Immigration Policy in Europe. In Crisis and Migration: Implications of the Eurozone crisis 
for Perceptions, Politics, and Policies of Migration. Nordic Academic Press.  
44 A wealth of research has analyzed whether de jure ratification positively affects de facto upholding human rights law realities. 
The evidence has been extremely mixed depending on the angle taken, dataset used, and modelling strategy(i.e., Hug and 
Wegmann (2016) find that results are often time dependent and significantly affected by type of compliance system, while 
Cingranelli & Filippov (2018) find that by including lesser human rights violations into the data analysis, the positive effect of 
human rights treaties dissipate. Hug, S., & Wegmann, S. (2016). Complying with human rights. International interactions, 42(4), 
590-615; Cingranelli, D., & Filippov, M. (2018). Are Human Rights Practices Improving?. American Political Science 
Review, 112(4), 1083-1089.  
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cooperative international endeavor.”45This makes sense given that the literature has shown that 
ratification has little to no positive impact on compliance (Neumeyer, 2005).46However, disingenuous 
motives behind ratification can backfire when their implementation and monitoring is delegated to 
domestic institutions (Moravscik, 2000).47 This has been shown to be the case with pressure from civil 
society (Hendrix & Won, 2013; McEntire et al., 2015),48 independent judiciaries (Keith et al., 2009) and 
veto power from opposition groups in the national legislature (Lupu, 2015).49 The latter may be because 
treaty ratification leads to the empowerment of the legislature and removes the executive’s discretionary 
power (Hathaway, 2007).50 When the executive sill retains hegemonic control, interaction between 
multiple parties (Freeland, 2008) or interaction between the judiciary and political parties (Conrad, 2014)   
may be necessary to force his commitment to human rights treaties.51 Interestingly, some of the most 
vociferous opposition within the EU to refugee absorption are leaders  whose party enjoys a strong 
command over their national legislatures (i.e., Viktor Orban in Hungary). Other streams of thought have 
looked to domestic politics to gauge the electoral effects of ratification. In a recent study analyzing 
international environmental agreements, Battaglini and Harsted (2018) find that incumbents negotiate 
weak treaties −defined by the authors as ineffective or with weak monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms− with strong reelection concerns.52Domestic political economy agendas may therefore lead 
to negotiating suboptimal agreements. 
                                                             
45 Nielsen, R. A., & Simmons, B. A. (2015). Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human 
Rights Regime?. International Studies Quarterly, 59(2), p200. 
46 Neumayer, E. (2005). Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?. Journal of conflict 
resolution, 49(6), 925-953. For a recent study showing a positive effect of treaties on de facto realities, see Fariss, C. J. (2018). 
The changing standard of accountability and the positive relationship between human rights treaty ratification and 
compliance. British Journal of Political Science, 48(1), 239-271. 
47 Moravcsik, A. (2000). The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe. International 
Organization, 54(2), 248. Nonetheless, this doesn’t negate all the incentives to violate treaty-based commitments. Leaders still 
may have incentives to break treaty-based obligations including weakening opposition parties. See Ritter, E. H. (2014). Policy 
disputes, political survival, and the onset and severity of state repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(1), 143-168. 
48 Here, again, the evidence is mixed. Hendrix & Won (2013) and McEntire et al. (2015) find a positive impact on compliance 
from civil society organizations making information transparent, pressuring, naming and shaming. On the other hand, Esarey & 
DeMeritt (2017) don’t find that NGO shaming and decrease foreign aid, while Peterson et al., (2018) find that NGO shaming 
only hurts regimes if the commercial relationship is with a non-human rights law violator. Hendrix, C. S., & Wong, W. H. 
(2013). When is the pen truly mighty? Regime type and the efficacy of naming and shaming in curbing human rights 
abuses. British Journal of Political Science, 43(3), 651-672; McEntire, K. J., Leiby, M., & Krain, M. (2015). Human rights 
organizations as agents of change: An experimental examination of framing and micromobilization. American Political Science 
Review, 109(3), 407-426; Esarey, J., & DeMeritt, J. H. (2017). Political context and the consequences of naming and shaming for 
human rights abuse. International interactions, 43(4), 589-618; Peterson, T. M., Murdie, A., & Asal, V. (2018). Human rights, 
NGO shaming and the exports of abusive states. British Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 767-786. 
49 Lupu, Y. (2015). Legislative veto players and the effects of international human rights agreements. American Journal of 
Political Science, 59(3), 578-594; Keith, L. C., Tate, C. N., & Poe, S. C. (2009). Is the law a mere parchment barrier to human 
rights abuse?. The Journal of Politics, 71(2), 644-660; But see, Conrad et al (2018) who explicate some of the downsides of 
strong domestic institutions on upholding international human rights treaties. Conrad, C. R., Hill Jr, D. W., & Moore, W. H. 
(2018). Torture and the limits of democratic institutions. Journal of Peace Research, 55(1), 3-17. 
50 Hathaway, O. A. (2007). Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(4), 594. 
51 Conrad, C. R. (2014). Divergent incentives for dictators: domestic institutions and (international promises not to) 
torture. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(1), 55. 
52 Battaglini, M., & Harstad, B. (2018). The Political Economy of Weak Treaties. (No. w22968). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
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Yet, ratifying the 1951 Convention is not an issue with refugee protection in the European Union. Rather, 
it is compliance. If EU States benefit from being in a community of norms when refugee inflows are low, 
why would they comply with the Convention during times of mass migration or when refugees were of an 
undesirable demographic? Addressing this very question, rewards theory seeks to answer whether States 
receive tangible or intangible benefits for treaty compliance. While a number of studies focus on credible 
commitments and legitimacy within the international community (Meyer et al., 1997; Simmons, 2000; 
Hill, 2010;)53 a number of studies hone their lenses onto more tangible external rewards such as foreign 
direct investment (Garriga, 2016) 54 or foreign aid (Smith-Cannoy, 2012).55This body of research has not 
found a consistent relationship between tangible rewards and treaty compliance. In fact, the above studies, 
often zeroing in on non-Democratic States, have found no significant effect.  
 
And when there is treaty-compliance in the aggregate, as Lupu (2015) and Poe (2004) remind us, 
violations in one domain may be strategically substituted.56 For example, while a State may comply with 
a treaty’s provisions on the surface, in our context, agreeing to protect individuals fleeing persecution, 
they may make positive determination standards so stringent as to deny the majority of claimants who fall 
under the Convention’s Article 1 definition of the refugee, thereby undermining the Convention’s 
purpose. In fact, Lupu’s argument, that “the effect of constraining institutions is not only a reduction in 
levels of repression, but also a change in the form of repression”57is critical towards unravelling this 
dissertation’s research question. Transposed onto refugee protection, this means that EU States may 
comply with the strictures of the 1951 Convention up until they feel adversely affected by the cost of 
protection. It is then that States will begin to deter, derogate, and amend so that their treaty-based 
commitments become cheap talk. 
  
Why then comply?   
 
                                                             
53 Meyer, J. W., Boli, J., Thomas, G. M., & Ramirez, F. O. (1997). World society and the nation-state. American Journal of 
sociology, 103(1), 144-181; Simmons, B. A. (2000). International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in 
international monetary affairs. American Political Science Review, 94(4), 819-835; Hill Jr, D. W. (2010). Estimating the effects 
of human rights treaties on state behavior. The Journal of Politics, 72(4), 1161-1174. 
54 Garriga, A. C. (2016). Human rights regimes, reputation, and foreign direct investment. International Studies Quarterly, 60(1), 
160-172. 
55 Smith-Cannoy, H. (2012). Insincere Commitments: Human Rights Treaties, Abusive States, and Citizen Activism. Georgetown 
University Press. 
56 Poe, S. C. (2004). The decision to repress. Understanding human rights violations: new systematic studies. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
16-42; Lupu 2015 (n49). 
57 Lupu 2015 (n49) p31. 
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1.2 Incentives to Protect 
 
In the presence of social and economic costs why do States comply with the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
agree to protect refugees? Or, put in economic terms, simply, what are the incentives to uphold treaty 
obligations to protect? From an economic perspective States have powerful disincentives to offer 
protection. Not only must they provide a minimum core dignified existence, −Germany, for example, spent 
10 billion euro for housing and food in 2015 with real costs as high as 21 billion euro− but they must 
confront issues pertaining to integration, national identity, labor competition and opportunity costs from 
expensive and often ineffective procedures.58 From a rationale choice optic, free-riding (infra 2.2.1) −taken 
to mean signing and ratifying refugee treaties, but allowing other States to do the actual hosting− should be 
the dominant strategy to an obligatory protection regime.59  And when free-riding is not possible amending 
the law is a rational strategy. Danish prime minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, for example, recently spoke 
of wanting to “change the rules of the game” by amending the 1951 Refugee Convention. Denmark and 
Switzerland, two of the wealthier nations in Europe, have both seized refugees’ assets to offset processing 
costs. From an economic perspective then, it is not at all obvious, why an EU Member State would comply 
with a legally binding refugee regime without an upper boundary.  
One reason is norms. Though amending the law or jockeying the General Assembly to curtail the UNHCR’s 
mandate might have short-term economic and social benefits, Member States comply with treaties because 
they derive utility from being part of an interconnected network of international human rights law. Simply 
put, there exists a State preference for upholding human rights undergirding their norm commitment 
(Sikkink, 2011).60 This holds true both for ratification and for complying with normatively meaningful 
treaty content. Studies have shown that norm commitments guide many States’ willingness to absorb 
refugees disproportionate to their respective GDP (Thielemann, 2003). Further supporting this point, a 
strong correlation exists between domestic redistribution, giving foreign aid, and offering protection.61To 
refuse to comply with the Geneva Convention would have far-reaching repercussions for individual 
Member States and the EU as a whole. It is not simply a matter of optimizing the law to fit economic 
strategies. Refugee protection is layered in several universal fundamental rights and grounded in human 
dignity. To deny shelter for those fleeing persecution or place an ex ante limit on the notion of protection 
                                                             
58 Fernández-Huertas Moraga, J., & Rapoport, H. (2015). Tradable refugee-admission quotas and EU asylum policy. CESifo 
Economic Studies, 61(3-4), 638-672. 
59 Sykes, A. O. (2013). International cooperation on migration: Theory and practice. The University of Chicago Law 
Review, 80(1), 315-340. 
60 Sikkink, K. (2011). The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (The Norton Series in 
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61 Thielemann, E. R. (2003). Between interests and norms: Explaining burden‐sharing in the European Union. Journal of refugee 
studies, 16(3), 264. 
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would begin to dismantle the post-World War II value system and Europe’s place at the vanguard of human 
rights law. 
Another reason is reputation. A wealth of research has studied the reputational effects of treaty 
compliance. Early studies by the likes of Joel Sobel (1985) connected reputation and reliability to 
cooperation through the lens of a principle double-agent model. A number of studies have followed up 
with game-theoretic predictions concerning the impact of reputation on defection and compliance. 
Guzman (2002), looking at repeated prisoner dilemma games, surmises reputational effects figure 
prominently into State compliance against rational actor predictions. Downs and Jones (2004) take a more 
nuanced view arguing for multiple reputations that fluctuate depending on their source and value. 
Keohane (2005) distinguishes between long and short-term incentives to comply with treaties, even when 
going against rational choice predictions. The author notes that it is not only fears of retaliation but 
maintaining reputations that lead to compliance. Later, Keohane and Victor (2016) note that reputational 
incentives and decentralized policy coordination might lead to higher levels of compliance. Other studies 
have approached the reputation-compliance nexus from a psychology point of view. Byram (2017) shows 
how reputational effects factor into solidifying a European identity which in turn leads to compliance. 
While Cialdini & Goldstein (2004) reveal how fostering a positive self-concept and maintaining social 
relationships may lead to compliance. Reputation here is an important byproduct of self-concept. 
 
Aside from the abovementioned reasons, several factors make offering protection attractive for EU States. 
One incentive is Inter-Union solidarity. In consonance with the TFEU, refugee matters are governed “by 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications” and are to 
be “achieved by means of the principle of solidarity.”62 Partaking in a Community-wide burden-sharing 
regime plays into a narrative in which freedom of movement and other reciprocal benefits are realized. 
Remaining in the current regime may also reduce transaction costs from asylum-shopping by having 
supranational oversight. EURODAC fingerprints databases, increasing the number of border agents and 
coordinated border patrols have all impeded unauthorized secondary movement.63   
In addition, there are also incentive-entailing benefits that may be unobservable. Protecting displaced 
persons positively impacts security, which is why some scholars have argued that refugee protection is a 
public good, non-excludible and non-rival.64 Security here includes transit-associated violence and 
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spreading conflict to neighboring countries.65 Insurance policies during times of external shock are likewise 
an incentive for States afraid of being asked to host beyond their reception and integration capacities. 
Insurance through annual absorption quotas (infra 2.2.3) regulate large inflows of asylum seekers during 
catastrophes and other external shocks. States are ensured an exact quota of refugees each year that they 
must absorb and do not have to worry about shocks to their asylum infrastructure. 
1.3 Enforcement Mechanisms 
If norm, electoral, or economic incentives fail to prevent an under provision of refugee protection, 
enforcement mechanisms should act as the buttress supporting the 1951 Convention. For the purpose of 
our discussion, enforcement will be looked at both at the international and EU levels.  
1.3.1 EU-Level Enforcement 
Who enforces Member States to uphold EU primary law’s protection mandate (Article 78 TFEU) and the 
several Regulations and Directives guiding its implementation? 66 This question is of particular 
importance since burden sharing proscriptions are typically implemented at the national level. For 
example, first instance decisions that determine whether to grant an applicant refugee, subsidiarity, or 
humanitarian status are assessed domestically. Essentially, this means that without effective supranational 
enforcement, States who don’t want to host refugees may fail to recognize persecuted asylum seekers as 
refugees, pushing them to more lenient EU States to apply for refugee status or live illegally. 
As Figure 5 shows, recognition rates vary considerably by State. Using three-Member States recognized 
for hosting (Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands), two often portrayed as not having a preference to host 
(Poland, Czech), and one in the middle (France), we can see that, except for Poland, all six countries have 
drastically reduced their recognition rates from 2016 to 2017. Still, the three ‘hosting countries’ averaged 
well above 60 percent recognition rates in 2016 and 40 percent in 2017, whereas Poland and the Czech 
Republic averaged 22% in both years. France, on the other hand, remained steady, dropping from 32 to 25 
percent. These numbers further validate the claim that the status quo is one of freeriding and that States 
                                                             
65 Thielemann (n61) p264; Nadig, A. (2002). Human smuggling, national security, and refugee protection. Journal of refugee 
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without a preference for hosting refugees apply more stringent refugee determination criteria. However, 
they don’t tell the full story.  
 
 
FIGURE 5: THIRD QUARTER RECOGNITION RATES OF REFUGEE STATUS, SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN 
(SOURCE: EUROSTAT). 
 
Figure 6 shows the real numbers of humanitarian migrants granted refugee and subsidiary protection. It 
reveals that, while Germany and Sweden absorbed 104,000 and 17,000 respectively, in 2016, Poland and 
the Czech Republic accepted a combined 170. This means that if Germany would have applied the same 
recognition rates as Poland in the third quarter of 2016, it would have granted positive status to 
approximately 31,000 (22%) asylum seekers instead of nearly 105,000 (73%). Conversely, if Poland 
would have applied Germany’s recognition rates for the third quarter of 2016, Poland would have 
determined positive status for 265 (73%), not 80 (22%) asylum seekers. Given these figures, it is hardly 
surprising that Berger and Heinemann (2016) find that 22 EU countries are freeriding off six countries.67 
Similar results have been reported by Enderlein & Koening (2016).68 Thus, despite refugee protection 
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being grounded in EU primary law, and legislated through several secondary law instruments, the lack of 
clarity at each phase of execution has meant that ex ante legislation has proven insufficient to achieve an 
equitable Union-wide allocation, prevent freeriding or ensure those genuinely fleeing persecution are 
granted refugee status.69  
 
 
FIGURE 6: REFUGEE AND SUBSIDIARY STATUS 3RD QUARTER 2016, 2017 (SOURCE: EUROSTAT) 
 
Significantly, what guidance is present in secondary legislation and extrapolated from primary law has 
suffered from weak enforcement structures.70What tools are available to States who refuse to comply with 
EU law? One tool is infringement proceedings. Under Article 258 TFEU, infringement proceedings can 
only be commenced if a Member State has breached EC law, for instance, for failing to properly 
transpose or implement directives at the national level. Ignoring initial infringement steps can lead to a 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) referral. If an Article 258 litigation brought by the EU against a 
noncompliant Member State results in continued noncompliance, fines might be levied or funds 
                                                             
69 In cases of increasing heterogeneity, the literature suggests that it is better to establish ex ante the allocation of goods in a 
constitutive document even if too much centralization in the constitutive document might lead several Members not to join the 
Union, thus impacting the efficiency gains from economies of scale. See also: Mittal, S. (2010). Constitutional stability in a 
changing world: Institutions, knowledge and adaptive efficiency. Working paper. Department of Political Science, Stanford 
University. 
70 Knowing that there might be ex post efforts at regulating protection, Member States have ensured that enforcement 
mechanisms are sufficiently weak so that any post Lisbon Treaty efforts to mandate a comprehensive system of allocation will 
not be viable. Grigonis, S. (2016). EU in the face of migrant crisis: Reasons for ineffective human rights protection. International 
Comparative Jurisprudence, 2(2), p. 97. For more on the downward shift in post-Lisbon accountability see: Brandsma, G. J., 
Heidbreder, E., & Mastenbroek, E. (2016). Accountability in the post-Lisbon European Union. International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, 82(4), 621-637. 
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000
Poland
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Sweden
Netherlands
Number of individuals given refugee or subsiary status
C
o
u
n
tr
y
Poland Czech Republic France Germany Sweden Netherlands
2017 100 35 8260 75355 6430 1585
2016 80 90 6845 104055 16770 4335
Refugee and Subsidary Status 3rd Quarter
2017 2016
33 
 
withheld.71Financial sanctions would fall under Article 260 and directed by the Court of Justice in the 
event of noncompliance.72 By and large, recalcitrant EU States have not treated these threats with much 
concern and have maintained obstinance as the status quo.73Despite some success in specific cases where 
an admixture of hard and soft power resulted in compliance, for instance, fishing protection regulations in 
France (Faulkner, 2016), as Kochenov and Pech (2015) note, “the Commission’s infringement powers 
have proved ineffective to remedy systemic violations of EU values.”74 
 
Enforcement might also be realized by Article 7 TFEU in which persistent violators of fundamental rights 
[as explicated under Article 2 TFEU] could be sanctioned. Sanctions under Article 7 include curtailing 
voting rights and suspending (but not expelling) membership rights within the EU.75 Although this so-
called “nuclear option” was contemplated for discrimination of Roma by France, and political corruption 
in Romania, it has only recently been triggered against Poland in December 2017 for infringement of the 
judiciary. Tellingly, Hungary has already signaled that they would prevent the unanimity needed under 
Article 7(2) to curtail Poland’s voting rights. Even triggering Article 7(1) dealing with fundamental 
freedoms has thus not had a strong positive effect on forcing compliance with EU law.76  
 
This lack of effective enforcement at the EU level is a critical point in the refugee protection narrative. It 
means that EU Member States who do not want to host in consonance with EU directives cannot be 
effectively punished at the supranational level to the extent that the cost of shirking EU mandates 
outweighs the costs of hosting refugees above State preferences. Resolutions typical of collection action 
problems will thus not necessarily lead to an efficient outcome, since, in the absence of enforcement, the 
gains from cooperation with the European Union (i.e., political capital, reputation) will not necessarily be 
equal to the subsequent State-level costs (e.g., electorate-related dissatisfaction).77 Neither will such gains 
                                                             
71 See Article 260 TFEU (n26). 
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accessed 08 August 2018 from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2388165. 
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account for electoral shifts shown in the Political Economy literature to impact cooperation with Federal 
or supranational structures.78 
Because the issue is not creating new legislation, but strengthening enforcement mechanisms, the 
European Commission would need to overhaul enforcement or conclude that shunning Member States 
over inadequate transposition of refugee-related directives is worth fragmenting the Union. Both are 
entirely unrealistic. Accordingly, as heterogeneity in State attitudes towards hosting increases, and 
incentives for ex post bargaining have already proved unable to achieve an optimal level of protection, a 
mechanism able to coordinate incentives between States may be necessary.  
1.3.2 International-Level Enforcement 
 
International-level enforcement takes place through human rights treaty bodies or Universal Period 
Reviews (UPR). Human rights treaty bodies monitor the implementation of the nine core human rights 
treaties, as well as the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT). Essentially, each 
treaty body acts as an oversight mechanism and are all supported by Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), especially in reporting and harmonizing working methods. Each treaty body, or 
committee, consists of independent experts and fulfills several important functions which are defined in 
their respective protocols.79 Committees interpret treaties, monitor State progress on implementing 
measures prescribed by the treaty body, provide guidance how to transpose international law at the 
domestic level, and help identify implementation gaps (Mechlem, 2009).80 As Mechlem (2009) notes, 
treaty bodies “play an important role in establishing the normative content of human rights and in giving 
concrete meaning to individual rights and state obligations.”81  
However, these committees do not possess classic enforcement instruments; treaty body reports are 
nonbinding and participation in treaty bodies is optional. Treaty mechanisms assume that countries that 
have opted-in have sufficient commitment to implement recommendations. In the case of recalcitrant 
States, treaty bodies follow up with quiet diplomacy, such as soft pressure through influencing public 
opinion. Strong reports may also convincingly reference binding law thereby providing a legalistic 
pathway towards enforcement.  
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Some treaty bodies have individual, as opposed to only inter-State, complaints procedures. Although 
there have been no individual cases filed regarding asylum claims, there have been two recent instances 
where treaty bodies have discussed asylum seekers. In 2017, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) expressed “alarm” at Australia transferring asylum seekers in conditions that 
allowed for the impunity of human rights violations.82Similarly, the Committee Against Torture (CAT) 
expressed “concern[ed]” at Australia transferring asylum seekers to a detention facility in Manus Island, 
Papua New Guinea. The Committee’s concern focused on harsh conditions, uncertainty, and closed 
detention which “creates physical and mental pain and suffering.”83Australia did not change their Manus 
Island policy as a direct response to these concerns and alarms. 
UPR’s, which are periodic reviews of a State’s human rights record, also lack a binding enforcement 
mechanism and constitute a soft power approach to regulation. Each participating country has a UPR 
every 4 to 5 years, which compliment treaty bodies and other human rights mechanisms through country 
reviews.84 In November 2015, Australia received two recommendations under its UPR concerning its 
Manus Island detention facility. Germany asked that Australia “review” its offshore asylum processing 
policies and concomitant legislation to ensure it did not breach non-refoulement obligations. Maldives 
recommended that Australia immediately close its Manus Island and Nauru detention facilities. Australia 
“noted” both recommendations –that is, did not formally accept them.85 As such, no viable international 
enforcement mechanisms guiding the protection of refugees exists at the UN level. This means that EU 
States cannot be effectively punished for shirking their legal obligations to protect individuals fleeing 
persecution. Sufficient incentives must then be emplaced to ensure an optimal level of provision both at 
the State and supranational level.  
1.4 Costs 
Incentives and disincentives to protect, however, must be considered in light of protection costs. Before 
proceeding onwards, it is important to ground our argument in the theoretical constructs driving costs of 
protection. We must determine what variables constitute costs of protection, for whom these costs are 
assessed, and how costs and benefits lead States to welcome or limit refugees.   
1.4.1 Costs and Optimal Allocation in Economic Theory 
 
Economic theory tells us that individuals will try and maximize their utility. When States try to maximize 
the aggregate of individual utilities by providing an optimal provision of resources, they are maximizing 
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social welfare (Cooter & Ulen, 2016). Before optimization takes place, the value of the resources, the goods 
or provisions in question, must be evaluated. Resources may include scare goods such as water, or more 
abstract ones, for example, social cohesion. In the latter context, the primary intragroup resource are the 
members themselves whose interaction generates social utility and is impacted by social compatibility.86   
From the Public Choice literature, we can separate the optimal allocation of protection from both the State 
and supranational perspective. This is germane to the context of refugee protection since the values EU 
States or even the EU itself assign to the costs and benefits of refugee protection often display considerable 
variance. One reason for this difference is that individual preferences towards allocating a resource is 
usually best known within that State. Despite the potential for spillovers onto neighboring States, the 
majority of economic, social, and cultural costs of refugee protection are borne by at the country, not 
supranational level. This answers one of the questions posed at the introduction of Chapter 1.4: the ‘who’ 
to whom costs are assessed are refugee-hosting States who often worry about allocating scarce resources. 
Unless economies of scale can be realized, social welfare maximization at the State-level is often more 
likely to take into account local preferences and result in an optimal provision. Moreover, a supranational 
entity will frequently look to maximize its social welfare function in a Pareto efficient manner, that is, 
where Member-States are better off without any individual State being made worse off. On the other hand, 
individual States may aggregate their social welfare function in a different way, for example, through a 
State-specific Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, focusing on net gains to that society.  
This dissertation focuses on efficient allocation of protection through maximizing EU Member State social 
welfare functions. This is not to say that supranational or third-party countries do not figure into the 
equation. Indeed, the proposal of an EU-OIC market presupposes 57 non-EU Member States and two 
supranational entities. Still, efficiency of allocation in this dissertation is measured solely among EU States, 
since States determine whether an asylum seeker qualifies for refugee status, individuals within States are 
the entities whose utility functions are primarily affected by hosting, and States, not the Union itself, have 
deterred refugees due to perceived economic, social, and cultural costs. 
How then to maximize social welfare and optimize allocation of protection? As Holcombe (2012) notes, 
in many economic models, planning the optimal allocation of a resource requires replicating the 
conditions of a benevolent dictator who has full control and authority over allocation. This dictator 
changes the non-optimal status quo to become an optimal allocation.87 However, the unobservable nature 
of external costs means that an optimal solution is non-attainable, especially if external costs are non-
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static and change frequently. The inability of general equilibrium models to fully account for costs 
ultimately means failure despite there being “something aesthetically pleasing about demonstrating an 
optimal policy with mathematical precision regardless of how loosely the math is connected to 
reality.”88Suggestions such as internalizing externalities through a corrective tax to efficiently allocate 
protection in a Pareto manner also requires quantifying the cost of protection 
Avoiding general equilibrium models, the first step towards maximizing social welfare for EU States is to 
clarify the nature of their costs and benefits. When the value a State places on the social good of 
protecting refugees falls below these perceived costs, there is often national-level consensus that 
“Migration should be encouraged but not at the expense of the well-being of the population of the 
destination country.”89Critically, these costs need not reflect reality. Whether refugees are at times costly 
economically, or socially matters only insofar as influences a State’s policies on refugee protection. 
Because each voter has a utility function which may be influenced by refugee protection, and voters 
impact electoral outcomes, if voters feel that the current level of allocating protection adversely affects 
their individual utility and the county’s overall social welfare function, they may impact the absorption of 
refugees. Chapter 5.2.1 details perceptions of threat underlying that many EU host populations feel 
towards refugees and the consequent effect on policies. This strand of analysis, largely derived from 
Realistic Conflict Theory, predicts outgroup hostility and intergroup conflict when threatened by the 
outgroup.90 Threat impacts individual utility, and may also shape policies towards refugees by informing 
electoral behavior. 
 
Contemporary research supports the impact of the 2014-2017 wave of refugees on anti-immigrant 
electoral behavior. Many of these studies employ IV-type strategies to clarify the nexus of voting 
behavior.91 For example, in a recent study, Barone et al. (2016)  finds that migration flows lead to greater 
electoral gains for anti-refugee parties in Italy.92 Similarly, threat of refuges has be linked to the 
fortification of anti-refugee right wing parties in Denmark (Halla et al., 2017), Greece (Dinas et al., 2018), 
Germany (Otto & Steinhardt, 2017) and Turkey (Altindag & Kaushal, 2017), while the percentage of 
cultural heterogenous immigrants is a significant determinant in increase of right wing votes for the Swiss 
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People’s Party in Brunner & Kuhn‘s (2018) study.93 In fact, Dustmann (2018) shows that anti-immigrant 
sentiment changes voter behavior leading to  positive effects for both right-wing, as well as center-right 
parties. In addition, the authors find a causal link between increased refugee allocation and increased 
voter turnout at the municipal level.  
 
It is notable that while not all studies have found a causal link between refugee absorption and anti-
refugee electoral swings, those that have not, have often confined their unit analysis to localized situations 
in which intergroup contact may reasonably have affected adverse outgroup hostility (i.e., Steinmayr, 
2016).94 What then are these perceived costs that several European populations have felt threaten their 
utility? Typically, costs have fallen within two domains: economic and socio-cultural. 
 
1.4.2 Macroeconomic costs 
Each EU State will experience different macroeconomic costs to refugee protection. Costs depend a 
State’s respective economy, as well as its integration infrastructure. Although a full-scale economic 
analysis is well outside the scope of this chapter, a predictive glimpse might come from Germany, who as 
of January 2018 had absorbed over 1.4 million refugees in a population of just over 80 million.95 Stähler 
(2017) modeling simulations of economic impacts from migration to Germany, finds only a small 
possible macroeconomic impact from refugee migration; still, Stähler concludes that failure to integrate 
migrants into the German labor market could result in a .43% reduction in per capita income.96In fact, 
most studies calculating the macroeconomic impact to individual European States have found a net 
positive outcome over time (infra 5.2). Nonetheless, studies that have predicted a positive macroeconomic 
impact are often contingent on an upfront initial investment for language and educational upskilling (Bach 
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2017; Spahl, 2017).97However, the ability for refugees to upskill remains only a single, albeit an 
important dimension to economic integration in Germany. Integration depends not only on refugee 
characteristics but environmental factors, most prominently, the absorptive capacity of the particular labor 
market (Berger and Strohner, 2017). Perception of economic threat may therefore be linked to economic 
vulnerability in a specific demographic (Dustmann et al., 2016).98  
The economic cost of hosting refugees thus depends on both the refugee’s ability to integrate and the 
State’s environmental factors at any given time. When a State feels that its labor market is glutted or that 
the level of upskilling vis-à-vis refugee characteristics does not lend well towards effective integration, 
then the economic costs of hosting may exceed their benefits to include commitments to international law. 
However, as evidenced from the above studies, short-term economic costs and long-term gains are the 
norm. It is then social and cultural costs that haven driven many EU States to deter or refuse refugee 
protection. 
 
 
 
1.4.3 Social and Cultural Costs 
 
Integrated Threat Theory tells us that it is not only competition for scarce resources (i.e. Realistic Conflict 
Theory) that foments perceptions of threat, but symbolic threats such as national identity and status quo 
social norms (Stephan & Stephan, 1996).99In the context of State-level social welfare maximization, 
perceived social and cultural costs may affect electoral behavior in favor of anti-refugee parties, as well as 
sway mainstream candidates towards an anti-refugee discourse. These fears can be divided into short and 
long-term costs. Short-term costs are frequently associated with accounts linking refugees to violent crime 
(MacDonald, 2017).100This is often heightened by the language of media (Bieliscki, 2018; DeBone, 2018) 
depicting refugees as criminals.101 Often, the effect of such portrayal, as Hynie (2018) notes, is 
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dehumanization of the outgroup, which may reduce the magnitude of moral obligations and prosocial 
behavior, while increasing anti-social behavior.102 Fears of violence may also be exacerbated by social 
distance. In consonance with predictions from Group Threat Theory, being forced to absorb refugees in 
greater numbers than a community desires can lead to hostility (Pratto et al., 2006).103While the effect 
may be mitigated over time by positive intergroup contact, in the immediacy it often constitutes a 
threat.104 
Long-term costs, on the other hand, usually fall under the category of symbolic threats to one’s national, 
ethnic, or religious identity (Suhnan et al., 2012; Row & O’Brien, 2014; Wirtz & Doosje, 2016).105   
Many citizens are worried about having the societal status quo upended. (Eidelman & Crandall, 
2012).106Perceptions of long-term threats may be fostered through several avenues. One avenue is the law. 
Politicians may foment the presence of threats by ushering in laws that upend status quo social contacts 
between religion and the State. Policy shifts or institutional deviations from longstanding social policies 
are sometimes seen as harbingers of negative social cohesion. In a study of 26 Swiss municipalities, 
Helbling and Traunmüller (2016) find that government policies to amend existing laws as to 
accommodate immigrants has fomented threat among the local populations.107 In many Eu countries, 
these have included watershed issues, such as opposition to hijab, the Muslim headscarf (Van der Noll, 
2010; Helbling, 2014).108 
A second avenue is emotions.  Emotional barriers may foster negative sentiment towards social policies 
resulting in long-term costs that politicians must address through legislation or rhetoric (Halperin, 2011; 
Wirtz & Doosje, 201)).109 Cottrell et al. (2010) test this link between attitudes toward a specific social 
policy and specific emotions. Honing their empirical lens of social policies towards four distinct groups 
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−Arab Muslims, Black Americans, Mexican Americans, and homosexuals− the authors conclude that 
specific emotions towards the perceived threat of each group, not generalized prejudice, predicted the 
respondents’ attitudes.110These threats may also be compounded by a third avenue: media. Several studies 
have found a significant impact on threat formation from the media’s portrayal of immigrants (Watson & 
Riffe, 2013; Okomato & Ebert, 2016).111  
While all three avenues may impact voting behavior and policy level decision-making, the channel 
through which long-term social and cultural threats are disseminated and metastasize within populations 
is only important to our analysis insofar as it affects refugee protection. If individual and group-level 
threats impact policy-level immigration decisions either through bolstering or shifting a politician’s 
willingness to accept asylum seekers, then they will increase the marginal cost of hosting refugees. The 
question then becomes: when the marginal costs of protection outweigh the marginal benefits, is there a 
way to efficiently allocate protection by minimizing the cost of protection? One way, this thesis suggests, 
is through protecting without hosting. 
 
 
1.4.4 The Cost of Hosting Versus the Cost of Protecting 
 
Hosting refers to States protecting refuges on their own territory; protection is used here to denote that a 
refugee is protected from persecution in consonance with Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, whether on 
one’s own territory or elsewhere. Refugees may be protected without being physically hosted. For 
instance, a State may support refugees financially in another country. Money-sharing schemes (infra 2.1) 
have been present in the refugee regime for years. Typically, they take the form of payments or financial 
incentives that ensure refugees are protected in a third-party State. When speaking about a market 
mechanism, however, the relationship is one-to-one: refugees are protected by State A through payments 
but hosted in State B.  
Other categories of asylum seekers are often considered whilst discussing allocation of protection. 
Asylum seekers unable to obtain refugee status may be granted subsidiary status under the EU 
Qualification Directive Recast, if their return might result in serious harm.112 Subsidiary status is clearly 
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delineated in the CFEU.113 In addition, States typically protect asylum seekers before their application has 
been decided. All three categories: refugee status, subsidiarity status, and awaiting determination status 
may be hosted in a third-party State through financial agreements. For the purpose of this analysis, 
refugees are most salient, since they can be expected to stay long-term and obtain full political and social 
rights.114  
Protecting refugees without hosting them has several important benefits for States who do not want to 
host in excess of their preferences. It enables an efficient allocation of protection without the marginal 
costs of hosting an additional refugee outweighing its marginal benefits. Translated into economic 
terminology this means a State-level social welfare function in which the marginal benefits of protection 
are greater to society than the corresponding marginal costs. Benefits here consist of both those with 
public good characteristics (e.g., utility citizens derive from humanitarian norms and collective security), 
as well as those with private good characteristics such as societal benefits to the labour market, pension 
system, and other internal state-specific structures. Costs, on the other hand, are typically private such as 
unemployment and adverse public opinion surrounding national identity, social cohesion, crime, and the 
labour market (infra 1.42, 1.43). 
Such a distinction between private and public benefits runs contrary to the literature modelling refugee 
protection as a pure public good whose non-rival and non-excludable nature stem from its security and 
poverty alleviation characteristics (i.e., Shurke, 1998). Such is why, to understand how refugee protection 
can reach an efficient allocation on a market for tradable refugee protection quotas (infra 2.1), it is 
necessary to clarify whether refugee protection is in fact a pure global public good and can be shared at 
no additional marginal cost, or whether it has private components that make it rival and excludable.115The 
distinction is crucial in validating the choice of a market for protection where refugee quotas are traded 
between States.116 If refugee protection quotas have private benefits, then excludability may result in 
internalizing benefits from joint output, directly connecting refugee protection to the proportion of private 
(excludable) benefits. In turn, this will bridge the disjuncture large States face between benefit and cost, 
making free-riding and in general, sub-optimality, less of a factor.117 
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Basing his analysis on the work of Economist Todd Sandler, Bettis (2003) tests whether refugee protection 
is a pure public good or is best served through a joint-product model, where a single good has components 
that vary in their excludability and rivalry. Ultimately, Bettis substantiates several private components of 
refugee protection that dispute its role as a pure public good.118 Roper & Barria (2010) further question the 
public good premise, instead finding that private benefits suggest, at best, an impure public good.119Both 
conclusions are in line with the private costs detailed above (infra 1.4). This means that on a market for 
protection, States who want to fulfill their legal obligations to protect without absorbing costs related to 
hosting can do so by trading part of their annual protection quota. In this scenario, State A would pay State 
B to protect a refugee allocated to State A. Chapter II details different ways that refugee protection transfers 
transpire.  
Here we must make a distinction between protection and hosting not clearly demarcated in the literature. 
The public good component of refugee protection is not necessarily derived from hosting but protecting 
humanitarian migrants from persecution.120 While protection has both private (e.g., altruism,121 prestige, 
labor market) and public good subcomponents (e.g., upholding norm commitments, global poverty 
concerns)122 hosting, by contrast, is predominately a private good. Positive externalities are then 
generated when States offer protection to refugees, but not necessarily when hosting them. Society and 
politicians gain utility from hosting only when their State-specific marginal benefits, which include both 
private and public good components, outweigh the marginal costs.    
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This means that as the marginal private costs of hosting increase, the marginal public good benefits of 
humanitarian norms must increase to provide an optimal level of protection.123  Prima facie, this is 
extremely unlikely. There is no evidence of States projecting an increase in the marginal benefits of 
humanitarian norms, if the recipients of those norms are perceived to have an increasing cost on society. 
Moreover, there is uncertainty surrounding whether humanitarian norms are static, and if not, how they 
are formed (Holzgrefe & Keohane, 2003).124 This uncertainty resonates within refugee protection. The 
theoretical literature, for instance, typically models refugee protection as a global public good with the 
cost of shading normative commitments figuring prominently into any equilibria of socially optimal 
protection.125If humanitarian norms decrease during times of external shock then the private benefits will 
have to increase commensurably for protection levels to be maintained at their optimal. However, if the 
marginal costs of hosting become greater than their benefits, including utility derived from upholding 
international legal norms, EU States can still contribute to the protection regime without having an 
increase in utility gained from humanitarian norms, if they can protect without hosting. For this to 
happen, however, there must be sufficient coordination, revealed preferences, and low transaction costs.  
1.5 Federalism of Refugee Protection 
 
The question then turns to organization. If protection levels can be optimized through States paying to 
protect without hosting, who is to coordinate such a process? Will a command and control system where 
States negotiate amongst themselves without third-party regulation be sufficient? Or is it necessary to 
have a systematic clearinghouse at the intergovernmental level?  
Centralization of protection is the key, this monograph argues, to efficiently reconciling the law with 
social and economic forces. Efficient here is taken to mean that European Union Member States will not 
host greater than their preferences dictate, while simultaneously, ensuring that all asylum seekers who 
reach Europe and are determined to be genuine refugees are protected.  
To simplify an extensive body of literature, centralization involves the allocation of property rights by a 
single agent who imposes them vertically, whereas in a decentralized system, multiple rights holders may 
contract and bargain. With perfect information both scenarios should lead to an efficient outcome. In the 
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presence of informational asymmetries, most often the case, the Coase Theorem tells us that agents in a 
decentralized system will try and internalize externalities through bargaining, so long as rights are 
enforced and transaction costs sufficiently low.126 As Oates (1972) famously postulated, decentralization 
is preferred when regional preferences show wide variance with little spillover. 127 In areas where core 
preferences exhibit large degrees of homogeneity, transaction costs may be reduced and efficiency gains 
increased. 128Jurisdiction also plays a role. Oates’ correspondence principle holds that individuals should 
have control over the good whose benefit they are internalizing. Control implies knowledge of location-
specific needs, typically more so in a vertically higher level of government. Accordingly, decentralization 
may also reduce inefficient bureaucracy (Eichenberger, 1994) and learn from other jurisdictions (Halpin 
& Monnin, 2016).129The concern with decentralization is that spillovers will lead to an under provision of 
goods. In addition, the inability to bundle resources or distribute and monitor best practices may lead to 
ineffective outcomes. In one such example, the decentralized organization of welfare administration 
within parts of Germany was found to have a negative effect on employment integration for men 
(Boockmann et al., 2015).130  
Centralization, on the other hand may better coordinate inter-jurisdictional externalities (Faccini et al., 
2006)131, increase accountability (Besley & Smart, 2007) foster electoral rules that stifle corruption 
(Ferraz & Finan, 2001) and reduce transaction costs associated with contracting.132 Despite these benefits, 
centralization may have difficulty dealing with asymmetric distributions of a public good (i.e., lack policy 
uniformity, differentiated provision of a good), and is frequently insensitive to local preferences (Besley 
& Coate, 2003). In addition, there is a wide body of literature from the Political Economy angle that 
considers strategic voting and the behavior of politicians.133  
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1.5.1 Transboundary Externalities (freeriding) 
There are four compelling Fiscal Federalism arguments for centralization of refugee protection delineated 
by Berger & Heinemann (2016): free-riding, economies of scale, insurance, and maintenance of the 
Single Market.134 Free-riding here is taken to mean an EU member state refusing to protect refugees but 
benefiting from other members states protecting refugees. For example, Poland and Hungary both derive 
benefits related to security and norm fulfillment (e.g., global poverty concerns) from refugees being 
hosted in neighboring States, such as Germany and the Netherlands, without having to worry about the 
financial or domestic political cost of protecting refugees at home. Freeriding is typically realized through 
either an outright refusal to protect, low asylum recognition rates, deterring migration or increasingly 
restrictive policies towards immigrants (Hatton, 2016; Monheim-Helstroffer & Obidzinski, 2010 ).135 
Moreover, because costs related to reception, processing, and integration are frontloaded, Member States 
with restrictive policies can benefit from labor mobility at a later date without the initial expenditure. 
Freeriding has been possible within the EU due to Brussel’s inability to enforce burden sharing (infra 
1.3). 
1.5.2 Economies of Scale 
If failure to internalize the cost of restrictive refugee-related policies incentivizes freeriding, the other side 
of the coin is that the harmonization of cost-related policies may lead to economies of scale. Economies 
of scale mean that increasing output will reduce the average cost of a public task. In the context of 
centralization, an economy of scale is created when a vertically higher level of government can provide a 
task at a lower cost than its constituents individually. A central government may do this through less 
costly production and distribution, or internalizing spillovers from cross-border effects; though these 
spillovers, or cross-border externalities, may be positive or negative, both result in an inefficient level of 
provision. In the asylum context, Schengen mobility means that refugee protection and integration efforts 
are not delimited to a single State’s borders. This suggests, to quote a recent Center for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR) paper, that refugees are “best perceived as an aggregate shock [to Europe] with 
uncertain differential impacts on different regions.”136 This opens the door for an EU level policy that 
creates an economy of scale. 
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Centralizing processing, for example, has been estimated to save between 5 and 30% in comparison with 
national provisions (Berger & Heinemann, 2016). Because the cost of processing is highest among EU 
Member States with lower GDPs, centralization could lower those costs by assigning case workers 
towards homogenous groups (Hatton, 2015; Thielemann et al., 2010). 137Evidence of this can be gleaned 
from assistance (Special Support Plans) offered to Bulgaria, Italy, Cyprus, and Greece by the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO), particularly in the domains of training, processing, and guardianship 
plans, reducing their respective costs. In a centralized system guided by harmonization of status 
determination, processing costs, such as housing and clothing can be provided for at lower marginal 
cost.138 The same principle might be applied to legal costs.139  
 
In addition to the costs of protection, integration may likewise create economies of scale. A State-driven 
integration program can upskill workers who may find employment in a neighboring State (European 
Parliament, 2015),140as well as promote adaptation to EU Charter values− a benefit to all Member States. 
Just as the initial costs of housing and processing might be written off after a refugee moves cross-border, 
an EU funded and monitored integration program can help assure outcomes that are align both local and 
supranational goals. The proposed mentoring program (Chapter IV) funded at the EU level but tailored at 
the State and regional level is one such example. Supporting this underlying logic is a recent CEPR 
research paper that merits quoting at length: 
Given the size of the shock and the cross-border spillovers of a country’s stance on this issue, an 
uncoordinated approach at the national level would likely be less effective (in terms of its political and 
humanitarian goals) and less efficient (in terms of its economic costs) than a coordinated approach….the 
refugee crisis presents a common persistent shock that has to be dealt with via common long-run policies 
that internalise the costs and benefits across the EU. The crisis is a prime candidate for a policy that 
should be European rather than national in order to share the burden in a solidary way. At the same time, 
because securing a border or integrating a refugee requires local knowledge and a flexible approach that 
is adaptable to the place and the people involved, it is not necessarily best done by a single European entity 
rather than the national authorities. Reconciling these two characteristics requires that the financing of 
such a policy at least is common, even if the implementation may be a mix of European and national 
policies.141 
 
                                                             
137 Hatton, T. J. (2015). Asylum Policy in the EU: the case for deeper integration. CESifo Economic Studies, 61(3-4), 605-637; 
Thielemann E. et al., (2010): “What system of burden-sharing between Member States for the reception of asylum seekers? PE 
419.620. 22.01.10. European Parliament. 
138 Article 78(2) TFEU provides the legal foothold for uniform asylum procedures.  See also, European Commission (2016), 
Communication: Towards a sustainable and fair Common European Asylum System, Brussels. Processing costs and housing 
assistance already provided for under the already provided for by the 2011 Qualification Drive. 
139 Lack of adequate reception and housing conditions have had high costs on States. [i.e., Lille Administrative Tribunal, 2 
November 2015, No. 1508747]. This could be mitigated by harmonized standards at the EU level. 
140 European Parliament (2015). ‘Economic challenges and prospects of the refugee influx’. Last accessed 02 March 2019 from < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572809/EPRS_BRI(2015)572809_EN.pdf>. 
141 Corsetti et al., 2016, (n136), p 39. 
48 
 
1.5.3 Insurance 
The majority of refugees are protected outside the borders of Europe.142A July 2016 Oxfam study found 
that the six wealthiest economies host less than 9% of the world’s refugee population. European countries 
breaking with international refugee law norms would likely trigger many Global South countries to do the 
same thereby destabilizing the norm-based incentive structure for protection, and increasing migration 
flows northward.143Upheaving the protection regime is therefore not in the interests of economic efficiency 
for the EU, or in general, developed States, who often “see value in showing their commitment to refugee 
law but would prefer –to the greatest extent possible– to avoid being subject to its practical strictures.”144 
Retaining the status quo is of particular importance in light of the lack of a binding obligation for the EU 
to share in the cost of protecting the nearly 15 million refugees outside of its borders.145  
However, Global South actors, many already overcapacity, could push refugees northbound. Moreover, in 
times of crisis, many States have and could continue to allow asylum seekers to reach Europe without 
evaluating their status in Asia or Africa. In this sense, offering protection on a clearinghouse with a 
maximum annual quota is akin to timely catastrophic insurance payments: uncertainty of exogenous shocks 
(e.g., civil war) leads to a situation in which low risk participants would rather suffer regular predictable 
payments than test the unknown.146 Payments in this narrative are regulated annual quotas of refugees. If 
exogenous events such as civil war or economic depression occur, EU States will not have to absorb more 
than their quota prescribed. While insurance in and of itself does not provide an explicit argument in favor 
of centralization, it does support the transboundary externality argument positioned above (infra 1.5.1). 
With insurance, there is less of an incentive to freeride off protection, as the cost of protection is regulated 
ex ante.  
1.5.4 The Single Market  
Refugee protection has become a contentious issue within the EU, resulting in several impediments to 
free movement and border checks. Austria and Hungary already have erected fences, and Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, France, and Sweden reintroduced periodic border checks in 2016-2018.147 
Reintroducing border controls or pushing popular opinion towards breaking with the Union ala Brexit 
                                                             
142 Of the world’s estimated 15 million refugees, Europe hosts nearly 3.5 million. UNHCR (Mid-Year Trends 2015 2015) 
http://www.unhcr.org/56701b969.html Accessed January 10, 2017  
143 There are countries not party to international refugee instruments that continue to host large amounts of refugees. Pakistan, for 
example, a non-party to the 1951 Convention, hosts the second largest refugee population. See UNHCR, Mid-Term Trends 2015, 
Ibid 
144 James Hathaway & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence’ (2014) U of 
Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper, (14-016), 5 
145 Türk Volker, ‘Address to the 60th Meeting of the UNHCR Standing Committee’ U.N. Doc. EC/65/SC/CRP.101  
146 Peter Schuck, ‘Refugee burden-sharing: A modest proposal’ (1997) Yale J. Int'l L., 22, 243. 
147 Allowed for during times of Emergency under the Schengen Borders Code Articles 25,26,28,29. EU Regulation 2016/399 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
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could be catastrophic for the Single Market. As Berger & Heinemann (2016) note “if having national 
responsibility for asylum issues creates significant obstacles to the proper functioning of the Single 
Market, there is a strong case for introducing centralization.”148 
1.5.5 Summary: centralization versus decentralization  
Lowering the State-perceived cost for protecting refugees may at times require paying for refugees to live 
in a third-party country: in effect, protecting without hosting. There are several ways this can happen. States 
can simply trade amongst themselves bilaterally. At the point when one State no longer wants to host and 
the other still has capacity a transaction is made. Yet several potential problems arise in a decentralized 
command and control system. Firstly, despite the direction of alliance theory, a decentralized market will 
not generate the necessary coordination nor incentivize a transparent display of preferences.149 Insular 
States that do not receive many refugees will still be incentivized to freeride off those States popular with 
refugees. Those insular States then benefit from the positive externalities of refugees being protected 
without participating in the protection regime within their capacity and norm requirements.150 Increased 
burden will then be placed on States deemed ‘desirable’ by asylum seekers, thereby affecting their 
commitments to host and potentially triggering a race to the bottom. Moreover, in a decentralized system 
matching refugee with State preferences will be inefficient, both inter-State and at the EU level. 
However, centralized distribution of protection, with its ability to disperse information uniformly, limit 
freeriding, and bypass the need for implementing weak enforcement mechanisms, will prove more effective 
than contracting and bargaining in a decentralized system where private information is dispersed by States 
strategically and lack of adequate incentive structures encourage freeriding.151While there is always a 
danger that a centralized market may become glutted during times of external shock, or, if transfers are a 
component of a market, that third-party countries will hold out (if the protection quota price is not uniform, 
see infra 2.7), these costs, the author argues are far less significant than ignoring the private components of 
protection and how they interface with States’ norm commitments, both in terms of costs and benefits. 
1.6 Moving Forward 
Centralization of refugee protection on a supranational clearinghouse helps mitigate weak enforcement 
mechanisms by reconciling interjurisdictional externalities, so that protection may reach equilibrium. In a 
                                                             
148 Berger & Heinemann. (n134) p9. 
149 Sandler, T., & Hartley, K. (2001). Economics of alliances: The lessons for collective action. Journal of economic 
literature, 39(3), 869-896. 
150 While several Member States do not share the same echelon of norm commitments as founding EU Members, others Member 
States whose norm commitments remain on par have been deterred from hosting by the lack of burden-sharing within the Union. 
151 It is notable that earlier literature found a lack of convergence in policy outcomes (i.e., recognition rates) from the 
institutionalization of asylum policies at the EU level. I argue here that this is due to disincentives emanating from the cost 
function. See: Neumayer, E. (2005). Asylum recognition rates in Western Europe: their determinants, variation, and lack of 
convergence. Journal of conflict resolution, 49(1), 43-66. 
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decentralized system there will still be incentives to withhold preferences, push asylum seekers to 
neighboring countries, or race to the bottom in determination rulings.  
As to how that centralized system should look is what Chapter II outlines. Proposals for an EU-specific or 
internationally regulated asylum system have been suggested over the past few years. Yet they have all run 
into roadblocks for several common reasons: political will and legal issues have stifled many proposals, but 
also, the inability to account for an absolute EU annual quota that would be divided by Member States using 
a distributional key. Proposals for annual quotas have typically worked off absolute rather than relative 
numbers. So, Germany, for instance, might host 15% of the refugees arriving in the EU in a single year, but 
that is 15% of what total? 100,000 or 3 million? How to allocate refugees above that number has not been 
adequately addressed in the market-based literature. Nor are calls for a global quota system realistic due to 
coordination problems, political will, and quality of protection concerns.  
Secondly, market-based proposals rarely involve the Global South. This has been a notable concern of 
policymakers for several reasons. Not only do non-EU countries host well over 90% of the world’s refugees, 
but they are the primary refugee producing and refugee transiting nations. Ignoring their presence and 
failing to involve them, risks a number of reactions that can throw a market out of equilibrium. These 
include pushing refugees northbound, overloading neighboring States in the Middle East and Africa with 
refugees without compensation, and inadequately incentivizing combatting human trafficking. Thirdly, 
most market-based proposals do not account for the preferences of individual EU States to protect and host. 
By conflating protection and hosting, previously proposed distributional keys are unable to reflect non-
static State-interests that frequently shift over time. 
The inability of market-based proposals to address these legal, allocative, coordination, and incentives-
entailing factors has led the European Union towards a preference for bilateral agreements.152 Chapter II 
proposes a market-based solution meant to supplant bilateral protection agreements. It involves actors from 
the Global South, including nearly all refugee producing and transiting countries and provides an incentive-
compatible framework for States to reveal their true preferences.  
 
                                                             
152 Adepoju, A., Van Noorloos, F., & Zoomers, A. (2010). Europe’s Migration Agreements with Migrant‐Sending Countries in 
the Global South: A Critical Review. International migration, 48(3), 42-75; Clemens, M. A., & Postel, H. M. (2017). Deterring 
emigration with foreign aid: An overview of evidence from low-income countries (No. 136). IZA Policy Paper. 
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Chapter II An EU-OIC Market-Based Solution  
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 investigates whether a joint market-based mechanism between the European Union and the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) can provide a durable solution to EU Member States whose 
preferences for hosting refugees are often at odds with refugee law.  153 It presents a market mechanism 
whereby refugee protection quotas are allocated annually at the EU and OIC level. These annual 
supranational quotas are then divided among participating Member States and permitted to be transferred 
internally within the OIC and EU. When preferences to host are less than the preference for paying 
another State to host, a State simply sells a portion of its quota. From a legal standpoint, this enables 
treaty-based protection obligations to be satisfied when norm commitments to host are less than the costs 
of protection. The degree to which externalities are anticipated by the laws governing refugee protecting 
thus impacts its ax ante allocation.154 
Though there exists a rich literature on refugee protection and market-based solutions the proposed EU-
OIC mechanism adds value in three important ways. Firstly, it proposes a specific market structure between 
the EU and OIC in which tensions between international law and domestic preferences may be reconciled. 
Including the OIC increases the amount of countries available to host EU protection quotas thereby ensuring 
protection at a number which may be greater than an annual maximum prescribed at the EU level. Previous 
studies advocating protection quotas do not adequately address the issue of absolute versus relative annual 
quotas. Secondly, the proposed mechanism offers a legally consistent solution that ensures that 
commodification of protection does not lead to reification of the individual. Other market-based solution 
proposals fail to tackle potential legal hurdles to transfers.  And thirdly, previous market-based solutions 
have not adequately involved the primary stakeholders in protracted refugee crises. Involving the OIC, 
whose States compromise nearly all the refugee producing and refugee transit countries, will provide a 
more inclusive network of affected States and allow for a wider range of interventions. While this could 
conceivably be accomplished through bilateral agreements with affected States, coordination at the OIC 
level reduces transaction costs, bolsters compliance mechanisms, and adds a norm-based incentive, Islamic 
values, to protect asylum seekers. 
                                                             
153 The OIC is the world’s second largest Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) after the United Nations. Founded in 1969 to the 
OIC counts 57 Member States and a number of organs ranging from banking and peacekeeping, to disaster relief and a General 
Secretariat. 
154 Klibanoff and Poitevin (2013) argue that it is not merely the externality’s size, but the measure of its uncertainty relative  to its 
private benefit. Klibanoff, P., & Poitevin, M. (1999). A theory of (de) centralization. CIRANO discussion papero. Mimeo. 
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2.1 Reassignment & Market-Based Solutions 
Reassignment is certainly not a novel suggestion. Within the EU human transfers have been suggested since 
1994 when Germany failed to pass a proposal allocating temporary protection seekers based on Member 
States’ GDP, population, and size.155Then in 2000, the Kosovo Evacuation Programme (KEP) proposed 
non-binding unilateral quotas on accepting Kosovar refugees temporarily residing in The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. More recently the Turkish Statement provided for the return of failed asylum 
seeker claimants from Greece to Turkey, and a September 2015 EU directive aimed to reallocate 160,000 
refugees from Greece and Italy.  
Resettlement and dispersal schemes are two other forms of reassignment. Several Member States have 
employed resettlement schemes, many using quotas. In 2018, for example, Australia continued its 
resettlement of 2,000 refugees from the island of Nauru to the United States. On the supranational level, 
the EU allocated 50 million euro in 2016 to resettle 20,000 individuals living outside of the EU and 
identified by UNHCR as unable to remain in safety in the respective country of origin. This prototype may 
be subject to future binding legislation.156 Dispersal refers to moving refugees from an area deemed over-
concentrated and is typically conducted within State territory. An example is the no choice dispersal of 
asylum seekers from London to southeast England in 2000.157 Dispersal has also been common in the last 
decade the Pacific, where Australia has excised land and declared it international territory, dispersing 
refugees from the Australian mainland. 
Money-sharing schemes are another form of reassigning responsibility. They have been suggested in the 
literature, notably by Betts (2003), and have ostensibly been employed for years.158 The European Refugee 
Fund (ERF) in one example, dispersed 630 million euro proportionally to Member States hosting refugees 
from 2008 until 2013. The ERF was replaced by the deep-pockets of the Asylum Migration and Integration 
Fund (3.1 billion Euro from 2014-2020). There also exists refugee-related allocations for regional 
development and protection programs, healthcare and an emergency fund recently proposed by the 
European Commission with a startup of 1.8 billion Euro. In addition, there are compensation and tariff 
relief to third party countries hosting refugees attempting to reach Europe. Bilateral agreements with Jordan, 
in one example, allow Jordanian manufacturers whose workforce consists of 15 to 25 percent Syrian 
refugees, to pay little to no export duties to EU States.159  
                                                             
155 European Union, Council Document 7773/94 ASIM 124.  
156 ECA European Agenda on Migration. Brussels: COM (2015) 240 final, 5. 
157 Stewart, E. S. (2012). UK Dispersal Policy and Onward Migration: Mapping the Current State of Knowledge. J. Refugee 
Stud., 25. 
158  Betts (n122). 
159 Lenner, K., & Turner, L. (2018). Making refugees work? The politics of integrating Syrian refugees into the labor market in 
Jordan. Middle East Critique, p11. 
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The drawback of money-based burden-sharing is the transaction costs associated with implementation and 
the difficulty monitoring how money is spent. Corrupt bureaucracies might siphon funds and provide poor 
quality of protection.160 A second problem with money-sharing schemes is longevity. While support might 
be helpful during the processing and reception stage, it is not clear whether the Union will have the capacity 
to support Member States in the long term in case of failed integration. 
The theoretical literature has attempted to shed light on reassignment strategies. Hatton (2015) provides a 
model where asylum is viewed as a locally provided public good, which, in the absence of cooperation is 
underprovided.161 Hatton foresees optimal burden sharing realized through either refugee transfers or 
asymmetric compensation from a common pool. However, Hatton’s model, like Moraga and Rappaport’s 
(2014, 2015) suffers from assumptions of what States view as socially optimal. Insufficient quarter is 
provided to States that refuse to host in excess of their privately optimal number no matter the 
compensation. Neither does either proposal address the possibility that a boundless definition of protection 
might exceed the total annual number of incoming claimants.  
 
Market Approaches to Burden Sharing 
Markets are one approach to burden sharing. Their framework is often derived from Coase’s discussion of 
crop markets and include recent ‘cap and trade’ proposals in the environmental literature.162 The market 
literature dealing specifically with immigration is indebted to two papers, one by Hathaway and Neve 
(1997), and the other, Peter Schuck (1997), who contemporaneously proposed tradable quotas in refugee 
protection. More recently, studies have explored markets for auctioning visas (Orrenius & Zavodny, 
2010),163 centralized funds compensating both refugees and host nations (Lee, 1986),164 debt-based 
deductions from regimes responsible for persecution (Blocher & Gulati, 2016),165 low-skilled labor tax 
subsidies (De la Croix, D., & Docquier, F. 2015),166 and an EU-specific refugee market. The latter, proposed 
                                                             
160 In theory, this externality might be mitigated by UNHCR oversight, which already represents a piecemeal burden-sharing 
financial approach. UNHCR involvement would substantially reduce the transaction costs associated with monitoring and 
implementation, as well as allay concerns about quality of protection, excessive agency participation, and flow of information. In 
practice, sovereign concerns make such a proposition difficult to implement. 
161 Consequently, EU-centric policymaking has the opportunity to produce socially optimal results. This contrasts with 
harmonizing policies at a national level.  
162 Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (2011). The effect of allowance allocations on cap-and-trade system performance. The Journal 
of Law and Economics, 54(S4), S267-S294. 
163 Zavodny, M., & Orrenius, P. (2010). Beside the Golden Door: US Immigration Reform in a New Era of Globalization. 
American Enterprise Institute. 
164 Lee, L. T. (1986). The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of Asylum. American Journal of International 
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165 Blocher, J., & Gulati, M. (2016). Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis. Colum. Hum. 
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166  de la Croix, D., & Docquier, F. (2015). An incentive mechanism to break the low-skill immigration deadlock. Review of 
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by Moraga and Rappaport (2014) includes a refugee matching mechanism that reveals both refugee and 
destination countries preferences, whilst compensation is paid for States absorbing in excess of their refugee 
quota.167 It is unclear, however, how the authors presume to reach an efficient arrangement for refugees in 
excess of an EU directed absolute number.  
Markets typically involve transactions that compensate one State for absorbing the quota of another. They 
are often modeled in two steps. Perhaps most famously elaborated upon by Schuck (1997, 2014) the first 
step consists of a quota set by an international or supranational agency. A burden-sharing system that deals 
with an absolute number disproportionality benefits wealthier and larger countries and so equity presumes 
that quotas include multiple criteria. To discharge their quota, States can offer protection to refugees within 
their borders or sell a portion of their quota.  
Refugee protection quotas may have a fixed price based on a single commodity or may be satisfied 
holistically. Compensation in Schuck’s system, for example, is not fixed and has the flexibility of trading 
in goods, which “encourage[s] states to exploit their heterogeneity.”168Similarly, Thielemann & Devan 
(2006) coin the term ‘comprehensive trading’ to mean optimizing the comparative advantages of diverse 
agents.169 Burden-sharing in their model may include contributions from peacekeeping, post-conflict justice 
and reconstruction, as well as efforts subsumed under the general category ‘deterrence.’ Such a market-
based mechanism may approach equilibrium, since, in contrast to the public goods literature which predicts 
smaller countries exploiting larger ones, peacekeeping burdens are carried by larger countries.170In our 
context, a flexible quota system would account for the preferences, strengths, and comparative advantages 
of both EU and OIC States. OIC States unable to host refugees due to political or legal concerns would be 
able to contribute to peacekeeping, peacebuilding, food security and preventative measures in strategically 
critical locations.  
Technically speaking, the drawbacks of market mechanisms are the costs not captured in dyadic market 
transaction leading to over-incentivized trade (Schuck, 2014). Dyadic costs here include social unrest, 
security (Loescher & Miller, 2013), difficulties integrating new members into society, and lateral 
transfers.171 On the latter point, whilst trading refugees may lead to an efficient outcome within a 
geographically limited domain, as Bubb et al., (2011) point out, where North to South transfers are a 
                                                             
167 Moraga, J. F. H., & Rapoport, H. (2014). Tradable immigration quotas. Journal of Public Economics, 115, 94-108. 
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component of the market, asylum seekers might forgo the perilous northbound journey, travelling directly 
to neighboring countries, thereby distorting levels of compensation; such a distortion may lead to a 
prisoner’s dilemma whereby a State’s best option may be to forgo entering the market unless they can be 
receive commensurate compensation.172 In a general equilibrium model, it is therefore necessary to account 
for non-dyadic costs, particularly unilateral South-to-South migration.  
2.2 Why not an exclusively EU market? 
This chapter proposes a joint OIC-EU market. But why not simply an EU market, which would have far 
lower transaction costs and deal with unified supranational obligations of protection?173 One such example 
might come from Moraga and Rappaport (2015). After an initial EU-wide quota based on observable 
factors, the M&R model mitigates the principle-agent problem arising out of misaligned preferences by 
matching; like the top-trading cycle mechanism proposed in the literature for housing assignment,174 
refugees ordinally rank their preferred destinations, and Member States list their preference refugee 
attributes (i.e., language capacity, education, job skill). States that host more than their quota are 
compensated by States with an unfulfilled quota. The EU could be responsible for enforcement through 
collecting unfulfilled quota penalties.  
The problem with an exclusively EU market is twofold. From an ethical point of view, it allows many State 
actors in the Global South to avoid responsibility. Consequently, those States owning up to their moral and 
legal mandates become overburdened by their regional neighbors. OIC participation ensures that nearly all 
regional neighbors are participants in refugee protection. Secondly, an exclusively EU mechanism places 
an ex ante ceiling on the legal definition of protection. When the number of claimants exceeds the aggregate 
number imposed by the Union, a lacuna in allocation will lead to an under-provision of protection. One 
might argue that an exclusively EU market could enter into bilateral agreements with multiple Global South 
and transfer refugees in excess of the annual EU quota. Logically, two problems arise with such a 
proposition. Already, regional protection differentials have cubby-holed the EU into bilateral agreements 
that are subject to legal challenges (i.e., Turkish Statement).175Without a harmonized system of monitoring, 
EU-wide consensus on transfer States, and thirty-party oversight, transaction costs from increased legal 
challenges are likely. These costs may make an EU market with multiple bilateral agreements untenable.    
                                                             
172 Bubb et al., (n125) p367. 
173 Not all OIC Member States are party to the refugee Convention. Pakistan, for instance, hosts over 2 million refugees and is a 
non-signatory. 
174  Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American economic review, 93(3), 
729. 
175 Whether transfers in general require interpretation by the CJEU under 276(b) of the TFEU is debatable; it is nevertheless 
common sense that a blatant disregard for the consensus EU minimal standards that fulfill ‘sufficient,’ ‘effective,’ and ‘adequate’ 
risk illegitimating transfers. There is likewise a concern when dealing with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian third party States 
whose unpredictable activities may invalidate their status as safe hosts.  
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As it stands, an exclusively EU model with a non-finite quota and adhering to international law operates 
under three assumptions (a) that deterrent measures can stem the tide of claimants below aggregate State 
preferences for hosting (b) the number of asylum seekers will not trigger a race to achieve more stringent 
determination standards (c) those not adjudged as needing protection under international law will 
repatriate.176 
All three assumptions are unrealistic. Firstly, deterrence can be accomplished either through preventing 
war, persecution, and poverty (unfortunately, highly unlikely), preventing access to mainland Europe 
(nearly impossible), more stringent immigration laws (empirically inconsistent)177or dis-incentivizing 
economic migrants to pass as refugees (unrealistic without incorporating the threat of extraterritorial 
transfers). On the latter point, Hatton (2016), using data from Uppsala’s Conflict Data Program and 
Freedom House indices, evaluates asylum applications from 48 origin countries applying to 19 OECD 
destination countries. Hatton finds that better economic conditions in origin countries reduces asylum 
applications by approximately 5 percent. Dissuading economic migrants in high numbers by infusing 
capital or making business friendly policies is thus highly unlikely. Supporting this view is a recent 
UNHCR report on migration to the European Union from Libya; the report concludes that the majority of 
migrants departing from Libya, of whom are a variety of nationalities, are doing so for reasons of 
economic hardship in their home country.178Without robust evidence that economic migrants are being 
dissuaded from applying for refugee status, tougher deterrent policies towards reaching EU territory may 
be necessary to validate an exclusively EU market.  
On the point of preventing access to mainland Europe, Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan (2017) outline 
several examples that illustrate how deterrence policies are placing migrants at additional risk and 
increasing human trafficking through smugglers, without effectively deterring access to Europe.179 
Neither do changes to domestic welfare policies seem to work. As Hatton (2016) remarks, “Welfare 
policies have little deterrent effect because the fundamental motive driving asylum seekers is to gain 
permanent settlement at almost any cost.”180 Legal challenges to deterrent measures have also met with 
some success. In Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber found Italy’s agreement 
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to send refugees back to Libya as violating Article 3 of the European Convention.181Denmark has also 
received unfavorable ruling against their deterrent measures. Biao v. Denmark, for instance, ruled against 
Denmark’s restrictive family reunification policy.182   
Finally, there is the issue of repatriation and removal of asylum seeker claimants who have been denied 
refugee status. 183 If EU States were able to successfully repatriate refugees and remove denied claimants, 
Member States might be willing to protect above their current level. However, repatriating refugees has 
been compounded by legal barriers (infra 2.3.2) and returning unsuccessful claimants has been highly 
ineffective. In 2014, over 60% of asylum applicants receiving a return decision were recorded as leaving 
EU territory.184When return to Balkan countries is disregarded, the rate of return is barely over 25%.185 
Despite efforts to set up an effective integrated system of return management, EU States continue to 
struggle with executing return directives. 
At the State level there are several reasons for difficulty enforcing deportation orders of failed asylum 
seeker claimants. In Ireland, one reason is the law. Sheridan (2007) highlights how for several years, 
Omar v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison prohibited enforcing deportation orders in private residences.186 
The Netherlands, in another example, documented a 20% return rate by the year 2007 for asylum seekers 
who applied in 2001.187 Some individuals who choose to stay illegally have taken advantage of the fact 
that the Dutch return policy is not geared specifically for asylum seekers, but third-party nationals without 
the legal right to reside in the Netherlands; consequently a host of reasons exist, such as medical 
dispensations or uncertainty about the safety of a destination country, may result in being issued a 
temporary (no fault) residence permit.188 What is important for our analysis is that problems 
implementing the Return Directive exist in many EU States. An OIC-EU partnership potentially alleviates 
this concern.    
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2.3 Why an OIC-EU Market? 
As discussed above, an exclusively EU market might exploit common funds, a centralized bureaucracy, 
pan-European values, and have less administrative hurdles. Common market structures would also more 
efficiently streamline non-monetary goods. In contrast, the breadth of the OIC’s political, economic, and 
geographical diversity has several notable drawbacks. Transfer of money or other goods might be restricted 
by trade treaties, security provisions, and less than half of OIC countries are considered non-refoulement 
by EU Member States. Most strikingly, OIC countries already host 52% of the world’s refugees. A market-
based burden-sharing system cannot start tabula rasa, and EU States would be strongly dis-incentivized to 
begin their quota in the red. That having been said, there are also several benefits to an EU-OIC market that 
outweigh its costs. These fall under three categories: (a) logistics (b) diversity of market (c) congestion. 
2.3.1 Logistics  
Since 2010, 92% of migrants assessed as refugees have fled from OIC countries.189 Although refugee 
burdens are most commonly suffered by neighboring countries, smuggling networks have dramatically 
changed the informational and logistical asymmetries in favor of migration to continental Europe. A joint 
market would improve screening capabilities, as well as reduce the enormous transaction costs of non-
entrée schemes conducted by FRONTEX. Importantly, it may have the ability to more efficiently process 
claimants before they undertake a perilous journey to Europe (Garlick, 2006; Liguori, 2015).190  
Why is large-scale extraterritorial processing not efficient within an exclusively EU mechanism? Whilst 
the UNHCR can and does currently process resettlement claimants bound for Europe in their home 
countries, it has proven ineffective in large-numbers; in 2015, for example, offshore processing amounted 
to just over half of the total resettlement figure of 82,000, in part because UNHCR strategies and agency 
constraints do not at all time align with EU or OIC objectives.191 There are also grey areas. Significantly 
expanding an EU operation would run into the legal hurdles of an effective control definition that has 
expanded its legal space from a territorial-oriented framework to one including authority over individuals 
and the exercise of public powers. How and where migrants may be processed and interdicted now presents 
                                                             
189 The World Bank. ‘Refugee population by country or territory of asylum’< 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG> Last accessed February 1, 2016. 
190 Garlick, M. (2006). The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or Conundrum?. International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 18(3-4), 601-629; Liguori, A. (2015). The extraterritorial processing of asylum claims. JMCE Migrants, Jean 
Monnet Centre of Excellence on Migrants' Rights in the Mediterranean. 
191UNHC, Ressettlement fact sheet 2015. Last retrieved 19 February 2019 from 
<https://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/524c31a09/resettlement-fact-sheet-2015.html>. Total resettlement numbers for 
2015 81,893. The link between agency constraints and EU-OIC objectives are the author’s opinion. 
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dilemmas not in existence a decade ago.192 OIC Member States exercising public powers on their own 
territory, on the other hand, should allow the EU to avoid constraints from recent developments in the law. 
Logistics are also aided by pre-existing structures. The OIC has several centralized organs crucial to 
lowering the transaction costs of non-monetary commodities on a market. Issues of trade have a centralized 
forum through the Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (ICCIA) and the Islamic Centre 
for the Development of Trade (ICDT); banking through the Islamic Development Bank (IDB); post-conflict 
humanitarian concerns through the Humanitarian Organizations Council (HOC) and Islamic Solidarity 
Fund (ISF). Though without a single sub-organ, conflict resolution doctrine subordinates itself to UN 
precepts, is built into the OIC Charter, and is guided by its executive organ, the Council of Foreign 
Ministers. Already there is collaboration between the EU and OIC in matters of peacekeeping, terrorism, 
and refugees. This is not to say that implementation and monitoring between two supranational bodies will 
be fluid or have low transaction costs, only that the bureaucratic structures are firmly in place and have a 
distinct advantage over an ad hoc multi-State network. 
2.3.2 Diversity of Market  
Whilst regulating an OIC-EU market is far more complicated than an intra-EU market, OIC States bring to 
the table several comparative advantages. They are: (a) cost; (b) incentives to repatriate, and (c) diversity 
of commodities. Cost is straightforward. Providing protection in Cameroon or Malaysia is far less expensive 
than in the Netherlands, or even Estonia. For example, the 2015 estimated cost of a first-year refugee in the 
United Kingdom is 24,000 GBP and Germany spends between 10,000 Euro per a refugee, per a year, on 
food and housing alone.193 Turkey, one of the OIC Member States with the highest GDP per capita, 
estimates its 2015 refugee cost per capita a 3,450 USD.194Cameroon is less than an eighth of that figure. 
The question then arises why OIC countries have lower costs per individual protected. One obvious 
reason is cost of living. Cost of living in Turkey is lower than Germany; cost of living in France is more 
than in Cameroon. The question that follows is one of quality. Is it possible that the cost of protection in 
                                                             
192 Not only is effective control now interpreted as a territorial function [No. 52207/99 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 
Others [2001]] but includes exercise of public powers [No. 30696/09 MSS v. Belgium and Greece [2011]; No. 55721/07 Al-
Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom [2011]; and control as authority over individuals [No. 31821/96 Issa and Others v. Turkey 
[2004];  no. 46221/99 Öcalan v. Turkey [2003]; Appl. No. 27765/09. 23 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [2012]; No. 3394/03 
Medvedyev and Others v. France [2010]. 
193 The Telegraph. ‘Each Syrian to Cost 24,000 Pounds a Year’ (October 9. 2015). Last accessed August 9, 2016 from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11941580/Each-Syrian-refugee-to-cost-Britain-24000-a-year.html; CESifo Group 
Munich, ‘Cost of refugees to reach ten billion Euro’ Last accessed January 31, 2016 from  http://www.cesifo-
group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen-Archiv/2015/Q3/pm-20150920_sd18_fluechtlinge.html 
194Seufert, G. (2016). Turkey as partner of the EU in the refugee crisis: Ankara's problems and interests. Wissenschaft und 
Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs. 
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Turkey is less than in Germany, because Germany provides better quality of protection than Turkey? And 
if this is the case, are transfers still permissible? 
Two points require examination. The first is level of protection, and the second, if States need to provide 
the same level of care as other States. To the first question, the 1951 Convention does not stipulate 
gradations of living standards under protection. Taken together, the Convention outlines fundamental 
positive rights that must be afforded to refugees, absent of detailed qualitative statements. The ECtHR has 
been very clear on this point: that self-calculated standards of living are not the responsibility of a hosting 
State to actualize.195 Standards of protection simply may not drop beneath emergency levels196 and must 
adhere bestow fundamental rights. In the proposed market EU-OIC mechanism, these levels are 
monitored by UNCHR staff. To the second question, there is no legal basis for equal services between 
States, only that minimum standards be tied to standards in the respective State. To paraphrase a ruling 
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights” legal differences in treatment aren’t inherently 
discriminatory.197 However, they must not drop below a minimal threshold of quality. 
Repatriation 
A market-based solution must also account for the temporal parameters of refugee protection. For how long 
is a State obliged to offer protection? In accordance with refugee law, refugee status may end when 
individuals re-avail themselves to the protection of their country of nationality,198 acquire a new nationality, 
or when the “well-founded” conditions by which they were declared a refugee no longer exist.199Without 
refugee status repatriation may occur. Changes which are cosmetic or not causally linked to the reason a 
refugee fled are not applicable.200 Germany, for example, refused to recognize genuine change in 1992 
Romania primarily because of the continued presence of the Ceausescu era secret police.201 Similarly, the 
Federal Court of Canada, in Oskoy v. Canada, reversed a denial of refugee status to an Iranian applicant 
due to the Iran’s law of executions.202 Time is another issue. Though the UNHCR recommends a minimum 
of 12 months to observe the permanence of changes, the UNHCR also places a more ambiguous threshold 
                                                             
195 Müslim v. Turkey, no. 53566/99, 26 April 2005 §85. 
196 Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands (complaint no. 90/2013), Council of Europe: European 
Committee of Social Rights, 21 January 2013. 
197 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 Jan. 1986 (Proposed Amendments to the 
Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica requested by the Government of Costa Rica), §55. 
198 It is important to note that returning and re-availing oneself to their home country is insufficient under Article 1(c)(4). The 
individual must be re-established taken to mean a fundamental change and durable protection. Otherwise, a host nation declaring 
a cessation of refugee status may be liable under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, namely, refoulement. See: Hathaway, J. C. 
(2005). The right of states to repatriate former refugees. Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol., 20, 175. 
199 Refugee Convention at Article 1(C) 1-4. 
200 Arggello-Garcia v. Canada, [1993] F.C. 635 
201 Cf. Hathaway (n23) p792. 
202 Oskoy v. Canada, [1993] F.C. 644. Also Hathaway (2005). The rights of refugees (n23). 
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of “sufficient time to take hold.”203 Crucially, voluntarily repatriation according to the Voluntary 
Repatriation Handbook must be just that: absent of any type of coercion or incentivizing.204  
Must all repatriation be consensual? Reading UNHCR documents one would be led to believe this is the 
case. In fact, the voluntary nature of repatriation is not relevant to binding treaty-based obligations.205 This 
has been echoed rather succinctly by the English High Court´s position that, “Aspirations are to be 
distinguished from legal obligations.”206It is thus critical to note that the recommendations of UNHCR as 
to when mandatory repatriation is possible, or even preferable, are non-binding.207 What is relevant is 
protection up until cessation of status. It is therefore important in this case to avoid conflating optimal from 
a refugee’s point of view with legally binding State obligations. Though mandatory repatriation is never 
promoted and rarely used by the UNHCR, as Michael Bartutciski reminds us: 
We should not lose sight of the fact that international law concerns the imposition of obligations on States. It may be in 
the individual's best interest actually to remain in the host country and continue his or her life in exile, but is the State 
obliged to provide refuge if conditions in the country of origin have become safe within a reasonable time period? Clearly, 
States never agreed to such legal obligations.208 
 
Though deferring to UNHCR is common practice, ultimately each host State may decide which countries 
constitute non-refoulers and the circumstances surrounding positive rights. Nevertheless, the UNHCR 
recommends that invoking the cessation clause should consider duration of stay, familial, economic and 
social links, and allow refugees to “maintain their established situation including the grant of permanent 
residence status”209 have frequently been incorporated into domestic laws. Challenging a State with strong 
domestic rights networks entails high transaction costs from general bureaucratic investigations and legal 
procedures.210States providing incremental benefits including access to the political community must thus 
consider the long-term implications of the difficulty to repatriate.  
                                                             
203 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 3: Cessation of Refugee Status under Articles 1(C)(5) and (6) of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/03 (2003) §14 
204 UNHCR, ‘Handbook-Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection, January 1996 2.3  
205 Hathaway 2005, (n23) p182.   
206 R. (Hoxha) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ 
1403 (Eng. C.A.), at §s. 46-48 as qtd in Hathaway (n197) p232. Also, at § 47-48: “Moreover, it must be seen as significant that 
the international community did not take the opportunity at the time of the 1967 Protocol to amend the proviso to Article IC (5) 
when it was considering the temporal scope of the 1951 Convention .... One might think it desirable that states should... recognise 
[sic] the humanitarian purpose which would be served by ignoring the restriction on the proviso to Article IC (5). But that is not 
enough to establish a legal obligation binding upon all parties to the Convention.” 
207 See Hathaway (n197) p231. “While all states have the sovereign authority to allow any person they wish to remain on their 
territory and while it will often be humane and right to extend such generosity, this is not a matter fairly understood to be 
required by either the text or purposes of the refugee law” at 231. 
208 Michael Barutciski, Involuntary Repatriation when Refugee Protection Is No Longer Necessary: Moving Forward after the 
48th Session of the Executive Committee, 10 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 236, 245 (1998) as qtd in Hathaway 2005 (n121) p177. 
209 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Note on Cessation Clauses, 30 May 1997, EC/47/SC/CRP.30, at § 9. 
210 “A number of countries do not invoke the cessation clauses at least in part because of the administrative costs involved, 
including the costs of implementing review procedures; the recognized likelihood that even where cessation results, it may not 
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Mandatory repatriation is often conditional on levels of attachment. In Europe, a generous social welfare 
system and educational opportunities disincentive repatriation. In addition, Europe’s extensive network of 
positive rights impede the removal after social and economic links have been formed. As per the ECJ’s 
ruling in Salahadin Abdulla and Others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, the Qualification drive “must be 
interpreted in a manner which respects the fundamental rights and the principles recognized in particular 
in the Charter”211 meaning that transfers will most likely be time-consuming and an enormous expense to 
court systems. Ethical mandates are likewise pressing and increase over time.212Whereas temporary 
protection (i.e., temporary work and residence permits) may satisfactorily fulfill legal and ethical norms 
in the first instance, over time, justice concerns demand full integration into the political community. This 
may mean that asylum needs to be allocated based on the potential for the refugee to live long term. As 
such, from a normative point of view, transfers must consider projected length of stay, as well as 
incremental access to the political community of third-party States. To proceed unfettered, transfers must 
then be conducted expeditiously before ties are formed. 
 
By the same token, ethical mandates also ground the reasoning for the State’s right to exclude refugees 
vis-à-vis transfers. This claim is predicated on a territorial-based reading in which States have developed  
“a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next.”213Cooperation has helped forge 
State institutions through a historical relationship between a country and its peoples and by virtue of these  
collective decisions preferential assignment of exclusionary rights is demanded.214This is the distinction 
between claims originating in human rights and those in social cooperation.215If externalities are predicted 
due to absorption of refugees in excess of State interests, then the State has a right to exclude, if and only 
if the State can provide a reasonable alternative.  
 
                                                             
lead to return because those whose refugee status has ceased will have the possibility to remain under another status; and/or a 
State preference for naturalization under Article 34 of the Convention.” Expert Roundtable, Lisbon, Port., May 3-4, 2001, 
Summary Conclusions: Cessation of Refugee Status, at §2 (June 2003). 
211 Salahadin Abdulla, 2010 (n7) §53. 
212 cf. Carens (n31) 546 
213 Rawls, J. (2005). Political liberalism. Columbia University Press. at 15. 
214 Sadiq, K., & Pevnick, R. (2011). Immigration and the Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Absolute 
Sovereignty. Perspectives on Politics, 9(4), 930.  Note: Wellman (2008) unconvincingly argues that freedom of association, not 
derivate of a socially cohesive political community supports exclusion of refugees. Wellman’s argument seems unable to explain 
the jurisdictional link between a State’s right to exclude in order to empower control of self-regarding behavior at the heart of the 
freedom of association.  Wellman, C. H. (2008). Immigration and freedom of association. Ethics, 119(1), 109-141. 
215 Kates, M., & Pevnick, R. (2014). Immigration, jurisdiction, and history. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 42(2) at 194, surmise 
“only once we recognize the importance of the state as an institutional embodiment of the decisions of a particular self-
determining political community that it might make sense to say that the current citizens of a state are entitled to restrict the 
entrance of potential immigrants.” 
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Related to this discussion are removal mechanisms for claimants denied refugee status. Europe has 
struggled to implement its Return Directive.216In 2013, less than 40% of irregular migrants refused asylum 
status were returned to their country of origin, despite such instruments as the Cotonou Agreement which 
provides for reciprocal readmission upon request.217 The expulsion rate for 2015 has been calculated at 
32%.218 Neither have trilateral treaties such as the Pilot Project on Return with Pakistan and Bangladesh 
achieved higher success rates.219 In OIC countries, removal mechanisms for those able to return in safety 
and dignity have proven far more effective, largely due to that fact that the social and educational benefits 
are nowhere as generous as in EU States. 
Diversity of Commodities 
The third category, diversity of tradable commodities, is more efficiently realized in an OIC-EU model than 
the current EU asylum system. Within the OIC there are wealthy States that can pay their quota without 
hosting, and poorer safe countries welcoming an infusion of capital. OIC States that cannot fulfill their 
quota financially may systemically contribute to upskilling, screening, peacekeeping, and preventative 
measures. Because a market institutionalizes contributions, local organizations may receive more consistent 
funding, and reduce barriers to governmental collaboration. Moreover, from a human security optic, 
involving a more diverse range of grassroots, civil society and governmental actors increases the agency 
through which prevention, detection, and transnational advocacy may be realized. 
2.3.3 Congestion 
Both an exclusively EU as well as an EU-OIC market mechanism operate under an absolute annual 
number. Refugee inflows, however, are relative numbers.  A look at Figure 7 shows the level of asylum 
applicants to the EU from Q1 2014 to Q3 2018. Their range of 100,00 to well over 400,00 applicants per 
a quarter would mean that a total EU quota may have to be in excess of 1.5 million to operate solely 
within the boundaries of the European Union. Taking the status quo into account, it is highly questionable 
whether a quota in excess of 1 million would be agreed upon by EU Member States. Such is why the OIC 
contributing 57 States to the overall mechanism potentially alleviates congestion from the overall EU-28 
total. 
                                                             
216 Directive 2008/115/EC, 2008. 
217 Joint declaration on migration and development, Article 13(3), provides for readmission.   
218 European Commission (n185). 
219 Council Conclusions on EU Return Policy adopted at the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting of 5 and 6 June 2014, as 
qtd in EC 2015 p10. 
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FIGURE 7 ASYLUM APPLICANTS, EU-28, Q1 2014 -Q3 2018. SOURCE: EUROSTAT220 
 
2.4 The Mechanism 
 
The proposed OIC-EU market involves seven steps outlined in Figure 8. They are: 
1. Preliminary steps 
2. Harmonizing determination of status and eligibility procedures 
3. Setting annual refugee intake numbers 
4. Matching mechanism 
5. Transfers 
6. Allocation of refugees more than supranational quota 
7. Integration programme tailored to matching mechanism 
 
                                                             
220 European Commission. Asylum Statistics Explained. Las accessed 01 March 2019 from 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics. 
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FIGURE 8 SEQUENTIAL SCHEME OF MECHANISM 
2.4.1 Preliminary Measures  
(a) A list must be populated by each EU Member State of OIC States deemed safe transfer countries. (b) 
The EU and OIC must then set up a minimum annual intake rate decided at the ministerial level (c) For the 
EU this includes a 20 percent mandatory resettlement of OIC hosted refugees. The basis for this 20% is to 
further incentivize OIC States hosting well above capacity to continue to host both refugees and asylum 
seekers. 221 (c) Each Member State must receive a quota. There have been various formulae suggested both 
in the literature and at policy level. The most frequent variables are GDP, prior hosting, and unemployment. 
(d) UNHCR already has a presence in all potential OIC destinations. However, additional staff and 
streamlined monitoring mechanisms must be emplaced to determine true hosting capacities. (e) Refugees 
                                                             
221 The number 20% is based on the author’s personal correspondence with academics and local stakeholders in several refugee 
hosting countries. Unfortunately, there are no such concrete proposals in the literature to cite. While the number 20% need not to 
be exact, it must be sufficient to incentivize repatriation. Ideally, a hard number could be formed at the ministerial level, both in 
the OIC and EU.  
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•List safe transfer countries
•Set intake levels (supernational)
•Set State-level quotas
•Ensure UNCHR monitoring presence
Member 
States
•Member States decide State-level hosting number
•Quota price set
Matching 
•Matching mechanism activated
Final Steps
•Transfers commence
•Allocation of refugees above annual supranational quota
•Integration programme funds
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must be included in a database to keep track of preferences and prevent overlap. This includes biometric 
information. The current EURODAC system is sufficient. 
 
 
FIGURE 9 PRELIMINARY MEASURES EU/OIC MARKET 
 
2.4.2 Harmonization, Intake Levels  
(a) Setting the mechanism in motion requires harmonizing status determinations. Uniform status 
determination is not a novel idea and has been agreed upon in the 2011 Qualification Drive (but not yet 
implemented).222 Setting the mechanism in motion requires both harmonizing status determinations and 
setting a market price. On the first point, EU Member States have an incentive to establish a centralized 
positive status determination instrument, as failure to do so would leave them out of the market mechanism 
and thus threaten receiving ‘less desirable’ refugees as per their respective preferences.  
 (b) Each EU Member State may set its annual intake rate. This can be more than their allocated quota but 
must not be less than a basement determined at the policy level. This lower threshold signifies commitment 
                                                             
222 Minus Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Demark. European Union: Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/95/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for  
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), 20 December 2011, OJ L. 337/9-337/26; 20.12.2011, 
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to international norms and intra-Union solidarity. This may be one-third, one-fifth, etcetera, and decided at 
the ministerial level. In the event of extraordinary circumstances, a Member State may apply for an annual 
exemption and move below the lower boundary.  
(c) OIC States set an annual hosting quota. Contributions from non-hosting States (NHS) are directed 
towards refugees already hosted by OIC Member States. This procedure may alleviate some of the burden 
for Turkey, Lebanon, Pakistan, Jordan and others hosting above capacity.223 (d) Several OIC States operate 
below the poverty line. The per capita income of Somalia, Niger, and Central African Republic is under 
1,000 (USD) with Uganda, Burkina Fasso, Mali, and Mozambique not far behind.224 NHS might therefore 
contribute in a number of ways, from manpower, to goods and services.  
2.4.3 Setting a price for Tradable Protection Quotas 
 
A protection quota price must also be agreed upon. This may work in two ways. Either the market can set 
its own price, or a single price for a protection quota may be established annually.225 The first measure may 
raise serious ethical concerns as it parallels bidding on human beings in slave markets. Qualitatively it may 
not much differ from setting a single annual price across all quotas, yet political capital is essential. Any 
protection quota price would be subject to annual cost of living adjustments based on inflation. 
 
FIGURE 10 HARMONIZATION OF STATES AND SETTING THE MARKET PRICE 
 
2.4.4 Matching   
In order to raise the probability of successful labor market and social integration, as well as reduce 
secondary movement, a matching mechanism is included in the market mechanism. In effect, the matching 
mechanism acts as a centralized clearinghouse. It matches refugee preferences with State preferences. Any 
State that decides to opt out of the burden sharing mechanism would be at high risk of receiving less 
                                                             
223 While some might argue that this compound the dilemma of paying States for consummating their obligations under 
international law, because the money is directed at States already hosting above their fair burden, the argue is null. 
224 World Bank. GDP Per Capita. Last accessed July 30, 2016 from < http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>. 
225 See Annex B 
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desirable refugees (according to that State’s preferences) than if they would participate. The mechanism is 
therefore incentive-compatible, provided a general willingness to protect refugees.   
Following matching theory, the mechanism is a two-sided matching, top trading cycle mechanism 
inspired by Moraga & Rappaport (2015) and Jones & Teytelboym (2016), and explicated in previous 
scholarship regarding universities and apartments Chen & Sönmez (2002).226 As Gale & Shapley (1962) 
first showed, an algorithm for a two-sided matching mechanism can be made stable, meaning that there is 
neither preference for re-matching nor aloneness.227 Later, Roth (1992) showed that many-to-one two 
sided matching may be Pareto efficient, whilst Fragiadakis et al., (2016) revealed this to be the case for 
minimum quotas.228 If a mechanism is ill constructed, a refugee will obtain a slot near the bottom of her 
list, whilst a State at that top of her list wants to host her; if well-constructed, Pareto dominant outcomes 
will prevail (i.e., match between preferences of States and refugees). 
It is worthwhile to note that a matching mechanism does not decide how many refugees are protected; it 
simply distributes an absolute number. As such, matching is about finding the optimal allocation, not 
negotiating boundaries. Currently agency belongs almost entirely to the State. Either the Dublin system 
gluts select States with asylum seekers (i.e., Italy, Greece), or EU Member State decide who is eligible. A 
matching system that takes into account refugee preferences offers a more equitable dynamic. 
The matching works as follows. Refugees list countries they want to go. Member States list their 
preferred criteria for hosting. An ordering is chosen randomly from the distribution. An algorithm is 
employed whereby the first protection quota is filled by the first refugee’s first choice, the second refugee 
her first choice, etcetera. When a particular Member State has been exhausted of visas, it is crossed off 
the list. For example, if an asylum seeker lists her top three preferences as Sweden, Germany, and France, 
she may be allocated Sweden until there are no more visas for Sweden. In that case, her first choice will 
become Germany, and so forth. As Moraga & Rappaport (2015) show in their mathematical model, the 
mechanism is individually rationale and there are no incentives to misrepresent preferences. Moreover, 
taking into account stated preferences, no refugee can be made better off without making another refugee 
worse off. 
                                                             
226 Jones, W., & Teytelboym, A. (2017). The international refugee match: A system that respects refugees’ preferences and the 
priorities of states. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 36(2), 84-109; Chen, Y., & Sönmez, T. (2002). Improving efficiency of on-campus 
housing: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1669. 
227  Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical 
Monthly, 69(1), 9. 
228   Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. (1992). Two-sided matching. Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 1, 485-
541; Fragiadakis, D., Iwasaki, A., Troyan, P., Ueda, S., & Yokoo, M. (2016). Strategyproof matching with minimum 
quotas. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 4(1), 6. 
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If refugee preferences are simply a matter of ordering, State preferences are more complicated.229 
Preference matching must account for not only categories (i.e., language, skills, family ties), but 
distributional quotas, transparency requirements, and ethical constraints. Distributional quotas, similar to 
affirmative action in the United States would presumably be directed at vulnerable populations or 
underrepresented sectors of the labor market. 230 An example is Germany’s Humanitarian Admission Pilot 
program and the UK’s Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme both of which focus on permanent 
settlement of recognized humanitarian migrants and provide them with work permits (Sommarribas et al., 
2016).231 On the supranational level, the EU might mandate that the 20% resettlement category be aimed 
at protracted situations (candidates waiting at least five years). 
Any matching mechanism would have to accept harmonization, not only of status determination 
decisions, but also with regards to family units and legal constraints. Having family as a priority category, 
for instance, would require harmonizing understandings of what constitutes a family unit (Jones & 
Teyelboym, 2016). Moreover, categories incompatible with the ECHR (i.e., discrimination based on race, 
religion, nationality) must be excluded from formal preference criteria. Still, bespoke options may be 
tailored into this matching mechanism, if distributional constraints are deemed necessary within priority 
categories.232 In this manner, States can fill gaps where there are labor shortages and more expeditiously 
absorb refugees projected to integrate faster. This is in line with EU migration policy, which seeks to 
identify economic sectors and occupations experiencing gaps in recruitment and matching them to legal 
migrants (EC, 2015). Macroeconomic beneficial points are of course conditional on the mechanism being 
well-designed: a non- transparent system (e.g., non-disclosure of priority categories) may be necessary to 
avoid incentives to misrepresent preferences. 
2.4.5 Transfers   
Refugees allocated to Member States may be transferred to participating third-party OIC-EU countries. 
Though transfers may not always be optimal from a refugee’s perspective, recollect that the 1951 
Convention and its Optional Protocol were designed to provide haven and a dignified existence to those 
fleeing persecution, not for asylum shopping. In fact, there exists no legal basis for refugees choosing where 
they are protected.  
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2.4.6 Above the EU Quota  
Refugees above the total EU annual quota will be granted temporary (subsidiary) protection status. This is 
consistent with the 2011 Qualification drive and Article 14 of the UDHR. Those designated as recipients 
of temporary protection will have their Refugee Protection Quota listed on the market, with the costs 
borne by the European Union, not individual Member States. Those under ‘awaiting status’ would be 
placed first on the list of transfers for the upcoming year, with that year’s total mandatory absorption 
number adjusted accordingly. The rationale behind this decision is to maintain an incentive-compatible 
market. 
 
FIGURE 11:  REFUGEES ABOVE THE ANNUAL EU QUOTA 
 
2.4.7 Integration Measures 
Recent European Commission literature acknowledges that ineffective integration raises the cost of 
refugee protection.233 Instead of ‘externalities’ the Commission speaks of “the cost of failed 
integration.”234Euphemisms aside, policy-oriented scholarship has acknowledged that effective 
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integration is the key to preventing potential externalities (Grüner, 2017).235 Indeed, it is because of this 
relationship that this thesis argues that Member States be provided with the right to determine how many 
refugees become a part of their political community. Intake must be regulated with those most intimately 
acquainted with their respective integration infrastructure.  
However, heterogeneity in employment opportunities and social support programs mean that States with 
more potent social welfare systems (i.e., Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands) and better labor market 
conditions will more easily find refugees that match their respective preferences. Though at first glance 
counter-intuitive, this would seem the case particularly with highly skilled, highly educated candidates in 
need of protection. Social welfare systems frequently correspond with more robust economies and thus 
more opportunities. On the flip side, refugees allocated to a State near the bottom of the list might be 
more reluctant to integrate. Accordingly, EU States falling under the lower quartile of their matching 
preferences would therefore receive a proportionately greater share of integration funds.236 Such funding 
might be combined with a new algorithm that matches refugee characteristics to resettlement sites using 
supervised machine learning (Bansak et al., 2018). 
2.5 Why hasn’t it already been done? 
With every new refugee protection proposal, we must ask ourselves why it has yet to be conceived. In the 
case of the OIC-EU, there exists three reasons. The first is context. Never before has the EU experienced 
an influx of migrants, primarily from OIC countries (Figure 12), unable to be easily absorbed into the 
existing infrastructure. Advances in technology, smuggling networks, and the availability of information 
have forged a new migration paradigm to Europe and upheaved what was the status quo. More stringent 
immigration laws (i.e., tougher reception conditions), on the other hand, have not been empirically shown 
to consistently dissuade asylum seekers nor economic migrants.237 Diffusion of information and 
technological advances have thus spawned incentives to form a collaborative mechanism. 
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FIGURE 12 COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, ASYLUM SEEKERS TO EU 28 IN 2016/2017 (OUT OF THE TOP 10 COUNTRIES ONLY NIGERIA 
AND ERITREA ARE NOT OIC MEMBERS) SOURCE EUROSTAT. 
Secondly, over time, the laws governing refugee protection have become disconnected from economic and 
social forces. The refugee regime’s roots derive from mass displacement at the end of the Second World 
War, as well as the desire to offer safe haven to those fleeing communist satellites. It was therefore a quasi-
political tool formed in the post war period, when the positive rights regime was in its infancy and the 
logistics permitting the Global South to reach Europe in large numbers, limited. The international human 
rights regime has continued to develop, however, and with it a network of interconnected positive 
obligations, often transposed domestically, that imposes high costs upon States. The result has been a 
disjuncture between legal and economic forces. A market for protection may very well reconcile these 
forces, alleviating the tension between international law and sovereignty. Until recently, that tension has 
not warranted an intervention.  
Thirdly, the OIC has long since been considered an unreliable partner. The world’s second largest 
Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) after the United Nations, the OIC was founded in 1969 to 
“safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and 
harmony”238 and counts 57 Member States. In addition to several organs ranging from banking and 
peacekeeping, to disaster relief and a General Secretariat, the OIC consists of an Islamic Summit 
responsible for policy matters, composed of heads of state, a Council of Foreign Ministers which adopts 
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resolutions and oversees implementation of Summit decisions, and a powerful General Secretariat 
responsible for the practical implementation of directives. Though the OIC is a political not a religious 
organization and thus not strictly bound by any particular interpretation of the Islamic normative system, 
it was founded and has been sustained vis-a-vis Islamic precepts. The names of its various mechanisms 
are quite telling: The Rights of the Child in Islam, the Islamic Development Bank, even its landmark 
meeting for reform was held in Makah, a city exclusive to Muslims.  
Not surprisingly, in accordance with its raison d’etre, institutional conduct has addressed the interplay 
between Islamic and international mandates, frequently struggling to harmonize the normative content of 
two distinct systems. Through its first thirty-nine years, for example, fundamental freedoms and 
international obligations were subject to a sharia’ derogation clause in the OIC constitution. This meant 
that actions contrary to one of the many interpretations of Islamic law was grounds for invalidating a 
treaty-based commitment. The past decade has witnessed a shift in nomenclature from sharia’ to Islamic 
values, amounting nevertheless to the same uncertainty. Partnering with the OIC had long since been 
considered a worrisome mix of secular values with those constrained by interpretations of Islam and 
subject to the authority of often unelected kings, princes, and dictators. 
However, in 2005, as a roadmap for organizational reform and cross-cultural dialogue, 'The Ten-Year 
Programme of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century' urged 
Member States to introduce “changes to national laws and regulations in order to guarantee the respect of 
human rights.”239 In addition, the Ten-Year Plan enhanced interregional cooperation in conflict 
prevention, resolution, and post-conflict peace-building.240 Islamic values were largely equated with 
tolerance, moderation and consensus, advancing the role of women, and maintaining social justice and 
peace. In a similar vein, the Amended Charter, presented in 2008 at the 11th Islamic Summit in Dakar, 
aligns its constitutive document to reflect evolving organisational norms. Refraining from explicit 
reference to sharia’ as a qualifier to upholding human rights, the preamble instead asks Member States 
“to adhere [sic] our commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter, the present Charter and 
International Law.”241 Emphasis is placed on ensuring good governance and accountability. Fundamental 
freedoms are explicated in proactive terminology.242Rather than focus on ways to shirk human rights law, 
the Amended Charter thunders forward, affirming, in general terms, positive obligations to minorities, 
women, foreign treaties, tolerance and Islamic heritage. Sharia’ is removed as an impediment, and both 
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the OIC and UN Charters, are urged to be upheld. Shortly after these changes, in June 2012, the 
Independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights (IPCHR) was established, comprised of eighteen 
experts in the field of human rights. The IPCHR is a means to catalyze internal change has been tasked 
with reviewing and supporting organizational human rights positions while attempting to align global 
norms with domestic policies and Islamic values. Building on the lofty and egalitarian themes of its 
aforementioned predecessors,243 Article VIII of the Commission’s statute seeks to “advance human 
rights,” Article IX to “consolidate civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights,” Article X to 
“monitor observance of the human tights of Muslim communities and minorities,” while Article XI 
focuses on “eliminating all forms of violence and discrimination.”244 In this sense, the IPHRC can be seen 
as “a paradigm shift within the OIC in the way universal human rights and freedoms flow together with 
Islamic values”245 and a clear manifestation of the Organisation’s distinct will. 
Practically speaking, however, though the Commission is to provide technical cooperation, conduct 
research studies, provide consultancy and facilitate international and regional collaboration,246 its 
maneuverability is subject to the whim of OIC Member States. Ostensibly, the Commission is limited to 
consultative powers acting as an advisory organ, similar to the UN Advisory Committee to the Human 
Rights Council.247 With the Council of Foreign Ministers tasked with the actual adoption and 
implementation of policies, to what extent the Commission might leverage Member States to conform to 
their obligations remains to be seen. Unsurprisingly, many European governments have been reticent to 
collaborate with the OIC on refugee-related projects until a clear human rights mandate has been 
consistently implemented. This includes the ability of OIC Member States to achieve non-refoulement 
status.  
2.6 Potential Objections 
Several criticisms have been launched at market-based approaches in the past that might also be levied at 
an EU-OIC market mechanism. Seven of them are discussed below each of which has already been 
addressed in Chapter or will be tackled in Chapter III: 
(a) Advocates for refugee-centered agency might criticize the preponderance of State agency in a 
supranational-directed market. Though there is no legal basis for asylum shopping, failure of the Dublin 
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system has led to ad hoc refugee-centered movements. Proponents of these unilateral movements may 
consider State primacy inadequate.  
There has also been criticism launched over a potential EU-wide tradable refugee quota market, pointing 
to the fact that the current EU refugee system is not strictly command and control. The semblance of an ad 
hoc market arose when Hungary and Greece stated their preferences for not hosting refugees and German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed migrants northbound, en masse, without numerical qualification. 
Protection could in theory achieve Pareto efficiency through Member States engaging in intra-EU 
bargaining without the high transaction costs of a centralized agency responsible for establishing quotas 
and monitoring protection.  
Unfortunately, such optimism is illusory. Merkel’s Market has already proven unsustainable. Germany and 
Sweden have stopped welcoming unlimited numbers of refugees, and anti-refugee States have calcified 
their opposition. There is no EU-wide consensus on a mandatory quota system, in large part because 
observable factors such as GDP, population, or land size, the suggested criteria, do not sufficiently account 
for State preferences in the immediacy, nor their long-term costs. Inversely, forming a ‘hosting ability’ 
distributional key, would likely be undermined by State incentives to distort their true capacity.248 Even if 
a distributional key was agreed upon the costs of mass relocations including legal challenges and enforcing 
secondary movements may be prohibitive.249 
(b) Quality of protection has been a notable concern by human rights lawyers. Prioritizing quantity may 
result in a rush to obtain refugees in exchange for a desirable commodity, then providing less than stellar 
protection. This in turn may force Strasbourg to disallow transfers, even though the country may not fall 
under a non-refoulement category. This has already been seen in judgments from the European Court of 
Human Rights (e.g., M.S.S.)against returning asylum seekers to Greece, and transfers to Italy now require 
special arrangements.250 Guarantees of safe treatment, the Court has found, must fall under the rather 
general heading of  ‘certainty and appropriate action’.251  Crucially, they must include “real risk”252 
“significant evidential presumption”253and must breach “a minimum level of severity”.254 It is notable that 
the Court has also shown a willingness to disregard unfounded quality of protection cases.255 
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(c) The commodification of human beings, a multi-faceted argument involving norm-erosion could 
potentially stifle political will to create a centralized protection clearinghouse.  It is noteworthy that that 
redistribution (infra 2.3) is currently part of the EU status quo. Institutionalizing reassignment may be 
conditional on framing protection in a positive light and encouraging civil society actors to express their 
legitimate concerns and negotiate the rhetoric of a protection market. 
It is noteworthy that legally speaking humanitarian migrants, irrespective of status, may be transferred to a 
non-refoulement country provided the transfer is conducted in safety and with dignity (Infra Chapter III). 
The normative basis for this argument has been laid down by David Miller. Because the claim of a refugee 
is not against a specific State, but all States participating in the 1951 Convention, the refugee is not entitled 
claim to a specific State, but only to have her case decided by some legitimate selection criteria and be 
hosted in any State that can meet the legal obligation to host.256 Legal, of course, includes relevant human 
rights treaties. The foundation for Miller’s claim is a territorial-based jurisdictional right. Sovereign nations 
possess a unique ethical consciousness shaped by socio-political developments and historical 
circumstances. and are therefore licit in preferential assignment of exclusionary rights.257 Let us not forget 
that at the heart of a constitutional democracy is the notion of self-limitation. States place boundaries in 
accordance with the values of the public culture and political community. In fact, this is the very reason 
that refugees are admitted in the first place against conventional norms of entry. 
However, once a refugee develops familial and economic ties, or health complications, the legality of 
transfers becomes murky.258A number of rights are afforded to the former claimants that impose high 
transaction costs upon the transferring State (infra 2.2.3). The result is time-consuming and an enormous 
expense to court systems. To proceed with minimal transaction costs transfers must be conducted 
expeditiously. Moreover, from legal point of view, EU and OIC transfers must be coherent with equivalent 
protection as per Strasbourg’s rulings in the Bosphorous Case.259 Having its own legal personality, the 
European Community is legally responsible for wrongful acts.260 The same holds true from Member States 
under Articles 259 and 260 TFEU. Attribution of responsibility for breaches of fundamental rights under 
the ECHR is thus tenuous. Moreover, from a mechanism design standpoint Article 17 ECHR which 
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prohibits in engaging in activities “aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms” of the Charter could 
be interpreted as an ex ante caution against transfers to third parry, non-EU States. Notwithstanding this 
caution, the Charter’s usage of “aimed” in Article 17 clearly signifies prior intent. As there would be no 
malignant intent in an EU-OIC market mechanism, its juridical trajectory would very much follow other 
refugee relocation schemes, such as the Turkish Statement, which has yet to be effectively challenged.261 
 (e) If OIC States are compensated for hosting EU refugees, there may be an incentive to surreptitiously 
push refugees northbound to continental Europe, then receive compensation for taking them back. Milner 
and his co-authors, for example, in several texts (2009, 2015), express concern that trading protection may 
lead to negative externalities in the security sector262 not captured in market transactions and therefore lead 
to over-incentivized trade.263 Non-observable factors such as social unrest, national identity, and impact to 
the job market all suggest that this may be the dominant strategy. A few points here require exploration, 
though they must be conducted whilst bearing in mind the status quo.  
Currently, OIC States may push refugees northbound without penalty. Nothing prevents Jordan or Turkey 
from engaging in State-sponsored efforts to drive refugees northbound. The fact that they currently host 
refugees without proportionate compensation speaks to their norm commitments. To presume that EU 
funding (already intact, albeit not for hosting specific refugees) would undermine the utility of their norm 
commitment is presumptuous at best. As a corollary, Islamic values add an incentive to uphold norm 
commitments and bilateral agreements. Islamic values, the raison d'être of the OIC, mandates a level of 
care for refugees beyond the proscriptions of the 1951 Convention.264 OIC States shirking refugee quotas, 
without the excuse of security concerns, would fall prey to being named and shamed, and might very well 
face opposition from domestic forces.  
Secondly, there is no guarantee that countries who push refugees northbound would receive additional 
compensation. On the contrary. Refugees may list the States that pushed them northbound at the lower 
spectrum of their preferences, and therefore make them less likely to be selected in the matching 
mechanism. Moreover, several of the OIC States currently hosting refugees may be considered safe first 
countries under the Asylum Procedures Directive. States that push refugees northbound in exchange for 
compensation could end up taking them back without payment. 
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(f) Critics might question why OIC States would compliantly enter into an EU-centric market? Again, 
taking into account the status quo, OIC States are better off entering into an EU-centric market than 
maintaining their current trajectory. First off, payments for some future refugees would be predictable. OIC 
States now host the majority of the world’s refugees without adequate or stable levels of compensation. 
Pakistan, for example, hosts 2.5 million Afghan refugees and receives an annual budget from the UNHCR 
below 140 million USD; however only 40 million of that was disbursed in 2015 due to the Syrian crisis. 
Joining an EU-OIC market is akin to an insurance policy for potential future migrant crises  
Second, and more significantly, the EU resettlement quota would require a number of refugees to be 
transferred from OIC States and hosted on EU territory. Whilst an EU-centric market is not the optimal 
solution for OIC States, and certainly not Pareto efficient, it does put them in a better position than they are 
currently. Though Turkey has recently been earmarked 3 billon Euro for migrant-related matters, many 
OIC States have received little to nothing. If the cost of providing protection is significantly below the quota 
set by a market, poorer OIC States would have incentives to accept refugees from wealthier European 
neighbors.   
(g) In order to employ an extraterritorial approach, the UNHCR recommends repatriation or transfers be 
conducted in safety and dignity. Though this agency standard is non-binding, it is rooted in binding 
mechanisms. Avoiding “harassment, arbitrary detention or physical threats”,  265 for example is derived 
from Article 7 of the ICCPR. Dignity, on the other hand is less clear. In UNHCR’s words, dignity is 
composed of a host of factors including leaving families intact and unconditional return.266The legality of 
market mechanisms may then boil down to the fundamental right of an autonomous individual’s right to 
dignity. If so, dignity is the shibboleth by which market-based solutions may be subject to court stoppage 
and high transaction costs. It is to this complex domain that the forthcoming chapter is devoted. 
Chapter III  
On the Legality of Refugee Transfers 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the refugee crisis of 2015, several EU Member States have employed strategies to avoid hosting 
asylum seekers: tighter border controls, non-entrée agreements with third-party countries, pushing migrants 
to neighboring countries, and fortifying evidential standards for granting refugee status. Dissuasion in its 
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many forms is a consequence of international law clashing with economic and social forces. The 1951 
Refugee Convention to which all EU States have acceded provides a non-bounded definition of protection:  
asylum seekers reaching Europe and determined to be refugees must be protected. State preferences for 
hosting, however, are not boundless. They are subject to shifting public perception, labor market trends, 
and the ability for previous waves of refugees to successfully integrate. Member States that have 
preferences to host fewer than international law dictates are thus faced with a dilemma: either ignore the 
law, amend the law, or lower their respective absorption rate within the law’s proscriptions. 
 
Transferring refugee protection to third party countries may be a solution to ensure Member States satisfy 
both their Geneva Convention and electorate-related obligations. Transfers have been written about 
extensively in the literature and discussed at the EU-level. In effect, they translate into protecting without 
hosting. There is however a question of their legality. Can an EU country legally transfer a refugee or 
asylum seeker to a third-party? And if so, under what conditions? 
 
Chapter III seeks to answer these questions. It does so through two distinct avenues. The first approach 
reviews international and domestic legal instruments pertaining to refugee law. The legality of previous 
intra and inter-EU and external transfers are discussed with an eye towards recent developments in the 
law and future challenges. The second avenue takes a rather unique turn. Arguing that dignity frequently 
has been and may reasonably continue to be the Archimedean point off which European courts permit 
refugee transfers, predicting dignity-based challenges to refugee transfers will be necessary to reduce the 
risk of transfers being adjudged illegal. In turn, lower risk will lower ex ante transaction costs and help 
make an OIC-EU mechanism viable.  
 
The dignity- refugee transfers link is extrapolated in two steps. The first step seeks to clarify ambiguities 
in the term dignity. From a legal optic, dignity has been applied from many different angles and at times 
inconsistently by European courts. How then can States anticipate whether Strasbourg or Luxembourg 
might invalidate a transfer based on multiple understandings on what constitutes dignity? Dignity as a 
principle open to interpretation is analyzed using an evolutionary approach, whereby not only extant law, 
but developments in the law and the impact of those developments are anticipated. 
 
The second step if to put forth a methodological framework able to predict how courts may apply dignity 
to transfers. A logical and straightforward way would be to analyze caselaw pertaining to treatment of 
refugees, juridical tools (i.e., margin of appreciation), or even a chronological progression. However, this 
study argues that such approaches limit predictive capacity. Looking only at refugee-related caselaw, for 
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instance, limits analysis into the substrates of lex ferenda involving dignity− emerging understandings by 
which the law facilitates and protects conditions leading to a dignified existence. In turn, the ability to 
predict legal challenges becomes limited. These substrates are most effectively elucidated through a 
contextualized reading of dignity. The context of this dissertation is the domains typical of the refugee 
experience and constitutes a process by which an individual fleeing persecution must maintain their 
autonomy and occasionally reconcile competing interests with her host community. 
 
Looking at it another way, an organizing principle able to accurately synthesize the act of legally 
transferring a human being must accurately account for the reality that those human beings faces. Since 
millions of realities cannot be reconstructed in a single study, stages that most refugees face, and within 
these stages, common affronts to dignity, guide the analysis. The stages are depicted in figure 13. They 
are: spatial dislocation and relocation; psychological and physical impacts to one’s identity; and the 
interaction between societal and individual conceptions of dignity.        
                                                
 
FIGURE 13 ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK: PREDICTING CHALLENGES TO REFUGEE TRANSFERS  
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Within each stage, pertinent case law is analyzed. For example, how courts have ruled upon challenges to 
spatial dislocation, both refugee and non-refugee related are distilled towards extracting a common legal 
reasoning that guides the relationship between spatial footing and conditions facilitating a dignified 
existence. In turn, this reasoning can be applied to EU asylum policies, minimizing the possibility that 
transfers will be successfully challenged in court. The latter point cannot be emphasized enough: 
minimizing risk is critical towards designing a system of refugee allocation. Predicting dignity-grounded 
challenges to refugee transfers is essential to an efficient system whereby transaction costs from legal 
hurdles and human costs from psychological damage are prevented. 
3.1 Transfers 
Is a State legally bound to offer protection on its own territory? Put another way, the 1951 Convention 
stipulates that signatory states must protect individuals who are persecuted or have a well-grounded fear of 
persecution. There exists a clear negative right not to refoul. But do protection commitments carry any 
positive spatial implications in the absence of a written prohibition? Or, as Foster (2007) notes, is the 
negative implication frequently drawn by State parties in absence of a clear positive obligation licet?  
 
Beginning with Mavrommatis the ICJ has confirmed that the obligation of protecting a human being 
includes extraterritorial applications.267 This “bond of nationality between the State and the individual” was 
later confirmed in Panavezys Saldusiskis Railway Case to validate diplomatic protection.268 Though neither 
citizens nor diplomats of a hosting EU Member State, a link here can be made to refugees. To bring refugees 
who cannot benefit from the traditional State-individual bond of de jure protection, into what one UN 
Secretary-General called “the orbit of the law” a State must supplant the severed bond of a refugee from 
her home.269 Yet, a specific territory, is simply not a precondition for forming a new bond. In fact, territory 
arises as a condition not for the State, but the asylum seeker: she must be outside her country of nationality 
to apply for refugee status. A State then has a right to exclude from its own territory, if and only if the State 
can provide an extraterritorial alternative. Alternative, however, is bound by several legal constraints. Once 
a refugee develops familial and economic ties,270 or health complications,271 the legality of transfer becomes 
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murky.272 Despite the fact that rights and constitutional status derived from Union membership are not 
automatically extended to migrants, a number of rights are afforded to migrants that impose high transaction 
costs upon the transferring State. These include rights corresponding to ICCPR [art. 6, 7(1), 9(1), 10, 13, 
17], CESCR [art. 10(1), 11, 12, 12(2)(a)] and the Convention for the Rights of the Child [art 
2,8,9,10].273Moreover, Article 1(1) of the European Convention for Human Rights limits expulsion of a 
legal alien.274 Scale takes on another face as well. Group-level expulsion is prohibited.275Removal must 
therefore be conducted on a very costly case-by-case basis and without discrimination. The result is time-
consuming and an enormous expense to court systems.  
 
Moreover, because EU legislation must follow relevant human rights treaties (Article 6 TFEU) the 
administrative autonomy held at the national level by Member States cannot deviate from the scope and 
purpose of EU law.276This means that individual hearings must be provided during which the refugee will 
be able to provide reasons for extending his refugee status including past trauma, social, familial, and 
economic ties formed during his time in the host country,277 as well as any considerations relating to the 
possibility of being subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.278 Many of these aspects are 
grounded in EU instruments (i.e., the right to a family under article 8 ECHR) even if the European 
Convention of Human Rights does not retain the status of primary law, nor has the EU acceded to relevant 
human rights treaties.279 Under EU law, such administrative procedures transpire at a national level bounded 
by three constraints: equivalence, effectiveness and compliance with the European Charter on Fundamental 
Rights, particularly Article 47 on effective judicial protection; that is, national procedural and 
                                                             
272 Non-removal under the abovementioned ties has been supported by the Human Rights Committee which has stated that, 
“[Non-citizens] may not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence.” 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15, The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant §7 (1986). 
273 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 
September 1990). The articles from the three above-mentioned Conventions are conveniently delineated in both Hathaway 2005, 
(n23), as well as in footnote 32 of Marjoline Zieck, ‘Vanishing Points of the Refugee Law Regime’ (2005) Immigr. & Nat'lity L. 
Rev., 26, p251. 
274 Protocol No. 7 to the 1950 European Convention (n24). Note: while I am familiar with the three Conventions and these 
Articles in particular, I am grateful for Zieck, (n273), at 252-253 for framing them within the context of the general legal burden 
placed on States before removing refugees. 
275 Article 4, 4th Protocol, European Convention (n24). 
276 Akerberg Fransson, C 617/10, EU:C:2013:280. 
277 When "an alien has developed such a close relationship to his or her State of residence that it has become his (her) 'home 
country,' he is entitled, in addition to Article 13, to the nearly unrestricted protection against expulsion under Art. 12(4)." 
Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, commentary 228 (1993) as referenced Joseph, S., & Castan, M. 
(2013). The international covenant on civil and political rights: cases, materials, and commentary. Oxford University Press. 
 Also see Walter Kalin as qtd in Zieck, (n273) at 257: What must be decisive in the context of Article 12(4) ICCPR is ... that the 
link between the immigrant and the country of immigration has become so intensive that the country of origin is now the point  of 
reference in his or her life." 
278 See, for example, 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment1465 
UNTS 85 / [1989] ATS 21; ICCPR (n15) at Article 7; European Convention (n24) Article 7. 
279 Rosas, ‘The Charter and Universal Human Rights Instruments’, in: Peers, S., Hervey, T., Kenner, J., & Ward, A. (Eds.). 
(2014). The EU Charter of fundamental rights: a commentary. Bloomsbury Publishing. Also, on reliance on the ICCPR: ECJ, 
Parliament vs. Council, C 540/03, EU:C:2006:429 §37. 
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administrative autonomy must not afford lesser rules on EU-related matters than Community proscriptions. 
Community law may not made overly difficult to implement, and international legal instruments effectively 
provide guidance for duration of stay.280 Still, despite potential legal hurdles as positive obligations accrue 
over time, in the first instance, there are no prime facie legal barriers to transferring protection.  
3.2 Legal Objections to Transfers 
Anticipating UNHCR legal objections over refugee transfers may be gleamed from concerns over the 
‘Turkey Statement’ by which irregular Syrian migrants transiting from Turkey to Greece are returned to 
Turkey in exchange for resettling Syrians within the EU at a one-to-one ratio. To be clear, the legal basis 
for refugee transfers differs from the Turkey Statement. The latter rests on the safe first country principle 
derived from the Asylum Procedures Directive, and applies to refugees who could have applied for refugee 
status but did not or whose status was not yet determined.281The first country must be willing to receive the 
refugee, but also to provide a durable solution that includes ‘sufficient protection’.282 Even though transfers 
do not often make use of the safe first country of asylum concept, the UNHCR’s concerns over the ‘Turkey 
Plan’ sheds light on potential objections for refugee transfers and therefore warrant further scrutiny. These 
points are detailed below. 
 
Aside from non-refoulement, the UNHCR recommends that the first country provide “effective and 
available in law and practice”283 taken to mean accession and compliance with the 1951 Convention and 
1967 Optional Protocol.284In addition, there should exist no risk of further persecution,285 onward 
refoulement, and compliance should exist with international human rights and refugee conventions to 
include, but not limited to: health care, education, rights to work and ‘adequate standards of 
                                                             
280Rewe vs. Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland, 33/76, EU:C:1976:188, §5; ECJ, Samba Diouf, C 69/10, EU:C:2011:524, 
§49. Both cases referenced in Hailbronner and Tyhm, (n25), p18-19. 
281 Return of the refugee to the first safe country is optional, and the refugee may rebut or appeal the transferring State’s decision. 
In addition to an interview to determine admissibility Art. 34(1) APD, the refugee may have the right to legal counsel Art.  22(1) 
APD, and an effective remedy before a judicial body Art. 46(1)(a)(ii) APD. Under Article 35(d) of the APD, Turkey may be 
considered as safe (Article 38) country of first asylum. 
282 Plaintiff M70/2011 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32, Australia: High Court, 31 August 2011; UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the Concept of 
"Effective Protection" in the Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers (Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9-10 
December 2002). Note: sufficient protection includes several points, some of which are legally binding, others recommendatory.  
283 UNHCR. ‘Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey 
Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe third country and first country of asylum concept’ (23 March 2016) 
at 3. 
284UNHCR, UNHCR Provisional Comments on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards on Procedures in 
Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status (Council Document 14203/04, Asile 64, of 9 November 2004), 10 
February 2005, at 36; UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and 
Practice - Detailed Research on Key Asylum Procedures Directive Provisions, March 2010, at 283 
285 European Union: Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted (recast), 20 December 2011, OJ L. 337/9-337/26.   
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living’.286Though the UNHCR’s expansive definition of ‘sufficient’ is not in itself binding, several points 
are derived from Treaties and Covenants that all EU Member States are bound by, not to mention case 
law guided by readings of the ECHR under Article 3 and 13. As Ninette Kelley (2002) surmises, this may 
hinge on “whether the claimant’s basic civil, political, and socio-economic human rights, as expressed in 
the refugee Convention and other major human rights instruments, would be protected 
there.”287Importantly, these strictures would apply whether within or outside of EU territory. Since there 
is no clear legal principle separating transfers within supranational and international boundaries, nulla 
poena sine lega scripta would guide conflations of social justice concerns with legal obligations. 
 
Moreover, EU legislation bestows individual rights to migrants, a point clearly recognized by the ECJ.288 
Whether transfers in general require interpretation by the CJEU under 276(b) of the TFEU is debatable; it 
is nevertheless common sense that a blatant disregard for the consensus EU minimal standards that fulfill 
‘sufficient,’ ‘effective,’ and ‘adequate’ risk illegitimating transfers. Strasbourg has been explicitly clear 
that any threat of an Article 3 violation by a non-signatory State receiving an extradited, expelled or 
transferred individual would constitute a violation.289 This has been further clarified to include indirect 
refoulement, such as when actors function on behalf of a sovereign nation intra or 
extraterritorially.290There is likewise a concern when dealing with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian third 
party States whose unpredictable activities may invalidate their status as safe hosts. 
 
A Final Concern 
If the above concerns are satisfied there remains one significant hurdle: that refugees are transferred in 
safety and dignity. While the former can be easily extrapolated, the latter is not so clear. Most recently, in 
the Secretary-General’s report on migration, dignity was explicated in very broad terms: non-discrimination 
and inclusion, addressing roots cause, protecting large movements, responsibility sharing by hosts.291Yet 
precisely what comprises this legal hurdle? Put another way, to avoid high transaction costs from legal 
                                                             
286 UNHCR. ‘Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey 
Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe third country and first country of asylum concept’ (23 March 2016) 
at 3.  
287 Kelley, N. (2002). Internal flight/ relocation/ protection alternative: Is it reasonable?. International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 14(1), 35. 
288 Chakroun, C-578/08, EU:C:2010:117 §41. 
289 Saadi v Italy ECHR 2008; 49 EHRR 30§138, “The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if not returned 
does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment that the person may be subject to on return.” 
290 International Law Commission, ‘Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, UNdoc. 
A/CN.4/L.602, 31 May 2001; Türk, V., & Nicholson, F. (2003). Refugee protection in international law: an overall 
perspective. Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection, 3-45. 
291 United Nations General Assembly. ‘In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants. Report of the 
Secretary-General’ (21 April 2016). 
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battles, how can States predict future challenges to transferring refugees and asylum seekers founded on 
dignity-based claims?  
3.3 Dignity 
Because transferring refugee protection quotas may hinge on their legality, and legality is derived from 
international legal instruments grounded in human dignity, only an applied understanding of dignity can 
provide the legal and ethical validation for a refugee protection market. In order to systematically address 
potential dignity-grounded challenges to transfers, the following analysis proceeds in three steps. The first 
step is to plow through the vagueness and opacity surrounding the term dignity. From this clarity we can 
better understand dignity’s function in judicial interpretation and determine its generalizability amongst 
EU courts, domestic and supranational. Is it the case that one jurisdiction’s usage of dignity are spokes in 
an umbrella framework? Or is dignity context-laden? In other words, is there a minimum core of dignity 
that is translatable and applicable across the EU? The second step is to examine how courts have treated 
the notion of a minimum core, bearing in mind refugee protection. The third and final stage will be to 
approach dignity from a process philosophy optic. Arguing that the dignity of a refugee is ultimately 
decided through a non-static interactive process between refugee and her external environment, dignity is 
positioned within three progressive stages impacting refugees and asylum seekers: identity, spatiality, and 
competing conceptions of dignity between the individual and society.  
3.3.1 A Useless Concept? 
Dignity, and principles more generally, play an interpretive function by which ambiguities or gaps in the 
law are guided.292Unlike rules, which are applied at face value, dignity as a principle is subject to metrics 
or, to quote Robert Alexy, “optimization requirements”.293 This aspect of principles guide uncertainties 
when specific rules enumerating a positive right or prohibition are not present.294 And despite courts 
employing such legal tools as proportionality analyses, subsidiarity, and margin of appreciation to decide 
the appropriate balance between constraints upon personal dignity, opaqueness surrounding what dignity 
means has mounted considerable criticism.295 
 
Opposition to the use of dignity as a value without clear substantive meaning has a rather luminary 
history. Prominent bioethics professor Ruth Macklin has called human dignity “a useless concept” of 
                                                             
292 Barroso, L. R. (2012). Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the Transnational 
Discourse. BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 35, 356; Habermas, J. (2012). The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of 
human rights (pp. 63-79). Springer Netherlands. McCrudden, C. (2008). Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human 
rights. European Journal of international Law, 19(4), p668. 
293 Klatt, M. (Ed.). (2012). Institutionalized reason: the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford University Press; Möller, K. 
(2007). Balancing and the structure of constitutional rights. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 5(3), 453-468.  
294 Alexy, R., & Rivers, J. (2009). A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford University Press. 
295 Because context is critical in balancing interpretative standards, non-EU citizens may not benefit from status conferred by EU 
primary law. Hailbronner & Thym, (n25) p14. 
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“vague restatements”296 while notable Human Rights Law scholar, Christopher McCrudden, has 
acknowledged that dignity is frequently employed as “a smokescreen behind which substantive 
judgements are made.”297 Courts have often come to similar levels of disconcertion. The Supreme Court 
of Canada has found the concept of dignity too abstract to apply as a legal measurement, resulting in “an 
additional burden…rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.”298 Along similar 
lines the dissent in Bouyid v. Belgium, was perplexed at the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber enumerating a 
litany of Covenant and Treat-oriented texts that “provide[d] no indication of how the notion of human 
dignity is to be understood.”299 The German Constitutional Court, in another prominent example, often 
combines dignity with other rights in a manner which makes dignity’s standalone meaning opaque.300The 
worry, especially in a federation or supranational union is that applying universal conceptions of dignity 
that cannot be objectively estimated fosters a mishmash of international norm transfers to domestic law. 
The result is often a set of barely traceable domestic precedents which, in the words of Paolo Carroza, 
may become “indistinguishable from the arbitrary or idiosyncratic preference of a judge for some norm 
over some other one.”301 
 
Without a systematic account of how dignity has been used in relevant legal systems, we are stuck with a 
monolithic view that disallows “a comprehensive understanding of why the Court has embraced dignity, 
what type of actions threaten dignity, and how the Court weighs dignity in relation to other values.”302 
This is especially the case for two reasons. First, dignity has different nuances in different cultures.303 So, 
as Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak notes, “alongside those universal aspects are others that 
reflect each and every society’s own history, culture, and human experience—the matters that lead the 
                                                             
296 Macklin, R. (2004). Reflections on the human dignity symposium: is dignity a useless concept?. Journal of palliative 
care, 20(3), 212. 
297 McCrudden, C. (2008). Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights. European Journal of international 
Law, 19(4), p722. 
298 R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, 2 SCR 483 [22]. 
299 Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no 23380/09, ECHR 2015 §dissent. 
300 Also, Möllers (2009) remarking that dignity acts as an objective norm able to abridge other fundamental rights. Möllers, C. 
(2009). Democracy and Human Dignity: Limits of a Moralized Conception of Rights in German Constitutional Law. Israel Law 
Review,42(02), 420. 
301 Carozza, P. G. (2008). Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights: A reply. European Journal of International 
Law, 19(5), 940. 
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303 For further discussion see Fyfe, R. J. (2007). Dignity as theory: competing conceptions of human dignity at the Supreme Court 
of Canada. Sask. L. Rev., 70, 1; Mégret, F., & Hoffman, F. (2003). UN as a Human Rights Violator-Some Reflections on the 
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities, The. Hum. Rts. Q., 25, 314. 
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society to its own unique understanding of human dignity.”304These distinctions are not semantical. They 
impact how rights are adjudicated and provide content to individuals and groups over what they can 
expect from the State within its boundaries.305  
3.3.2 Evolving Understandings of Dignity  
Secondly, what constitutes dignity is non-static. It shifts alongside what U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Warren’s declared “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”306  
The European system has likewise calibrated dignity alongside shifting societal understandings. In 
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, a case addressing changes to the identity card of a post-op 
transsexual, the ECtHR clearly defines dignity through the Court’s temporal marker: developments in 
how 21st century Europe understood the impact of a transsexual’s identity on her ability to live a dignified 
existence; these understandings “cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the lapse of time 
to cast clearer light on the issues involved.” 307 Meaning, of course, that society had already evolved to the 
level where equal rights for transsexuals must be afforded.  In both instances, the justices use temporal 
markers to illustrate the relative nature of interpreting what constitutes a minimum core of dignity. 
 
Frequently, these temporal markers diffuse from more expansive applications of core rights. Gradual shifts in 
the right for a private life and marriage for homosexuals provide a fine example: laws protecting against 
discriminatory treatment of homosexuals, not recognized when the UDHR was signed are now the norm 
throughout the European Union and have often been reasoned by courts through the protection of dignity.308 
It is unimaginable that half a century earlier dignity would be linked jurisprudentially to homosexual or 
transsexual rights. This of course has bearing on potential refugee transfers. If dignity-based claims guide 
interstate refugee mobility, then a transferring EU Member State must gauge not just existing case law 
grounded in dignity but anticipate the direction society is moving and how that interfaces with lex 
ferenda.  
                                                             
304 Similarly, Israeli’s Basic Law, has allowed dignity to become “the unconventional weapon of invalidating regular law that 
injures human dignity and does not fulfill the stipulations of the ‘violations of rights’ clause.” Barak A. (1994). Human dignity as 
a constitutional right. Haprklit, 41(1-2) (Heb) as qtd in Shultziner, D., & Rabinovici, I. (2012). Human dignity, self-worth, and 
humiliation: A comparative legal–psychological approach. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 18(1), p131. Or the South 
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936 (CC). Also, Möllers (n222) p425, remarking that dignity acts as an objective norm able to abridge other fundamental rights. 
305 Rao, N. (2011). Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law. Notre Dame L. Rev., 86, 186. 
306 Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86 page 101. 
307Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (application no. 28957/95), July 11, 2002 §47. A case overturning an enormously 
unpopular decision four years earlier in Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, in which twelve judges offered dissenting 
opinions. 
308Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. UK, (Application nos. 21417/96 and 32377/96) 27 September 1999.  
88 
 
3.4 Three Stages 
If dignity has several meanings within different legal systems and must be understood contextually 
against a backdrop of shifting societal norms, how then is it possible predict legal challenges to refugee 
transfers? 309 One obvious answer is to look for precedent in previous refugee-related case law or to look 
more generally at case law that uses dignity as its primary legal foothold. Yet these logical pathways are 
either too narrow or too broad. They both fail to efficiently capture the actual experience of dislocation, 
identity stabilization, and macro-microsocial standoffs that refugees typically face in addition to threads 
of legal reasoning that may reasonably impact emerging applications of dignity. The consequence is that 
the determinants that delimit or allow dignity to thrive in dislocation, identity stabilization, and macro-
microsocial standoffs are cubby-holed. The alternative guides the remainder of this paper: extrapolating 
thematically-targeted case law that addresses both refugee-related and broader-related content. Figure 14 
illustrates three potential the analytic frameworks used below to analyze refugee transfers.  
 
 
FIGURE 14: POSSIBLE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS TO ANALYZE REFUGEE TRANSFERS 
What are these stages that help select thematically-targeted case law? Returning to the fundamentals of 
the 1951 Convention, the refugee is an individual who faces persecution, is compelled to leave her 
country of nationality, and whose preferences must be balanced with public interest and societal values. 
This progression constitutes a continuum along which the refugee is provided the opportunity to become 
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an autonomous human being and live a dignified existence. Provided, here, highlights the law’s role in 
facilitating dignity-enabling conditions. The law minimizes institutional, interpersonal, and macrosocial 
impediments towards a dignified existence. The courts enable by balancing, codifying emerging norms, 
but also, ushering in lex ferenda that at times is at odds with majoritarian opinions. These rights, though, 
are not simply bestowed en masse. They are accumulated in piecemeal fashion in contexts that may or 
may not be refugee related. Nevertheless, while their context may vary tremendously, their thematic 
relatedness betrays a certain cohesion. Stages, as meta-signposts highlight the course of the refugee’s 
narrative. They mark waystations and are interpolated with jurisprudential content that reasons dignity. 
Let us look more precisely at what each stage implies:  
 
(A) Asylum seekers flee persecution. They must be hosted on sovereign territory. As such, a spatial 
dimension exists between the fleer and their host. 
(B) Fleeing persecution may affect a refugee’s identity both physically and psychologically.  
 
(C) A refugee must be protected. She must also comport to a balancing act between the realities of 
her host country and her unique identity. Typically, divergences can be mediated. However, at 
times a situation may arise when the dignity of the individual is in confrontation with the dignity 
of the hosting national community. Courts have reasoned these competing conceptions of dignity. 
 
It is in the spatial, identity, and incommensurable rights domains that we witness the law’s response to 
dignity-based claims and their implications for future transfers. Jurisprudence from three themes guide 
State actors on two points. First, they help States anticipate due diligence requirements of alternative 
protection options in third-party States, ones that includes reasonable and affirmative protection.310 
Secondly, they paint an elaborate picture of how positive rights may take on more expansive applications 
reasoned through a dignity-grounded approach. Rights to gay marriage, hygienic detention centers, and 
minimum standards of living are just some of the many examples of recent years. In turn, EU States can 
better predict what type of transfers may entail high transaction costs and act accordingly. 
 
 
 
                                                             
310 For arguments of what constitutes effective and reasonable protection: Hathaway, J. C. (1999). International Refugee Law: 
The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative. Mich. J. Int'l L., 21, 131; Kelley (n287). 
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3.5 Case Selection 
 
In legal analysis there is often concern over cherry-picking cases. To avoid selection bias, a systematic 
method to case selection was undertaken for Chapter III. First, the author identified cases where the crux 
of the judicial reasoning was grounded in dignity. Secondly, the author read through the cases and 
grouped them into three categories: those impacting spatial aspects, identity, and cases that pitted two 
incommensurable rights. Cases that did not fall into these three domains and did not apply to refugees 
were not included. 
At times there was considerable overlap between similar cases. In those circumstances, the author 
determined a common thread of underlying logic and precedent. In those cases that used the same legal 
reasoning to arrive at a ruling that accounted for human dignity, the most was influential case was cited. 
Those cases that used the same precedents, both the original case and the most recent case were often 
cited. In addition, cases that relied on a similar stream of reasoning but did not advance the discussion 
were excluded or were simply footnoted without being extrapolated. For example, although Thornburgh 
v. Abbott, partially overruled Procunier, it did not add nor remove value to the legal reasoning 
surrounding dignity. Rather, Thornburgh placed limits on receiving publications that were detrimental to 
prison security, a limitation already discussed in Chapter III. Thornburgh was therefore not examined at 
length. A similar method was undertaken for cases that directly addressed the nexus of dignity and 
refugees. Cases where human dignity played a minor supporting role were not included, as they did not 
further the discussion. Cases that involved spatial, identity-related, or incommensurable rights that were 
not grounded in human dignity were not included. 
 
3.6 Spatial Progression  
Refugee law protects the persecuted who migrate in search of dignity. The refugee, by definition, is 
forced to flee. She must transfer, both physically and psychologically, a process reflected etymologically: 
‘refugee’ is derived from refugium, literally, ‘to flee back’ while ‘asylum’, means ‘a place not to 
pillage’.311 It is this spatial progression from untenable situation to safe haven that permits the asylum 
seeker to become an exception to sovereignty-based norms of entry. The spatial progression, in fact, 
defines the asylum seeker from the very first instance. To apply for refugee status an asylum seeker must 
have already dislodged herself from the boundaries of her country of nationality (Refugies sur 
Place)312after which any restrictions on a refugee’s movement be grounded in “a reasonable relationship 
                                                             
311 Brewer, E. C. (2001). The Wordsworth dictionary of phrase and fable. Wordsworth Editions at 70. 
312 Article 1A § 2 of the 1951 Convention (n5). 
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of proportionality between the end and the means”.313Unsurprisingly the primary failsafe mechanism 
preventing transfers is spatially grounded, the prohibition of refoulement: returning the refugee to a State 
where she may be tortured, or subject to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. So even whilst States 
have significant leeway in how they evaluate, recognize and host asylum seekers, −what Goodwin-Gill 
(2014) calls the ‘protection gap’−314 State discretion cannot dislocate asylum seekers from the terra firma 
guaranteed by international law.  
 
Case law has likewise drawn clear links between physical terrain and the ability to live a dignified 
existence. Perhaps the most fundamental expression of this linkage is statelessness. Removing one’s 
nationality, or by extension, refusing them entry when their nationality has become untenable, eliminates 
the juridical and psychological space needed to develop one’s sense of self and live a dignified existence. 
Banishment compartmentalizes autonomy. It significantly impedes what the FCC has called “an inner 
space for the purpose of the free and responsible development of his personality” 315 which is critical to 
ensure the potential for a dignified existence.  This opposition to dislocating the individual from her locus 
standii, is eloquently expressed by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles: 
 
There is, instead, the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form 
of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence 
that was centuries in the development… It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear 
and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established against him.316 
 
Highlighted here is the process by which removing one’s spatial footing has a threefold impact: on one’s 
ontological orientation (organized society), one’s mental condition (fear and distress), and by generating 
uncertainty (“knows not what”). By extension, providing a place to stand is not limited to its territorial 
component (e.g., physical safety), but also includes an existential counterpart. In other words, embedded 
within the term ‘footing’ is not only physical terrain protected by rule of law, but equally critical, the 
capacity for interpersonal relationships that allow self-realization through purposeful interaction. The 
opposite is also true: providing protection while dislocating the psychic space needed for a dignified 
existence negates the utility of a safe haven. 
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European jurisprudence, often through Article 3 violations under the ECHR, has often made this very 
link: that spatial configurations factor into whether one’s dignity has been impinged. In Armoniene v. 
Lithuania, space plays an important role in the ECtHR’s decision that publishing a man’s medical 
condition in a newspaper violated his right to a private lie. Because the family lived in a village there was 
an increased probability the illness would become known to family and neighbors “thereby causing public 
humiliation and exclusion from village social life.”317Had the man’s condition been advertised in a town 
with a larger population, poignantly –lower concentration of social ties–public humiliation and its 
deleterious community-driven stigmatization may have been avoided.  Space has likewise played a role in 
US Courts. In Procunier v. Martinez, prison censorship of mail was found to be a violation of the First 
Amendment, since “When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his quality of human 
dignity…the needs for identity and self-respect are more compelling in the dehumanizing prison 
environment.”318If spatial footing and dignity are intimately linked, what are the specific conditions that a 
refugee transferring State must consider to avoid humiliation or qualitatively similar determinants? Is 
transferring analogous to the psychological trauma of denationalization?  Do transfers after a community 
bond has been formed equate to humiliation produced from exclusion, as in Armoniene? Put in legal 
terms: what then are the parameters within which a State’s due diligence is bounded? 
 
M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece suggests what might be the lower boundary of due diligence. In M.S.S. an 
asylum applicant argued against return to his first EU port of entry, Greece, due to deficiencies in 
Greece’s asylum process: specifically, unhygienic living conditions, affronts by the police, and 
overcrowding in filthy spaces at detention facilities. 319 The ECtHR’s ruling hints at challenges to future 
transfers. Belgium, who returned the applicant to Greece was at fault (Art. 3 & 13) for not adequately 
reviewing Greece’s asylum reception record since, quoting Budina v. Russia, a vulnerable individual 
being “wholly dependent on State support” and being faced with “official indifference” could trigger a 
dignity-based violation under Article 3. It was in the Court’s words “because of their [Greek 
government’] inaction…that the applicant has been the victim of humiliating treatment showing a lack of 
respect for his dignity.”320 It is therefore “deliberate actions or omissions” in the face of “prolonged 
                                                             
317  Armoniene v. Lithuania §42 Noteworthy: the dissenting opinion by Judge Zagrebelsky refers to the lack of a proportionality 
test conducted by the Court between public interest and reputation. Of dignity and space there is no dissent. 
318 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), page 416. Also, the Supreme Court held an Article 14 violation (due process). 
Partially overturned in Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) which held that restrictions are permissible on prisoners 
receiving certain publications detrimental to security. 
319 Claims included “appalling conditions,” “lack of effective judicial proceedings” and fears of being refouled. M.S.S. (n250) 
§21.  
320 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (n250) §264. 
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uncertainty” and “the total lack of any prospects of his situation improving” that constitutes a violation of 
Article 3. Uncertainty combined with conscious apathy in the face of complete dependence therefore 
constitute a barrier towards moving refugees from State to State. In fact, though different in narrative 
structure than M.S.S., Tarakhel v. Switzerland relies on a substantively consistent line of reasoning: 
without guarantees (i.e, certainty and appropriate action) of satisfactory treatment, an Article 3 violation 
could transpire. In Tarakhel due to uncertainty over whether asylum seekers would be treated in 
consonance with legal strictures, the Swiss government needed assurances from the Italian government 
that asylum seekers would be treated in consonance with relevant legal statutes in order to make transfers 
legal.  
 
The ECtHR has likewise delineated the lower bounds of State responsibility. In the cases of A.S. v. 
Switzerland, and A.M.W. v. the Netherlands, insufficient proof of ill treatment precluded a positive 
obligation on the part of the Switzerland and the Netherlands not to return an asylum seeker to Italy. In 
A.S. v. Switzerland, “no indication” existed that the defendant would receive subpar treatment, while in 
the latter case, the latter risk of ill treatment was not “sufficiently real.”321 Once again, certainty and 
action are crucial towards satisfying due diligence. That a “minimum level of severity” is necessary to 
trigger an Article 3 violation relates to our discussion on a minimum core dignity.322Refugee-related 
spatial links to dignity are then mediated by: (a) certainty; (b) quality of action (or inaction) taken; (c) 
intention behind action/inaction. Action, moreover, has a predictive component whereby the law must 
reasonably foresee transgressions. 
 
The practical implications are that the intention behind transfers must be publicly articulated in non-
exclusionary terms for both transfer and receiving county. Moreover, transfers should be allocated in 
advance, so that refugees are aware that their terminus destination is not necessarily the one processing 
their claim. This will in turn effectuate certainty and help prevent the perception of unknown 
discrimination raised in Dulles. Quality of action is another factor transferring States must prepare in 
advance. Ensuring that there is not only “no indication” of negative treatment, but a positive confirmation 
of the contrary is essential towards avoiding a dignity-based claim against the transfer. Figure 15 outlines 
these three steps. 
 
                                                             
321 A.S. v. Switzerland (n255) §36; A.M.E. v. the Netherlands (no 51428/10) ECtHR 5 February 2015 §36. 
322 Tarakhel (n251) §94; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (n250) §219; Kudła (n254) §91.   
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FIGURE 15 POINTS OF DUE DILIGENCE NEEDING CONSIDERATION DURING REFUGEE TRANSFERS 
 
 
3.7 Identity: Corporeal 
 
Physicality 
Acknowledging ties between the body and autonomy and individuation is critical towards conducting a 
dignified transfer. The human rights regime was born out of the absolute reification of the individual. 
Recalling not just the image of gas chambers, but of two atomic bombs, a clear link exists between 
dignity and the sacrosanctity of the human body, acknowledged in the early stages of international 
mechanisms. The Geneva Conventions single out “humiliating and degrading treatment”323 in the context 
of prohibiting “outrages upon personal dignity.”324This is likewise true of Article 75 of the First 
Additional Protocol, which links not only humiliating and degrading acts, but enforced prostitution and 
indecent assault. The Second Additional Protocol follows this trend, adding rape to enforced prostitution, 
humiliating and degrading punishment, and indecent assault under Article 4. 
 
European Courts have also made coherent links between physicality, civilization, and human dignity.325In 
Bouyid v. Belgium police officers slapping the face of disrespectful detainees garnered an Article 3 
violation by the ECtHR, as a practice “undermining human dignity” since the face as central to human 
interaction “manifests his social identity” impacting communication.326 Notice that in Bouyid, human 
dignity is not ascribed ‘to’ or ‘of’ but ‘between’ human beings. The implication being that it is in the 
                                                             
323 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949, Art. 3. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no 23380/09, ECHR 2015 §81. The dissenters argued that failure to consider specific circumstances 
whence linking dignity to physicality trivialized the ECHR. 
326 Ibid §24. 
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interpersonal sphere, at times manifested through physicality, that individual human dignity unfurls. A 
slap in the face is in this narrative is not limited to a reaction transpiring at a moment of heightened 
emotion, but a transgression that has long-term implication for one’s psyche. The Court returns to this 
temporal component in Tyrer, where forcibly shaving the head of prisoners was linked to feelings of 
inferiority “at least for a certain period of time.”327The prisoner “carries a mark…visible to others” 
leading to a high probability of “feel[ing] hurt in his dignity.”328 Failure to treat the body with dignified 
recognition thereby impacts psychological states (i.e, subjective dignity) and by extension, self-realization 
as an autonomous individual. 
 
To this point, violating the dignity of the body has been stricken down by courts even when benefitting 
the criminal justice system or claims of public order. In Rochin v. People of California, a case involving 
police officers forcibly inserting a tube into the mouth and stomach of a man to obtain swallowed 
capsules, Justice Frankfurter found that it “shocked the conscience” to “legalize force so brutal and so 
offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a suspect.”329Reminiscent of Rochin, in Katalan v. 
Prison Authority, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled on whether performing an enema to detainees suspected 
of hiding drugs in their anus was constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Barack’s opinion is a 
scathing indictment of the link between violating bodily integrity and violating dignity.330 The ECtHR has 
likewise provided a considerable body of case law connecting dignity with the body. In Rachwalski v. 
Poland, a case involving excessive police violence and violation of one’s private life, Strasbourg ruled 
that “recourse to physical force against a person… diminishes human dignity and is in principle an 
infringement of the right set forth in Article 3.”331 Significantly, even the argument in Goodwin was not 
rebutted by claims of societal dignity or public order. Quite the contrary. Strasbourg emphasized that 
changing the status of transsexuals on their identification card would not cause “concrete or substantial 
hardship or detriment to the public interest.” 332As such “society may reasonably be expected to tolerate a 
certain inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity.” 333  
 
                                                             
327 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom judgment, (1978) case no 5856/72 §67. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) at page 342. Although, the Supreme Court commented in Schmerber v. California, 
‘the Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not 
justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.’ Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 
1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. 
330 HCJ 366/79 Katalan v. Prison Authority, 34(3) PD 294 [128]. Also, on physical intrusion based upon “reasonableness” see 
State of Ohio v. Dario Williams (2004 WL 1902368 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.). For the European system: Schmidt v. Germany (dec.), 
no. 32352/02, 5 January 2006). 
331 Rachwalski v. Poland, §59. 
332 Goodwin, (n307) §91. 
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The implication for refugee transfers is that States whose police force or penitentiary systems have a 
systematic record or excessive force towards migrants might have transfers disallowed. Similarly, States 
without adequate structural support for sexual identity (i.e., formal recognition) may have transfers 
precluded. Toleration, however, is not the gold standard. In some cases, the perceived harm to toleration 
fails to cross a certain minimum level of severity,334 whilst in others a wide margin of appreciation has 
been provided. Whereas threats to the body retain a high probability of successful legal challenges, it is in 
several recent cases involving religious symbols that help clarify the obligation a State might need to 
consider when transferring refugees. Here, the question at hand is whether restrictions to the body, in the 
form of religious paraphernalia lead to a dignity-grounded claim against being transferred? This is 
especially germane to our discussion since dignity in Islam is frequently linked to modesty in dressing. 
How courts have evaluated restrictions on wearing religious paraphernalia the is therefore critical towards 
foreseeing challenges to countries with or currently proposing such laws.  
 
3.7.1 Dignity and the body: the case of religious symbols 
In S.A.S v. France, the ECtHR reaches its most mature web of reasoning on the body-dignity nexus and 
its implications for refugee transfers. As Strasbourg weaves through the French government’s ban on 
wearing niqab, the Islamic veil, the Court considers the validity of the government’s claim that wearing a 
veil can have profound implication on the ability for society to facilitate a dignified existence.335 The 
French government begins with the claim that the face “expresses the existence of the individual as a 
unique person” and that it “reflects shared humanity with the interlocutor.” Veiling the face, in the 
government’s interpretation, leads to a break in the social tie and a manifest refusal to ‘live together’ thus 
constituting an action falling short of the “minimum requirement of civility that is necessary for social 
interaction.” 336  Veiling in this narrative negatively impacts the dignity of those sharing the same public 
space by a visual (i.e., symbolic) refusal to communicate, even if, from a legal point of view, the ECHR’s 
right to a private life places no obligation, nor guidelines how to engage the public sphere.  337  
 
If the French government’s claim that niqab precludes the potential for social cohesion, can such 
reasoning be proportional to culling the dignity of a subset of women who may link their existence as 
autonomous individuals to wearing niqab? In other words, could the European Court of Human Rights 
justify the impingement of an individual’s dignity (as manifested physically) by way of a reading of 
                                                             
334 López Ostra v. Spain, (1994) Series A, no. 303-C, §60. 
335 Moreover, that this ability is measured against a community-driven construct, in this case, social cohesion. In S.A.S. the 
French government’s claim is just this: that niqab leads to a disjuncture between the individual and the public space, making the 
notion of community difficult to actualize. 
336 S.A.S. v. France, [GC], no. 43835/11, (Judgment of 1 July 2014), §82. 
337 Here the ECtHR rightly points to a seminal passage Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 44774/98, (10 November 2005) §109. 
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public order or margin of appreciation? Oddly enough in upholding the French Court’s ruling the 
ECtHR’s first step is acknowledging “a significant negative impact” on women choosing to wear niqab, 
including, potential isolation, restricting their autonomy, and perpetuating and fomenting stereotypes that 
might encourage intolerance.338 Strasbourg’s second step may seem even more obtuse: the Court not only 
acknowledges that expressing one’s cultural identity is an inherent feature in the values of a 
democracy,339but also, that the Court’s role is not to remove the root cause of  tension in a democratic, 
pluralistic society, but to ensure toleration between groups.340Does niqab then preclude toleration? 
Suggesting otherwise, the Court’s states that there is no evidence that women wear niqab to express 
contempt or offend others’ dignity. And further, the Court is clear that a line of reasoning based on human 
dignity cannot justify a blanket ban on niqab.341  
 
What is circumspect here is the way in which a blanket ban on niqab is unable to constitute respect for 
human dignity in the Court’s interpretation but may guarantee the conditions of “living together”. In 
effect, as the dissenting justices point out, a concrete right unmistakably linked to the actualization of 
individual identity is sacrificed for an abstract principle. State-driven perceptions of ‘living together’342 
emerge as an acceptable legal mechanism to violate enshrined individual rights clearly protected by the 
ECHR and grounded in human dignity. The Court nevertheless justifies the ban, as a proportionate aim 
directed to ‘protecting the freedom and rights of others343 and as “necessary in a {specific} democratic 
society.”344  
Niqab was a practice deemed incompatible by the French State vis-à-vis their understanding of the 
fundamental interactions between individuals in French society.345 Society, here, is given “special weight” 
to interpret context346 and the potential diminishment of a Muslim woman’s identity therefore had “an 
objective and reasonable justification”.347 In effect, as the more legalistically coherent dissent points out, 
the perception that niqab is a barrier to individuals living in “a space of socialization,” and that a piece of 
clothing adversely impacts “easier” cohabitation348becomes a lawful mechanism to diminish the dignity 
of a human being. The metric for denying the personal dignity of niqabi women is fixed at a third party’s 
                                                             
338 SAS §149. This harkens back to Arrow’s (1973) model of discrimination where discrimination triggered at an initial phase 
may snowball, impacting perceptions and preferences on both sides. 
339 Ibid §120. 
340 Ibid §127. 
341 Ibid §120. 
342 Proffered as “far-fetched and vague” by the dissent. Ibid §151 
343 Ibid §142. 
344 Ibid §158. 
345 Ibid §153. 
346 Ibid §154. 
347 Ibid §161. 
348 Ibid §122. 
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perception of “easier.” Interestingly, the French version of the text uses “facilitant” to describe the 
‘easier’ metric (“un espace de sociabilité facilitant la vie ensemble”) thereby alluding to an active process, 
a heuristic to circumvent positive law. So, on the one hand, safeguarding human dignity, as the core of the 
ECHR, and more generally, international law, must be “practical and effective”349and on the other hand, 
dignity may be contingent on societal proscriptions. 
 
Interestingly, other cases involving the adornment of religious symbols have chosen to balance social and 
individual rights. Often, these cases have involved an employer’s right for a neutral environment. They 
have balanced the real-life impact to the employer against a potential ECHR Article 9 violation (freedom 
of religion). In Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom, one such example, an airline worker’s challenge to 
British Airway’s policy preventing her from wearing a cross necklace outside her clothing resulted in an 
Article 9 violation against the United Kingdom for failing to offer suitable domestic law. Though 
recognizing the right of a private company to act within a margin of appreciation, the Court in Eweida 
nevertheless found that a fair balance had not been achieved. The Court reasoned that manifesting one’s 
belief is a fundamental right, that “a healthy democratic society needs to tolerate and sustain 
pluralism,”350 and that wearing a cross may be “a central tenet” of their existence. On the other side of the 
scale, British Airline’s corporate image was not disproportionately harmed from her wearing a cross. In 
other words, although a neutral corporate image was “undoubtedly legitimate” it was given “too much 
weight” since there wasn’t evidence of religious clothing having a negative impact on the employer. The 
Court weighed the potential harm to British Airways’ corporate image versus “real encroachment on the 
interests of others,”351a formulation that is of critical importance for a dignity-based reading.  
 
This balancing between one’s identity as manifest in the choice to physically adorn themselves with 
religious paraphernalia and the encroachment onto the rights of other parties, is further clarified by the 
second applicant in Eweida who was prohibited from wearing a cross necklace at a geriatric ward. Using 
the standard of whether the cross was an “interference [that] was necessary in a democratic society”352 the 
Court ruled against the second applicant, Ms. Chaplin. The Court found that in hospitals a wide margin of 
appreciation must be permitted due to health and safety concerns.353 Hospital managers “were better 
placed” to make informed decisions regarding patient and staff safety than an international court.354 
                                                             
349 Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], no 32541/08, § 118, ECHR (2014). Also see Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, Series A 
no. 37, §33. “The Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and 
effective.” 
350 Eweida v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37 §94. 
351 Ibid §95. 
352 The sentence continues “in pursuit of one of the aims set out in Article 9 § 2”. Eweida (n350) §98. 
353 Ibid §95. 
354 Ibid §99. 
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Despite different results, both applicants in Eweida are adjudged by three common criteria: (a) whether 
there is a legitimate aim to discriminate; (b) whether the legitimate aim is in proportion to the right it 
discriminates against; (c) whether the court is in a better position than the discriminating party to decide.  
 
It is notable, however, that the ECJ has used alternative reasoning. In Archbita v. G4S Secure Solutions, 
Luxembourg sided with a private company’s neutrality policy against an employee adorning religious 
paraphernalia. It found that a neutrality policy prohibiting the manifestation of religious symbols was a 
legitimate aim not contravening anti-discrimination laws so long as there is contact between the employee 
and customers. 355 The concomitant point being that neutrality of religion in the private sphere is necessary 
for the perception of a neutral corporate image in a pluralistic heterogeneous society and may trump 
individual rights. This reasoning is at odds with the ECtHR in Eweida where neutrality accounted for a 
more robust understanding of Article 9 (Freedom of Religion), that is, in actuality, how it may have 
affected the customer base. Neutrality as a first-order principle by which physical manifestations of one’s 
religious identity may be limited is not taken for granted (e.g., Article 16 placed higher than Article 9) 
and must have appropriate weight. What was not taken up in either Eweida or Achbita is the variable of 
human dignity tied to self-expression, and self-expression towards human dignity. S.A.S. tackles this issue 
head on and still finds a wide margin of appreciation in France’s interpretation of social cohesion. 
 
What then are the implications for this chapter? Could limitations on wearing religious clothing be 
grounds to block a refugee protection transfer?  Or could a refugee argue that her ability to live a 
dignified existence within the social space of a host country impedes the development of her personality? 
To both questions an affirmative answer is dubious. While it is clear that repeated behavior by law 
enforcement or penitentiary systems humiliating, debasing, or otherwise limiting human dignity may lead 
to challenges over transfers, restrictions on wearing religious paraphernalia (what, where and how it may 
be worn), while non-homogenous across EU States, and not directed supranationally (e.g., France’s 
margin of appreciation might not be afforded to an argument provided by Poland) means that challenges 
to transferring on the basis of adornment of religious symbols is a purely domestic affair (Leyla Şahin v. 
Turkey). Neither is there any indication that physical restrictions within a social space or workplace could 
prevent transfers within the EU. However, in cases where niqab or hijab is restricted, refugee transfers 
                                                             
355 In an odd twist, the ECJ ruled that freedom to conduct business under Article 16 of the European Charter is legitimate 
“notably where the employer involves in its pursuit of that aim only those workers who are required to come into contact with the 
employer’s customers Case C-157/15 Achbita vs. G4S Secure Solutions [2015]§38. As noted in several commentaries, the ECJ’s 
proportionality treatment −asking whether Ms. Achbita could have been provided a position “without involving visual contact” 
with customers− implies that discriminating religious beliefs is licit so long as it is equally applied to all 
employees.https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/03/27/european-court-of-justice-keeps-the-door-to-religious-discrimination-in-
the-private-workplace-opened-the-european-court-of-human-rights-could-close-it/. 
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should strongly consider marking such States in the matching mechanism. This will bestow agency on the 
refugee as to whether she wants to be transferred to a non-niqab or non-hijab State. From Strasbourg’s 
previous rulings this would seem to satisfy due diligence concerns on the part of the transferring State. 
Figure 16 outlines the judicial tools and reasoning used in cases linking dignity to the body. 
 
 
Figure 16 Judicial tools used to decide cases linking individual dignity and the body  
 
3.7.2 Identity: Psychological  
While the psychological and corporeal pathways towards human dignity are at times linked–defilement of 
one’s body usually has severe psychological consequences– the two are distinguished by the manner in 
which they originate. Abasing one’s dignity through attacks to their identity can transpire psychologically 
without physical contact or spatial dislocation. This is particularly true with humiliation and degradation 
of self-worth, which Shultziner & Rabinovici (2012) argue constitute a psychological dislocation between 
individual and autonomy.356  
 
Courts have time again reached this very conclusion, often through a reading of degradation and 
humiliation leading to an infringement of human dignity. In Miller v. Minister of Defense, a case 
involving gender discrimination for fighter pilots, Justice Doner of the Israeli Supreme Court articulated, 
“There is no reasonable way of construing the right to dignity, as stated in the Basic Law, such that the 
degradation of a human being will not be considered a violation of that right.”357 Similar jurisprudential 
reasoning has come out of Strasbourg. In Orsus v. Croatia, a case involving discrimination of Roma 
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schoolchildren, the ECtHR ruled that if humiliation and lack of respect are generated through unequal 
access to equal education, the dignity of the children is undermined. 358 In Iwanczuk v. Poland359 
humiliation and debasement from vulgar comments while being strip-searched by prison guards “showed 
a lack of respect for the applicant’s human dignity” and in Price v. United Kingdom a long-term impact to 
one’s autonomous nature may be derived from “possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance”360 
and reifying them through adverse detention conditions.361  In Ireland v. the United Kingdom, a case 
involving extrajudicial interrogation methods against IRA members in England, the ECtHR found 
“techniques”362 that “arouse in their victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of 
humiliating and debasing them”363whether physical or purely psychological,  are in violation of Article 3, 
covering torture, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment. And the court has said on numerous 
occasions that the purpose of Article 3 is to protect one’s dignity.364  
 
Techniques, of course, suggest an exogenous agent. In Strasbourg’s jurisprudence, this agent has 
frequently acted with an intent to instrumentalize the humiliated, tortured, or degraded subject, as the 
United Kingdom interrogators exhibited in the previous example. The question then for a dignity-based 
reading of refugee transfers is what level of due diligence a State would need in order to avoid liability for 
an Article 3 violation. Is it enough that the State has no intent for transfers to lead to psychologically-
derived debasement and humiliation? Are reasonable quality of protection checks of third-party transfer 
States sufficient? Here, three points require examination: intent, intensity and social reality.  
 
3.7.3 Intent 
To be linked to the criteria of ‘degrading or inhuman’ Strasbourg has acknowledged that an “inevitable” 
typology of suffering must be present. Critically, whether treatment has exceeded the ‘inevitable’ 
threshold is not contingent on the victim’s behavior365 nor intent of the perpetrator.366 A violation of 
dignity may therefore occur regardless of the inflicting agent’s mens rea. Even in the absence of intent, 
                                                             
358 Oršuš and Others v. Croatia (15766/03), 16 March 2010. The decision was in part based upon UNESCO’s definition of 
discrimination under Article 1 of the Convention against Discrimination in Education, in terms of “national or social origin” at 
96.  
359 Iwanczuk v. Poland, no. 25196/94, 15 November 2001 §59. 
360Price v. United Kingdom, no. 33394/96 §75   
361 Ibid §95: “the act of depriving someone of his liberty brings with it the responsibility for the State to detain him under 
conditions which respect the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
362 Ireland v. The United Kingdom (App no 5310/71) ECHR 13 December 1977 §167. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Tyrer (n327) §33. The question then becomes: does there need to be a degree of permanence in barriers to identity, or is a 
single instance of stigmatization sufficient to constitute a formative violation? 
365 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §79; Georgia v. Russia [GC], no. 13255/07, §192. 
366 Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, §119, ECHR 2000. Although intent may be considered when determining whether an 
Article 3 threshold has been breached. See: Egmez v. Cyprus, no. 30873/96, ECHR 2000, §78; Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 
50222/99, (September 2004), §53. 
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humiliation can still, for instance, fall within the parameters of an Article 3 violation and negatively 
impact an individual’s dignity.367Underscoring this point the Court proposed that the standard for an 
Article 3 violation may be subjective: whether “the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes.368 This is 
in consonance with the psychology literature showing that humiliation and self-worth are intimately 
subjective.369 A tricky, albeit important aspect of the humiliation-dignity nexus is therefore perception. 
 
Intuitively, individuals process actions differently. What constitutes shame, fear, degradation, and pain in 
one person is not necessarily generalizable to her neighbor. And yet, because no instrument is capable of 
divining the genuine scope of perception, ultimately, courts must abide by a reasonableness and 
proportionality-based standard for determining subjectivity. Reasonableness has often been extracted 
within the framework of what the social community deems acceptable.  This logic is not far removed 
from the Rawlsian notion of public reason (Rawls, 1997)370 and has been frequently picked up by the 
ECtHR in Article 3 violations. In one such example, despite attempts to provide care for an 84-year old 
paraplegic convicted of crimes against humanity and genocide but unable to care for himself in prison, in 
Farbtuhs v. Latvia, the plaintiff was found to have been subject to humiliation and feelings of inferiority, 
falling under Article 3, due to the Latvian penitentiary system’s inability to provide for the prisoner’s 
basic health needs.371Ultimately it is up the judges to discern whether an act could have reasonably caused 
humiliation in a victim’s eyes.  
 
This implication likewise resonates in Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom,372 a case involving the 
refusal to change the gender of a post-op transsexual on her national identification card. Strasbourg 
concluded that denial of recognition of identity change from transgender surgery creates “a conflict 
between social reality and law arises which places the transsexual in an anomalous position, in which he 
or she may experience feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety.”373 The threshold for an Article 
3 violation is therefore not the magnitude of physical pain, but subjective feelings. This would be in line 
with Margalit (1998) who notes that, “human beings are creatures capable of feeling pain and suffering 
not only as a result of physically painful acts but also as a result of acts with symbolic meaning”374and 
may carry a long-term impact on the individual’s psyche. 
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371 Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672/02, 02 December 2004 §58. 
372Goodwin (n307). 
373 Goodwin (n307) §77. 
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3.7.4 Intensity 
Here we broach a connecting element: the intensity used to reach a particular goal.375 It is not merely 
intent or self-perception, but also, from the ECtHR’s point of view, that the “method of the execution” 
does not lead to “an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in [the process].” 376 
Even where there is no malignant purpose, such as in Jallah v. Germany, a case of police forcing a drug 
dealer to take an emetic in order to obtain the plastic bag of drugs he swallowed in police presence, if the 
goal leads to “grave interference” with a subject’s mental integrity it may constitute inhuman and 
degrading treatment, particularly if a less severe method was possible and if the procedure had the 
reasonable possibility of creating feelings of inferiority and humiliation.  377 Minimum-level of severity as 
a tool to clarify violations of dignity under Article 3 has also been made clear in Ireland v. United 
Kingdom, where the Court found that distinguishing deprivation of liberty from mere restrictions was a 
matter of intensity, not substance.  
 
This point is likewise evident from the negative approach Strasbourg has employed to edify the lower 
bounds of permissible behavior. In Lopez-Ostra v. Spain, the Court found that a waste treatment plant in 
the vicinity of the claimant’s house was not enough to be considered an infringement of Article 3 since 
the health risk to local families impaired quality of life, but “not enough to infringe the fundamental 
rights.”378 Whilst in Guzzardi v. Italy a holistic approach used to determine whether an Article 5 violation 
(restriction on liberty) had taken place found that a violation was a matter of intensity not substance. This 
reasoning is echoed in Tommaso v Italy where restrictions to Mr. Tommaso’s liberty were not understood 
by Strasbourg judges to amount to deprivation of liberty (Article 5 violation), since there had been an 
acceptable change of intensity to his liberty (i.e., restriction, but not deprivation). 
 
Nevertheless, while perception and intensity remain in the realm of judicial discretion there are some acts 
that constitute a social fact of humiliation or degradation. Courts have linked these particular types of 
behavior as being inconsistent with dignity. As Webster (2016) notes, Strasbourg’s usage of “in 
principle” in Yankov v. Bulgaria to explain how forcibly shaving a prisoner’s hair, could result in 
                                                             
375 Not only can there be a violation of dignity without intent, but simply breaking down resistance, either morally or physically 
may lead to degrading treatment. Hunde v. Netherlands, (05 July 2016) ECtHR. Here, the purposive element links severity with 
goal. A thread running between a conscious effort and the breaking down of conscience. The humiliator’s actions are goal-based. 
They seek to obtain information or met out punishment in order to elicit a particular response. Gäfgen vs. Germany, Application 
no. 22978/05 June 2010, § 89. 
376 Kudła (n254) §94. 
377 Jallah v Germany (App no 54810/00) ECHR 11 July 2006 § 82. In the case of Jallah, allowing the bag to be excreted 
naturally. 
378 Lopez Ostra v. Spain (41/1993/436/515) ECHR §11. 
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degradation of the prisoner’s dignity, reveals how acts may constitute a social fact of violating dignity. In 
such cases there is a clearer path for the courts. It is doubtful, though, that refugee transfers could 
constitute an ‘in principle’ situation, since the social fact of refugees being transferred to any location 
where they can receive protection overrides other concerns. Based on previous reasoning of the European 
Courts, a protection market would not prime facie appear “in principle” to humiliate, as previous rulings 
against refugee transfers have been tied to the conditions of their treatment, not the movement itself.379 
However, it is also true that the Court has ruled against cases where autonomy is restricted or coercively 
decided, and this point warrants further exploration.  
 
3.7.5 Restricting autonomy 
The legal question at hand is the degree to which transferring protection is a restriction of individual 
autonomy, stricto senso, that may reasonably lead to humiliation. Such restrictions would likely have real 
consequences for a refugee’s dignity. Looking at the jurisprudence of the European courts, the conditions 
laid out whereby autonomy is restricted typically involve impeding the ability to make a decision, not 
make a specific decision. Intentionally removing one’s ability to choose is what the Court has ruled may 
violate human dignity, not removing their number of choices. So, in the commonly cited example of UK v 
Ireland, it is facilitating the “break[ing] of the will” that denies a barrier to the functioning of one’s 
personality, not limiting the ability for the will to actualize itself in pre-selected environments. In this 
sense refugee transfers do not impede such a definition of autonomy. Autonomy, however, may also be 
restricted through exclusion from society. 
 
The psychological basis for this linkage is the notion of community. Dignity and community flow multi-
directionally. Individuation develops in consonance with community and requires some baseline of 
attachment and recognition.380 In the Lifetime Imprisonment Case, the FCC makes this very point: that the 
individual’s “potential to determine himself in freedom and develop from within… is related to the 
community and bound by it.”381 This thinking is in line with an early decision by the FCC found that, the 
Basic Law did not see man as an “isolated sovereign individual”382 but rather “has decided the tension 
between individual and society in favour of the person’s orientation and commitment to a community.”383 
 
                                                             
379 Tarakhel v. Swizterland (n251); M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, (n250); A.S. v. Switzerland (n176). 
380 The Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit, for instance, presupposes recognition by the community, as does dignity in the 
foundational writings of Paine and Renouvier.  
381 45 BVerfGE 187 (1977). Last accessed December 18, 2015 from < http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/dignity/45bverfge187.html>. 
382 BverfGE 4, 7 [15]. 
383 Ibid. 
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Though a pluralistic society will naturally have a diversity of belief structures, they are unified by a thread 
of community recognition, what Robert Post has observed, “arises from full membership in society”384 a 
notion at the center of Hegelian thought. That is, the formation of self is not a purely internal exercise and 
presupposes reflexivity. The pathway to dignity (or on the other side of the coin, self-respect) is 
recognition by an external body under certain conditions. Among these conditions is a rigor that moves 
beyond symbolic gestures to meaningful inclusion. In our context, the refugee must be viewed as not only 
an autonomous individual with intrinsic dignity, but also as part of the broader society.  
 
Process philosophy augments our understanding here: self-consciousness is frequently formed through 
objectification of the self, by way of popular expression: ‘putting oneself in another’s shoes’ then looking 
back unto oneself. Without the structured environment within which inter-subjectivity is facilitated, the 
objectified self cannot form. It is through these experiential transfers that the individual is able to become 
an object to himself (Mead, 1934). To this point neither refugee nor host is a passive actor. Each influence 
and is influenced by his environment. Each takes actions vis-a-vis objects created by social activity. 
Accordingly, perception becomes an interactive mechanism catalyzing object relation between an 
individual and her social environment, not a purely cognitive function removed from the external. To 
paraphrase Axel Honneth (2007) recognition must transcend the symbolic plane to reach some tangible 
fulfillment.385 
 
An essential implication of equating self-realization with membership in a community −and by extension 
dissuading exclusion− is protecting rights relating to personality and identity. Typically, these rights are 
interpersonal in character and are often exemplified in rulings against hate speech or group 
discrimination.386 Courts have clearly indicated that actions targeting a group’s identity adversely impacts 
their dignity. Limitations have been placed on several artistic productions due to their capacity to degrade 
the identity and self-worth of groups.387Germany’s ban on Nazi imagery recalls protection of group 
identity, 388 as does the prohibition of a Canadian schoolteacher disseminating anti-sematic material.389 In 
                                                             
384 Post, R. C. (1986). The social foundations of defamation law: Reputation and the Constitution. California Law Review, 691, 
711. 
385 Honneth, A. (2007). Recognition as ideology. Recognition and power: Axel Honneth and the tradition of critical social 
theory, p. 329-330. 
386 Whitman (n302) p1151. 
387 For example, BverfGE, 64 274 for a German Court ruling on peep-shows and the dignity of women. 
388 Stafgesetzbuch Art 86a; See also Mephisto Case BVerfG 1971, 30 BVerfGE 173. Also, Norbert Hofer´s comments about 
refusing to advocate an overturn on the Austrian ban of Nazi paraphernalia due to the alleged anti-Semitism among Syrian 
refugees. The Guardian. Last accessed 05 May 2016 from < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/25/austrian-far-right-
partys-triumph-presidential-poll-turmoil-norbert-hofer>. 
389The defendant told his students, that the Holocaust was used to bring about sympathy for Jews and the Jews were in a 
worldwide conspiracy for world domination, among other similar such claims. 
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the latter case, R. v. Keegstra, the Canadian Supreme Court found that preventing harm against an 
identifiable group overrode freedom of expression:390  
 
A person's sense of human dignity and belonging to the community at large is closely linked to 
the concern and respect accorded the groups to which he or she belongs. The derision, hostility 
and abuse encouraged by hate propaganda therefore have a severely negative impact on the 
individual's sense of self-worth and acceptance.391 
 
Being transferred to States that have a consistent record of discrimination against the transferee’s group or 
refugees in general might therefore preclude transfers. And yet here we must be careful not to include 
widespread discrimination with situations where the dignity of the individual has been pitted against 
societal goals. Consider the ban on the Islamic veil (niqab) in France, reasoned through promoting social 
cohesion. The ECtHR has found the ban within the margin appreciation of the French State and therefore 
not in violation of Article 9 (right to freedom of religion).392Nevertheless, the ban constitutes an affront to 
the dignity of many women wearing niqab by limiting their ability to live as autonomous individuals. Or 
consider the ban on dwarf throwing in the French towns of Morsang-sur-Orge and Aix-ev-Provence. The 
UN Human Rights Committee has stated that the ban must be upheld despite the dwarves themselves 
petitioning for the throwing practice to continue. The Committee reasoned that bans negatively impacting 
the livelihood of a few individuals, in this case the dwarves, may be “necessary in order to protect public 
order, which brings into play considerations of human dignity.”393 Limitations on individual autonomy are 
thus in some cases permissible when proportionate to non-discriminatory societal aims.394 
 
And yet, to ensure that balancing does not become exclusion, the architecture of placing limits on human 
dignity must not exceed a proscribed metric. Often, in the European regional system, such cases stipulate 
a threshold of “go beyond that inevitable element [of suffering or humiliation]”395 or have “exceeded a 
minimum level of severity” − both relative metrics.396Neither metric, it must be added, necessarily place 
community over individual needs. This is a crucial point. It means that while margin of appreciation may 
be afforded to State-level arguments, dignity-debilitating exclusion may run counter-majoritarian. In such 
                                                             
390 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 See also R v Krymowski [2005] 1 S.C.R. 101. 
391 Keegstra (n390) at 746. 
392 Ebrahimian v. France (application no. 64846/11) (2015). S.A.S. v. France, (n257). 
393 Manuel Wackenheim v France, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 (2002), at 7.3. 
394 Alexy, Robert. "Constitutional rights, balancing, and rationality." Ratio Juris16, no. 2 (2003): 131-140; Alexy, R. (2005). 
Balancing, constitutional review, and representation. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 3(4), 572-581. 
395 V v. the United Kingdom, no 2488/94, (10 December 1999) §71. 
396 Kudła (254) §91. Also note in Gäfgen (n375) §88 factors motivating an above-minimum reading include intention, 
motivation, context (e.g., emotions). 
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cases, the dignity of the individual supersedes what a large component of society understands as dignity. 
For example, though the State of Texas concluded that homosexual acts offended the autonomous 
existence of many of its citizens, in Lawrence v. Texas, the US Supreme Court invalidated Texas’ anti-
sodomy statue. The Court found the ability for consenting adults to engage in homosexual relationships 
“central to personal dignity and autonomy”397regardless of contrary views held by a large segment of 
society. Supporting this legal reasoning, in Alekseyev v Russia, the ECtHR is clear that “it would be 
incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Convention rights by a 
minority group were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority,”398 and earlier, in Young, 
James and Webster v. United Kingdom that “democracy does not simply mean that the views of a 
majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of 
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.”399The ECJ has likewise chimed in, finding that 
Community values against discrimination took precedence over regional identity.400 This means that 
juridical tools (i.e., proportionality analysis) may not easily employ numerical or national identity 
reasoning for policies that may adversely impact the dignity of asylum seekers. 
 
How might this play out in the refugee context? On the one hand, transfers might be precluded if  
refugees can legitimately argue that their dignity as individuals within a group will be adversely impacted 
by transfer to a particular state.401 For instance, if a refugee has formed social ties and sees herself as part 
and parcel of a particular community, being upended and transferred could very well be argued as being 
humiliating and a barrier to investing in that particular community in the first place. So too might be 
claims of group-based discrimination.  
 
3.7.6 Exclusion from Scarce Resources 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms dignity in metric terms: human beings are “equal in 
dignity and rights.”402A number of positive obligations are required to satisfy this equality. Social 
security, for instance, is deemed indispensable for both dignity and development of the personality, as is 
the right to work. 403 Both must be offered without discrimination.404This logic is likewise directed 
                                                             
397 Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 at 574. 
398 Alekseyev v Russia Application No 14599/09, Merits, 21 October 2010, §81. 
399 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom 7806/77 [1981], 4 EHRR 38, §63. 
400 ECJ 6 June 2000 – C-281/98 – Roman Angonese v Cassa die Risparmio di Bolzano S.p.A. 
401 Falling under the ‘protected characteristic’ category, depends on whether is “whether a group is united by an immutable 
characteristic or by a characteristic so fundamental to human dignity that a person should not be compelled to forsake it.” Türk & 
Nicholson (n290) p17. 
402 UDHR (n24) Article 1. 
403 Ibid Art 22; ICCPR at Art 9. 
404 CESCR, General Comment No. 19: The right to social security (Art. 9 of the Covenant), 4 February 2008, E/C.12/GC/19, at 
29; European Committee on Social Rights, European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless 
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towards non-contributory welfare schemes.405 Positive rights to a minimum standard of benefits are 
present in several domestic European constitutions and have been adjudicated in their respective 
constitutional courts. The Constitutional Court of Hungary, for example, grounds the right to social 
security as “necessary for the realisation of the right to human dignity.”406Italy and Switzerland’s High 
Courts have derived social welfare rights and housing, respectively, through an interpretation of 
dignity,407 and Karlsruhe has interpreted non-contributory social welfare benefits as the right to a 
dignified minimum existence.408 
 
Could refugees avoid transfers by claiming that their new host State is unable to provide benefits ensuring 
a dignified minimum existence? Could they argue, as Denise Réaume (2002) has on a related point, that 
“there are some benefits or opportunities, some institutions or enterprises, which are so important that 
denying participation in them implies the lesser worth of the excluded”?409Quite possibly. But in such 
cases, a distinction must be drawn between deprivation of scarce goods, and the impoverishment of an 
individual’s sense of worth caused by denial of access to a minimum quantity of resources in that 
particular State. It is important to recall that there is no legal basis for a refugee-hosting State’s 
understanding of fundamental, as derived vis-a-vis the social contract between State and citizen, as being 
equal to the understanding of other transfer States. What is required is that a minimum standard be linked 
to the status quo in that particular transfer State. This means that, as per Müslim v. Turkey, financial 
assistance for refugees to meet a self-desired standard of living is not an obligation of the State.410That 
standard, however, cannot drop below a minimum standard in that State, often articulated as emergency 
levels.411Therefore, though minimum may not be discriminatory, it is not at all times equal.  
Frequently, the legislature is afforded an interpretative margin of appreciation to calculate “the amount of 
what guarantees the physical and social existence of a human being.”412  Still, minimum benefits cannot 
be discriminatory. A recent ruling from the CJEU in Ayubi v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Linz-Land, 
                                                             
(FEANTSA) v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 86/2012; Kalsruhe has cited ICESCR in its Asylum Seekers Benefits Case, 
BVerfG, Judgement of 18 July 2012 – 1BvL 10/10 – Rn. (1-110): “complete exclusion from cultural life may hardly be 
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405  (CESCR), General Comment No. 19 (n404) p37,38. 
406 Alkotmanybirosag (AB) [Constitutional Court] 32/1998 (Hung.), as quoted in McCrudden (n292) p693. 
407 V. v. Einwohnergemeinde X. und Regierungsrat des Kantons Bern (BGE/ATF 121 I 367) Swiss Federal Court; Other 
Constitutional Courts, it must be noted, have strayed from dignity as a foundation for social rights. Dupré, C. (2003). Importing 
the law in post-communist transitions: the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the right to human dignity. Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 77. 
408 Hertz IV case. BVerfG, 1 BvL 1/09.  
409 Réaume, D. G. (2002). Discrimination and dignity. La. L. Rev., 63, 688. 
410 Müslim v. Turkey (n195) §85.  
411 Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands (complaint no. 90/2013), Council of Europe: European 
Committee of Social Rights, 21 January 2013. 
412 Note that in the case of Hertz IV, the legislature has leeway (Gestaltungsspielraum) to calculate welfare benefits that fulfill the 
quality of maintaining human dignity, being non-discriminatory and that are needs-based. Hertz IV, (n330), at 14. 
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clarified that Austrian provinces must provide minimum benefits to refugees in the same manner given to 
Austrian nationals.413 Ayubi clarified that Article 29 of the Qualification Recast means social assistance 
benefits are linked to refugee status not residence permits. EU Member States have to make certain “that 
every refugee to which it grants its protection enjoys the same level of social assistance as that provided 
for its nationals.”414Based on this ruling, it is likely that Austria could be successfully challenged in the 
CJEU, on their recent proposition of cutting benefits of  EU workers in Austria whose children live 
outside of Austria, based on the worker’s residency status, if those workers are refugees.415 
Above a minimum core, it is not a one-for-one relationship of social welfare goods that is the issue, but 
how groups on both sides (refugees and citizenry) perceive inclusion. Accordingly, in Asylum Seekers, the 
FCC positioned the right to a dignified minimum existence as “encompassing both the physical existence 
of a human being as well as the possibility to maintain interpersonal relationships and a minimal degree 
of participation in social, cultural, and political life.” 416 Often, proportionality and margin of appreciation 
have been applied to such cases where dignity is linked to social welfare rights. The Canadian Supreme 
Court, in a prominent example, has been quite clear that social welfare benefits may be limited when they 
promote, rather than depreciate dignity. This has been true not only of a dearth of provisions, but an 
excess. In Goslin v. Quebec, dealing with conditional welfare benefits for those under 30, Louise Goslin 
challenged legislation that provided full-benefits only if recipients would participate in one of three 
workforce programs in order to empower youths to seek gainful employment or go to school.417 The 
Canadian Supreme Court found that there had been no violation of denying welfare benefits to those who 
refused to participate in workforce programs, since “[Ms. Gosselin had] not demonstrated that the 
government treated her as less worthy than older welfare recipients” and that the workforce program 
incentivized working towards “the realization of goals that go to the heart of the equality guarantee: self-
determination, personal autonomy, self-respect, feelings of self-worth and empowerment…the stuff and 
substance of essential human dignity.” 418The lack of a homogeneous absolute metric is likewise clear 
from Strasbourg’s inadmissibility ruling in Budina v. Russia, where a disabled pensioner’s social welfare 
income, though low in absolute terms did not meet the minimum threshold to be linked to “serious 
deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity” and thus, an Article 3 violation.419 The allocation 
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of goods in these cases is linked to societal values and the relative purchasing power of what society 
considers necessary. 
 
Even as we speak of core commonality, then, the plurality by which dignity is applied is largely impacted 
by culture and context. Discriminating goods, by having an EU Member State fund transferred refugees 
with disproportionately quantitative (but not necessarily relative qualitative) differences in social rights 
does not in itself undermine dignity.420 As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has concluded “not 
all differences in legal treatment are discriminatory as such, for not all differences in treatment are in 
themselves offensive to human dignity.”421However, as per Gosselin, context must be examined in order 
to determine whether a practice is discriminatory, “whether the distinction, viewed in context, treats the 
subject as less worthy, less imbued with dignity, on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground.”422  
 
3.7.7 Summation 
By virtue of being signatory and active participants of the Refugee Convention, States agree to include 
themselves in a moral community that protects individuals fleeing persecution. That this inclusion may at 
times require territorial exclusion cannot constitute a legal infringement of an individual’s dignity, since 
there is no claim to a particular jurisdiction, only to be hosted in a safe and law-abiding territory. 
Inclusion in an amorphous body of States supersedes the notion of an individual territorial-based reading 
of exclusion and is clearly elucidated through the category of those excluded from refugee protection 
under Article 1F of the GRC: those determined to have committed crimes seriousness upon the collective 
human dignity (i.e., war crimes, crimes against humanity).423However, where refugees have developed 
deep economic and familial ties, other moral and jurisprudential concerns apply (infra, 3.2). Herein the 
line is drawn between transfers designated ex ante, before community attachments are formed and 
concerns pertaining to social justice and exclusion from an already engaged moral community. Transfers 
arranged in advance of social ties and executed without long delays would not have foreseeable legal 
challenges. 
 
                                                             
420 Neither does it breach Article 14 of the ECHR relating to discriminatory treatment. 
421 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of 19 Jan. 1986 (Proposed Amendments to the 
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3.8 Incommensurability    
Circumscribing spatial and identity-related cases is the overarching issue of societal versus individual 
dignity. A glimpse of this contestation was seen in S.A.S: both the French claim of living together and 
individual’s donning of niqab could easily be traced back to dignity-entailing roots of autonomy. Yet the 
Court in S.A.S. did not position the French claims as one of dignity. Moreover, the non-obligatory nature 
of niqab in Islamic law left some question as to whether face veils were in fact central to the dignity of 
niqabi women.  Yet what happens if: (a) an EU member or third part transfer State restricts the right of 
subset of refugees to live as an autonomous individual, impairing their ability to become a full member of 
the community or (b) an EU member state refuses to host refugees, claiming that ineffective integration 
infringes on their society’s dignity? Put another way, if refugees are absorbed at a pace the host State 
feels unable to properly integrate thereby creating discord between the individual right of refugees to 
freely develop their personality and the value of the community’s self-identity, can transfers be validated 
on the basis of infringing on the dignity of the community even if they also impact the dignity of the 
individual refugee? 
 
To answer this question, it is first necessary to go broad and answer the following: are some rights and 
values incommensurable? As Isiah Berlin would have it, absolute quantum unable to be measured and 
balanced?424 Or does there exist a framework by which rights and values, even the most fundamental, can 
be pitted against one another? And if so, is dignity one such value? Barroso (2012) purports that it is 
essential to view dignity as a relative principle that can be interpreted by its unique contextual parameters 
since “a shock of absolutes is insolvable.”425Along similar lines, Dworkin, argues that principles often 
need to be reconciled against one another due to their respective “dimension of weight.”426 Blake (2013) 
posits that the component which is “more central” has priority. European courts have had to tackle these 
questions on numerous occasions. Both Strasbourg and Luxembourg have weighed in on whether 
fundamental rights can be balanced, whether absolute rights can be balanced, and the potential for 
fundamental rights to be balanced with absolute rights.  
 
Consider a concrete application of two fundamental rights. In Evans v. United Kingdom, Mrs. Evans, who 
froze her fertilized eggs after being diagnosed with ovarian cancer, asked the court to preserve the 
integrity of her eggs, after her husband wanted the gametes destroyed. Legally, this involved the 
husband’s right under Article 8 (private life) versus Mrs. Evans’ right also under Article 8 (family). The 
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English Court of Appeal had rejected Mrs. Evans’ claim to which the ECtHR found no violation.427The 
English Court’s logic is at the heart of our conundrum. Balancing two Article 8 claims, private life versus 
family, both founded on the dignity of an autonomous individual, would “require a balance to be struck 
between two entirely incommensurable things. Whatever decision was arrived at….would be practically 
impossible to justify.”428 In the absence of a measurable framework justifications resided in the margin of 
appreciation provided to the UK High Court.429 Similar reasoning has been used in several cases 
involving assisted suicide where the right to determine one’s death in a dignified manner (Right to Private 
Life, Article 8 ECHR) and the State’s positive obligation to protect life (Article 2 ECHR) was afforded a 
wide margin of appreciation in favor of the State’s Article 2 obligation.430 
 
In contrast to absolute rights upon which no exception or derogation is permissible, fundamental rights 
rely heavily on context. This point is evident in RE A, a case where Mary, a cojoined twin with no chance 
to survive, was deemed to have less of a right to life than her sister, Jodie, that could be saved by 
separation.431The court, invoking the common law principle of necessity found that Jodie’s gain from a 
successful separation would be “the bodily integrity and dignity which is the natural order for all of us” 
whereas Mary, who had no chance to live out her life, separated or conjoined was “designated for death” 
and her life “fatally compromised.”432However, the High Court of England and Wales was clear that their 
reasoning was not founded on a balancing between lives, but rather a case where it was “impossible not to 
put in the scales of each child the manner in which they are individually able to exercise their right to 
life.”433 Nevertheless, it is clear that balancing took place between two incommensurable rights, albeit 
incommensurable rights of different magnitude.  
 
Let us look at another example. Dignity, even in the Grundgesetz´s absolutist interpretation is subject to 
balancing. As we have seen (infra 3.3) when the individual’s conception of dignity comes into conflict 
with society’s the court must make a choice based on reasonableness and proportionality, even in the 
absence of a measuring stick or reference point.434 Karlsruhe has been very clear on this point, whether, 
                                                             
427 Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 EHRR (2007). 
428 Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 727, at §66. See also HCJ 4541/94 Miller (n279) p.277: “the right to 
dignity (including the prohibition of group discrimination derived from it) is also not an absolute right but a relative one, and a 
balance must be struck between it and other legitimate values and interests.” 
429 Had one of the rights been an absolute right, say, the right to be free from torture (Article 3 ECHR), there would not have been 
difficulty reaching a justification. 
430 Petty v. UK, Application no. 2346/02, (29 April 2002); Haas v. Switzerland (App no 31322/07) ECHR 20 January 2011 
431 Re A [2001] 2 WLR 480. 
432 Ibid §197. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Proportionality is frequently utilized in competing claims of dignity. Abortion cases, by virtue of the contestation between 
claims of two competing forms of rights must be subject to some form of metric. In the Second Abortion Case, the woman’s right 
to personality and dignity and the mandate to protect her fetus is treated to a proportionality metric. 
113 
 
from a utilitarian point of view, the dignity of the individual can be sacrificed for the few, or the few for 
the many. In Aviation Security, the FCC deliberated over whether it was constitutional for the German 
Minister of Defense to order a hijacked plane to be shot down from the sky in order to potentially save 
lives. It found a breach of the constitutional right to dignity of those on the plane under Article One of the 
Grundgesetz even in light of potentially saving lives on the ground.435 The Court’s reasoning bears some 
scrutiny.  
 
By divesting of the passengers’ lives for the presumption of preventing larger scale casualties, the law 
was reifying (verdinglicht) and delegalizing (zugleich entrechtlicht) them.436 As Lepsius (2011) points 
out, “A far-reaching implication of the decision also signals the authorities that collective goods may not, 
under any circumstances, outstrip individual rights”437but also, uncertainty cannot raise the value of 
violating a negative right (not to kill) over a positive right (to preserve). Applying Lepsius´ interpretation 
to the refugee crisis, one might argue that transfers undermining the dignity of individual refugees cannot 
be implemented for the presumed benefit of the host social and political community’s conception of a 
dignified existence (e.g., “living together” in S.A.S). 
 
And yet, as we have seen in several cases, individual rights cannot outweigh the dignity of the 
community. In Omega, for instance, a British laser-tag company simulating homicide was ruled by the 
German lower courts as violating dignity and public values, which was deemed more pressing than the 
Omega’s right to provide services and free movement of economic goods (TEU Art. 49 and 28, 
respectively). The German ruling was upheld by the ECJ on the basis of subsidiarity, claiming that 
individual rights cannot always outweigh public interest and the values of a community. Wherein lies the 
distinction? Shooting down a plane under the presumption of saving lives provides no alternative space 
for the passengers to express their objective and subjective sense of dignity. It reifies by way of 
presumption. In Omega, alternatives were present.  
 
Presumption has played an integral role in balancing competing absolute rights. In Gäfgen v. Germany, 
the police threatened Mr. Magnus Gäfgen, who abducted 11-year-old Jakob, with torture, if he did not 
reveal the boy’s location. The ECtHR, in Gäfgen, failed to balance the competing rights of Mr. Magnus 
                                                             
435 BverfGE, 1 BvR 357/05. The FCC ruled on the constitutionality of the Air-Transport Security Act of 2004 
(Leftsischerheitsgesetz) signed by President Horst Kohler, in January 2005. BGB1. I, §78. 
436 This discussion is derived from Lepsius, O. (2006). Human dignity and the downing of aircraft: The German federal 
constitutional court strikes down a prominent anti-terrorism provision in the new air-transport security act. German LJ, 7, 766. 
Moreover, through the Court could merely have invoked Article 2 (right to life), it tethered Article 2, which is subject to a 
limitation clause under the proportionality principle (Grundgsetz der Verhaltnismassigkeit) with Article 1 (dignity) which is 
absolute and not subject to limitation, thereby precluding parliamentary purview. Ibid at 768. 
437 Lepsius (n436) p770. 
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Gäfgen not to be subject to torture, inhuman, and degrading punishment and the rights of Jakob.438In fact, 
the Court was clear that State parties, including the police, were ‘not obliged’ to safeguard the child’s 
right to life at the expense of an Article 3 violation against Mr. Gäfgen.439 Strasbourg found that the right 
to be free of an Article 3 violation was to be applied “under any circumstance, even the most difficult” 
and that an Article 3 violation “does not allow for any exceptions or justifying factors or balancing of 
interests, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned and the nature of the offence at issue.”440It is 
the threshold requirement then, not a balancing between competing rights or public interest that triggered 
an Article 3 violation. Smet (2013) illustrates this point by way of example: whether an arresting police 
officer’s conduct triggers an Article 3 violation depends not on the arrest itself (which may be in the 
public interest), but the force used in conducting the arrest (the force needed for a non-resisting suspect 
will be different than one physically resisting).441 Gäfgen reveals that proportionality may be restricted by 
not only positive versus negative obligations (in this case, the positive right to save a life versus the 
negative right not to take a life), but also, by agency. Kantian in its nature, direct versus direct agency 
challenges the instrumentalization of a human being as a means to an end.442On a level playing field, one 
life to one life, the negative obligation may trump the positive one.  
 
Competing individual-societal claims to dignity have often avoided the meticulous reasoning of the 
German High Court, instead resolving disputes through testing ‘threats to the life of the nation’ (Article 
15, ECHR). In A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Strasbourg contemplated whether the 
detention of alleged terrorists without trial was in violation of the ECHR. The ECtHR sided with the 
Home Department, finding a wide margin of appreciation in the preemptive risk-reducing measures of a 
presumptive emergency. 443 Here circumstances reasonably leading to an infringement of dignity were 
validated through a presumptive benefit to the community. In an eponymous case, A. v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (no 2.), the Court ruled that while information from torture might be used in a 
ticking-time bomb scenery, it was inadmissible as evidence, and could not be used to certify terrorist 
affiliation. Where evidence was gathered (foreign or domestic power) was irrelevant, as the prohibition on 
torture outweighed other concerns and could not be circumstantially derogated based on origin.444In many 
                                                             
438 Note, the right to life is not an absolute right under the European Convention. Greer’s argument of balancing Jakob’s Article 8 
right to life against Mr. Gäfgen’s Article 3 right not to be subject to threats of torture, are thus not technically speaking competing 
absolute rights under the Convention. For a detailed explanation see Smet, S. (2013). Conflicts between Absolute Rights: A 
Reply to Steven Greer. Human Rights Law Review, 13(3), p. 481. 
439 Gäfgen (n375) §107. See also M.S.S (n250) §218. 
440 Gäfgen (n375) §10.1 
441 Smet (n438) p. 477. 
442 Saadi v. United Kingdom, 13229/03, Council of Europe, ECtHR, 29 January 2008, dissenting opinion. 
443 A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 WLR 87 (HL).  
444 Though torture in A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (no 2.) and Jalloh v. Germany has been deemed to make 
evidence inadmissible, in Gäfgen, the Court seems to suggest that evidence obtained through inhuman treatment is admissible. 
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ways, the Court’s refusal to allow evidence tainted by an Article 3 violation falls in line with Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, a due process case before the U.S. Supreme Court, challenging an ‘enemy combatant’ 
designation. Justice Sandra Day O’Conner’s opinion impresses that the Court has “long since made clear 
that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's 
citizens.” The dignity of the many under the presumption of emergency cannot trample the dignity of 
individuals. 445 Necessity may not always require proof, 446 but it must nevertheless answer to the dignity 
of the rights it wishes to trample. 
 
How then does this tie into refugee transfers? Perceived costs arising from the refugee regime, even if 
calculated to adversely impact the dignity emanating from the fundamental (albeit not the absolute) rights 
of the EU Member State’s social and political community, cannot be used as an excuse for violating the 
fundamental rights of refugees. Even as Courts have increasingly found a common instrument in 
proportionality447 a dignified alternative must be in place for competing conceptions to be adjudged. Only 
after a reasonable alternative has been emplaced can potential clashes of fundamentals be afforded a 
margin of appreciation. Proportionality, in this case, advances reasonableness: the dignity and integrity of 
the refugee’s fundamental rights cannot be trumped by positive obligations towards citizenry.448  
 
Moreover, dignity plays an important function in balancing rights. Whereas an absolute right, such as 
those that fall under Article 3, cannot be considered incommensurable when pitted against, for example, 
Article 8 or Article 5 violations, if a violation of one’s human dignity can be tied to the Article 5 or 8 
violation, both non-absolute rights, a right lacking the “absolute” title under the European Convention 
may prompt a conflict between domestic and supranational courts, irrespective of supranational primacy 
dictated by the Lisbon version. More specifically, since several EU States have dignity as an absolute 
right etched into their constitutive document and the ECHR speaks of dignity only concerning the death 
penalty in Protocol No. 13, there is a potential conflict of absolutes, even though Strasbourg has remarked 
on several occasions that absolute rights such as Article 3 are grounded in human dignity.  
                                                             
445 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Sandra Day O’Conner, opinion) at 3D. 
446 Dauber, M. L. (2005). The sympathetic state. Law and History Review, 23(02), 387-442. Interestingly, emergency and 
necessity has frequently hinged on control. That is, whether the emergency was controllable by the individual or due to external 
forces against which they could not have reasonably expected to protect themselves. Not irrelevant to our analysis, a similar 
argument has been made for defining a refugee. In Korablina v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that “persecution may be found by cumulative, specific instances of violence and harassment toward an 
individual and her family members not only by the government, but also by a group the government declines to control.” 
Korablina v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 97-70361, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 23 October 
1998. 
447 See Miller (n279), State v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) which subsumes dignity beneath the right to 
life, and the Conseil Constitutionnel’s treatment of the Abortion Decision of 2001 (the latter drawn to my attention by 
McCrudden (n268) p699. 
448 Opuz v. Turkey, Application no 33401/02, Council of Europe, ECtHR, 9 June 2009.   
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3.9 Avoiding dignity-based claims to transfers 
The law, as guardian of human dignity facilitates conditions whereby individuals may achieve and 
maintain a dignified existence. Often the institutionalization of norm-generation comes from enforcing lex 
lata, but also, preempting developments in lex ferenda. Anticipating developments in law is critical 
towards avoiding human and legal costs. Unfortunately, anticipating high transaction costs exclusively 
through refugee law or refugee-related case law limits the scope of prediction. Developments in the law 
are likely to consider dignity from unrelated content and apply their legal reasoning to refugee-specific 
cases. These cases are likely to fall under three domains: spatial dislocation and search for terra firma, 
identity emanating from physical and psychological minutia, and how her individual dignity-related 
considerations interact with societal needs.449 These three areas mark common waystations in the 
refugee’s journey from persecuted to safety and inclusion. Transferring refugees must consider the 
refugee experiences: While refugee case law has of course drawn from a variety of unrelated content, 
there has not been a systematic analysis into how unrelated jurisprudence from common waystations may 
develop into robust challenges to transfers. In light of these mechanics and from the above contextualized 
discussion of jurisprudence, from a policy and mechanism deign point of view, refugee transfers must 
comport to the following: 
 
(a) Although monitoring mechanisms must ensure that fundamental human rights ensuring a 
dignified existence are met, these rights need not be equal in quantity nor quality to that offered 
by other EU Member States. They must, however, not dip below a minimum justiciable level as 
defined by European jurisprudence and must comport to a defined standard of living in the 
hosting State.  
 
(b) Gauging dignity-grounded claims from the host community is challenging but can be 
approximated on an equal basis to refugee claims. This means that the integration infrastructure 
of each transfer State should be assessed at regular intervals to include labor market capacity, 
reception quality, and the political viability of increasing the number of refugees hosted. 
                                                             
449 Even outside the limitation of Bourdieu’s habitus, innovation absent a prior pool of societal values must respond to 
environmental conditions, and social action shaped by the interaction of competing groups sparks developments in the law. The 
perception of dignity as central to moral intuition in an agent’s action strategies is likewise impacted by the diffusion of emerging 
law, allowing the formation and replication of new structurally supported habits, which subsequently activate new interpretations 
to problems arising from previous interpretations of dignity. Bourdieu, in fact, argues that creative adaptation is a habitus itself.   
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Discussing immigration, Blake (2013) writes that “the right to exclude, on my account, is capable 
of being trumped by the rights of others.”450Yet others does not always mean outgroup.  
 
(c) When considering who to accept as a transferee, State-level selection criteria must not be include 
discriminatory variables (ethnicity, religion). However, disputes over religious paraphernalia and 
other non-discriminatory State-specific laws potentially affecting a refugee’s dignity should be 
considered before allocation and included in any quota-based matching mechanism. 
  
(d) To the degree possible, preferences of refugees should be taken into consideration when 
allocating transfers. This means that while not every refugee will be transferred to a destination of 
her choice, to the extent possible, including refugees in the decision-making process is crucial 
towards bestowing a sense of autonomous choice for the group. This may mean that a 
supranational clearinghouse with top-down allocation will be most effective. 
 
(e) Recognition that dignity exists in each person implies that there are boundaries over what 
constitutes permissible behavior towards another human. Relativity on an individual basis must 
thus come to terms with constraints on action. In practical terms this means investigation of third-
party States to ensure quality of reception and living conditions (i.e., non-discriminatory 
treatment particularly regarding education, sexual orientation, and physical security), as well as 
the State of law enforcement and penitentiary systems irrespective of whether that State is party 
to European or international human rights conventions.  
3.10 Conclusion   
The legality of refugee transfers can be derived from both specific rules and case law involving dignity.  
Only by satisfying primary legal obligations in addition to ensuring the dignity of a refugee is satisfied in 
its multiple dimensions can transfers be sanctioned. While this is hardly a novel conclusion, the approach 
taken to elucidate dignity is. Departing from an action-centric ontology, this chapter argues that the law 
guiding the dignity of refugees and their hosts is formed and sustained through an active diffusion of 
creative action, interpersonal relationships, and structural-level variables. These three elements enter into 
kaleidoscopic relationship where a constant state of interaction impacts the structure of agency, 
influencing institutional development, specifically the ushering in of lex ferenda critical to the growing 
case law on human dignity.451  
                                                             
450 Blake, M. (2013). Immigration, jurisdiction, and exclusion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41(2), 119. 
451 This does not portend to be a descriptive tool for causal explanations of micro-to-macro or macro-to-micro diffusion, but 
rather a guiding tool through the process by which actions grounded in beliefs must be reconsidered, and how those 
reconsiderations impact the law on an institutional level. 
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The law dictates that returning a refugee to a country she may be tortured or subject to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment is illegal. Positive rights also add a dimension of state responsibility: incremental 
rights relating to health, family, and finance prohibit transferring a refugee where social and economic 
ties have been built. In the case of an appeal, transferees must have their case reviewed to determine 
whether the new host country will constitute a reasonable threat to the individual refugee’s sense of 
dignity. Reasonable and non-discriminatory, do not however convert into equality along all dimensions. 
So long as a minimum core of dignity can be maintained in the transfer State and the transfer process, 
there is no legal or moral claim by the refugee onto a specific country or region. As Christopher 
McCrudden concludes, “Dignity allows each jurisdiction to develop its own practice of human 
rights.”452This may mean that the right to transfer refugees, in effect, protecting but not hosting, may be 
crucial in the long run for both refugees and those states who continue to offer them protection under 
international law. 
 
3.11 Moving from Allocation to Integration 
Part I outlined a system of allocation as a solution to the disequilibrium between economic and social 
forces, and the legal requirement to protect refugees. The proposed EU-OIC market mechanism addressed 
the cost of protection through trading protection quotes, enabling Member States to protect refugees 
without hosting more than social and economic forces prescribe. A second way to address the cost of 
protection is through integration. Because the perceived cost of hosting refugees is often tied to how well 
they integrate into the labor market and socio-cultural domains, increasing successful integration should 
lower the cost of hosting, thereby increasing the amount of refugees States are willing to absorb. 
The EU-OIC market mechanism accounts for integration in its mechanism design (infra 2.4.7). More 
generally, integration programs with successful outcomes should lower the cost of hosting, whether tied 
to a market or otherwise. Part II engages the nexus of integration and the cost of protection. Two studies, 
both using original datasets, seek to evaluate mentoring as an integration program. Chapter IV looks at 
mentoring from the perspective of refugees, and Chapter V from the host population. If a mentoring 
program positively impacts integration outcomes, it will help answer this monograph’s central research 
question: how to bring social and economic forces into equilibrium with refugee law. 
 
                                                             
452 McCrudden (n268) p720. 
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Part II 
 
Chapter IV Mentoring as an Integration Strategy:  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Integration of refugees into a sovereign nation –even the most pluralistic of them– frequently resemble an 
arranged marriage. As out-group moves to in-group, new hierarchies of order are expected, and 
responsibilities imposed. And like many newlyweds, younger refugees must eventually take on the role of 
the provider. Not only must they provide for the current generation, but the past ones as well. In Europe, 
this is acutely true: low fertility rates mean that refugees involved in the ‘third demographic transition’ 
will occupy higher skilled jobs, provide benefits for retirees, as well as have a decisive role in the cultural 
relevance of customs (Coleman, 2006).453  
Whether refugees fulfill their nuptial vows largely depends on whether they are integrated. This is 
particularly true of labor market integration, frequently cited as the bedrock of socio and cultural 
integration (Sniderman, 2004).454 Yet what strategies lead to effective labour market integration? 
Educational achievement has frequently been tied to positive integration outcomes, as has social cohesion 
(Spoonely et al., 2005).455 Yet beneath these broad categories are a range of context-dependent factors 
that have defied uniform effects.456 Lack of uniformity is not merely a consequence of diverse 
institutional frameworks and heterogeneous populations, but the dynamism inherent in the process of 
integration (Officer & Taki, 2013).457 Rather than a model with a clearly defined hierarchy, integration 
may be envisioned as a series of overlapping domains, in particular, employment, education and 
meaningful contact with the local population. A mentoring integration program, Chapter IV argues, will 
                                                             
453 Coleman, D. (2006). Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low‐Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic 
Transition. Population and development Review, 32(3), 401-446. 
454 Sniderman &Hagendoorn (n18). 
455 Spoonley, P., Peace, R., Butcher, A., & O’Neill, D. (2005). Social cohesion: A policy and indicator framework for assessing 
immigrant and host outcomes. Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, 24(1), 85-110. 
456 Mixed evidence, for instance, exists for the impact of parental education on integration (Grätz, 2015; Schnepf, 2008), as well 
as the significant of strong co-ethnic networks (Portes et al., 2005, 1019; Waters et al., 2010). In the grand scheme of things, 
there has not been a generalizable institutional explanation able to account for differences in successful integration strategies 
(Alba & Foner, 2014, S264). Nor have individual or family-level factors yielded pan-European uniform effects. 
457 Officer, D., & Taki, Y. (2013). The Needs of Refugees and the Integration Process in Cyprus. Report commissioned by the 
Cyprus Office of UNHCR and conducted by INDEX: Research & Dialogue. 
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successfully manage the interdependence of these correlates and determinants, and by doing so, positively 
impact labour market outcomes among mentored refugees. 
Mentoring can be defined as a type of developmentally-oriented coaching in which an experienced 
mentor acts as a role model to a mentee who has less experience (Eby et al., 2013).458 Mentoring is often 
separated into two broad categories: instrumental, which targets a specific goal, and socio-psychological, 
which nurtures emotional needs. Both categories help to leverage the mentee emotionally, socially, and at 
times professionally. In situations where refugees arrive without linguistic or familial roots, nor the tools 
to navigate institutions and culture-specific social cues, mentors can use their knowledge of local 
institutions and customs to bridge informational and social inequalities. 
In the literature, mentoring has been shown to target many of the disadvantages shown to adversely affect 
labor market integration. 459 Mentors positively impact the social skills needed to succeed in the labor 
market (Lerner, 2005) career outcomes (Allen et al., 2004),460 raise social mobility (Heckman & Mosso, 
2014), behavior and attitudinal outcomes (Eby et al., 2008) and may increase intrinsic job rewards 
(McDonald & Lambert, 2014).461 At the structural level mentoring has been shown to affect variables 
such as age at immigration (Corak, 2012), income inequality (Schneeweis, 2011), and peer concentration 
(Schneeweis, 2015).462 Qualitative studies have also provided insight into the processes through which 
mentoring positively affects socio-emotional capacity and builds secure identities (Rhodes, 2008; Rhodes, 
2005; Roffman et al., 2003), both of which are later hypothesized to impact labor market outcomes.463  
While the positive effects of mentoring on socio-economic outcomes are well-established, to the author’s 
knowledge there have been no empirical studies linking mentoring to refugee labour market outcomes. 
                                                             
458 Eby, L. T., Allen, T. D., Evans, S. C., Ng, T., & DuBois, D. L. (2008). Does mentoring matter? A multidisciplinary meta-
analysis comparing mentored and non-mentored individuals. Journal of vocational behavior, 72(2), 254-267. 
459 Meta analyses, however, have yielded modest results. Dubois et al., 2002; Dubois et al., 2011. The latter accounts for 73 (the 
former 55) studies and found modest positive impacts in academic, social, behavioral and emotional indicators. 
460 But see: Wanberg et al., (2003).  
Lerner, R. M. (2005). Promoting positive youth development: Theoretical and empirical bases. In White paper prepared for the 
workshop on the science of adolescent health and development, national research council/institute of medicine. Washington, DC: 
National Academies of Science, 5; Allen, T. D., Eby, L. T., Poteet, M. L., Lentz, E., & Lima, L. (2004). Career benefits 
associated with mentoring for proteges: a meta-analysis. Journal of applied psychology, 89(1), 127. 
461 McDonald, S., & Lambert, J. (2014). The long arm of mentoring: A counterfactual analysis of natural youth mentoring and 
employment outcomes in early careers. American Journal of Community Psychology, 54(3-4), 262-273; Heckman, J. J., & 
Mosso, S. (2014). The economics of human development and social mobility (No. w19925). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
462 Corak, M. (2012). Age at immigration and the education outcomes of children. Realizing the potential of immigrant youth, 90-
116; Schneeweis, N. (2011). Educational institutions and the integration of migrants. Journal of Population Economics, 24(4), 
1281-1308; Schneeweis, N. (2015). Immigrant concentration in schools: Consequences for native and migrant students. Labour 
Economics, 35, 63-76. 
463 Roffman, J. G., Suarez-Orozco, C., & Rhodes, J. E. (2003). Facilitating positive development in immigrant youth. Community 
youth development: Programs, policies, and practices, 90-117; 
Rhodes, J.E. (2005). A model of youth mentoring. In D.L. Dubois & M.J. Karcher (Eds.), Handbook of youth mentoring (pp. 30-
43). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Rhodes, J. E. (2008). Improving youth mentoring interventions through research-based 
practice. American Journal of Community Psychology, 41(1-2), 35-42. 
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Addressing this gap, Chapter IV adds value to the literature by evaluating a particular intervention 
(mentoring), among a particular subset of refugees (Arabic speaking humanitarian migrants), in a 
particular region (three European Union countries).464 Refugees were asked whether they had a mentor, 
whether that mentor aided in bridging institutional barriers, inculcating meaningful interpersonal contacts, 
and whether the mentor was integral towards attaining gainful employment. The results show that 
mentoring has a positive effect on the labour market participation of refugees, especially when the 
mentoring program includes an educational component, and when mentors help mentees foster 
meaningful social connections with the local population.  
4.1.1 Definitions  
By integration this study follows Berry (1997), as well as Alba & Foner (2014) in defining “processes 
that allow members of immigrant groups to attain, usually gradually and approximately, the opportunities 
afforded long-term native citizens of obtaining such valued societal goals as improved socioeconomic 
position for themselves and their children and to gain inclusion and acceptance in a broad range of 
societal institutions.”465 Attaining suggests breaching or dismantling impediments to participation, a 
process noted in earlier definitions of integration (Kymlicka, 1995).466 Furthermore, mentoring goes 
beyond equalizing roles in public institutions− it is meant to make social boundaries porous and allow 
socio-cultural lineages to diffuse into mainstream society through fostering meaningful interpersonal 
relationships that recognize value in diversity.467  
4.1.2 Limits & Complications 
Refugees are humanitarian migrants who fall under the Geneva Refugee Convention definition of a 
refugee.468 Humanitarian migrants who are not determined to be refugees but whose return jeopardizes 
their safety frequently attain subsidiary status.469 The majority of quantitative integration-related literature 
focuses on migrants in general with very few studies distinguishing humanitarian from other immigrant 
categories.470Decoupling what constitutes ‘effectiveness’ of refugee integration strategies from monolithic 
                                                             
464 Because these are not random clinical trials but self-reported experiences, I use the word ‘evaluate’ rather than ‘test’. I thank a 
reviewer for pointing out this semantic difference.  
465 Alba & Foner (2014), p. S263; Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. Applied psychology, 46(1), 15. 
466 Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. Clarendon Press. 
467 This is distinct from the definition of assimilation, that is, a unidirectional adaptation to dominant social norms involving a 
gradual erosion of unique identities. By integration then, this paper aims to describe the process by which persecuted individuals 
become functional members of an economic, social and political community, and find in her host country a normative alignment 
with their core values. Permeability must exist between refugee identity in the public sphere, identity as a member of the political 
community, and unique ethno-cultural identity. This resembles the acculturation literature which looks at different paths 
immigrants take to retain their old, prioritize new, or balance both identities (Berry, 1997; Constant & Zimmerman 2008). 
468 Refugee Convention (n15) art 31. 
469 European Union: Council of the European Union, Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted (recast), 20 December 2011, OJ L. 337/9-337/26.   
470 See Rositter and Rositter (2009) for an exception. 
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‘migrant’ indictors is unsurprisingly complicated. Secondly, several components of the data limit its 
generalizability.  Some of the indicators capture broad topics such as educational support of interpersonal 
relationships. While the author tried to clarify generalities through post questionnaire interviews 
(Appendix A), there remains considerable variance on the content contained in each indicator.   
4.2 Literature and Hypotheses 
To be considered a successful labour market intervention strategy mentoring must positively affect the 
determinants, largely derived from the labor economics, educational, applied psychology, and 
acculturation literature, shown to aid effective integration. As theorized in the introductory section, 
mentoring may simultaneously address these determinants thereby avoiding a differential model of 
integration whereby inclusion at one level fails to permeate to a wider social diffusion or political 
rights.471 The remainder of Chapter 4.2 explores this simultaneity, revealing how the social net return of 
mentoring refugees may be realized through fostering social capital, the role of information, and 
inculcating interpersonal connections between refugees and the host population. Figure 17 lays out the 
conceptional framework for Chapter IV.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
471 For a modern application of Castles’ model see: Cebolla-Boado, and Finotelli, (2015). 
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FIGURE 17 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF CHAPTER IV 
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4.2.1 Social Capital and Labour Market Outcomes 
 
Integration is often conceptualized as hierarchical process whereby economic assimilation becomes the 
basis for social, educational, and national: if one contributes fiscally they are valuable to society and have 
earned the right to be valued (Volleburgh et al., 2017).472 In macroeconomic terms, effective economic 
integration is frequently measured by net fiscal impact (NFI): the difference between tax-based 
contributions minus the cost of services and benefits received.  
Research has not found a substantial impact from refugees, positive or negative, on the NFI. A 2016 
European Commission report, for example, found the macroeconomic impact of refugees calculated as 
moderate to negligible, with short-term rises in public spending,473 while a recent IMF study (figure 18) 
found a small increase in GDP growth from refugees over the short-term, with uncertainty surrounding 
longer term effects on the economy (IMF, 2016).474  
 
                                                             
472 Vollebergh, W., Veenman, J., & Hagendoorn, L. (Eds.). (2017). Integrating Immigrants in the Netherlands: Cultural Versus 
Socio-Economic Integration: Cultural Versus Socio-Economic Integration. Routledge. 
473 Moreover, recent EU forecasts have ranged from .1% to.6% additional spending, predominately from rescue operations, 
housing, integration and welfare.EC. An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis: a macroeconomic Assessment for the EU. 
Institutional Paper 033 (July 2016) at 3. 
474 On the latter point, humanitarian migrants take longer than economic migrants to have a net positive effect on their host 
country’s budgets. The 10-15 year time frame calculated in a recent OECD study stands in stark contrast to that of economic 
migrants who often have a positive effect immediately. This finding is in consonance with the Australian Migrant Fiscal Impact 
Model that shows convergence for humanitarian migrants after 15 years. (OECD 2013, p. 134). Though from a lifetime 
perspective, does not reach a net positive value. 
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FIGURE 18 IMF ESTIMATES: FISCAL COST OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AS & OF GDP 2014-2016.475 
Dustmann et al., (2016) find that employment probabilities of refugees, though less favorable than that of 
economic migrants, increase by year, and that the refugee-native employment gap loses its statistical 
significance at between 15 to 19 years.476 Their results are displayed in figure 19. Whether there is a net 
fiscal benefit is typically dependent on myriad factors: age at migration, pre-existing institutional 
conditions, family structure, whether the immigration is humanitarian or labour-related, and reference 
year(s) of analysis. Moreover, conclusions vary considerably with methodological approach and 
location.477 
 
FIGURE 19 REFUGEE/NON-HUMANITARIAN MIGRANT EMPLOYMENT GAPS. ADAPTED FROM DUSTMANN ET AL., (2016).  
What is clear is that employment is widely considered the most significant variable catalyzing long-term 
durable integration and is crucial for the net fiscal contribution of refugees to be positive, particularly in 
social welfare States (OECD, 2013). What then are the structural barriers towards refugees obtaining 
gainful employment and how are they mitigated? One important barrier cited in the literature is the lack 
                                                             
475 IMF staff estimates. IMF (2016), p. 12. 
476 Dustmann, C., Fasani, F., Frattini, T., Minale, L., & Schönberg, U. (2016). On the Economics and Politics of Refugee 
Migration. IZA. DP No. 10234 p27. In addition, Bratsberg et al (2014) researching the linkage between firm bankruptcy and 
unemployment, find that employment for low income migrants may “lose steam” and even “go in reverse” before reaching parity 
with natives. And Algan et al., (2010) finds that the native-foreign born unemployed differential continues inter-generationally.476 
Storesletten (2003) finds negative intergenerational effects are due to economic assimilation. Conventional modes of promoting 
gainful employment for refugees may therefore require an initial dose of expenditure and patience not required of other subsets. 
Also, Sarvimäki (2011) finds that among migrants to Finland, only males from OECD reach parity with Finnish employment 
rates. Income transfer differences, however, are negligible after 20 years. Sarvimäki, M. (2011). Assimilation to a welfare state: 
Labor market performance and use of social benefits by immigrants to Finland. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(3), 
665-688. 
477 Complication calculating general accounting, dynamic modeling and insufficient data on the cost of labour market integration 
and health care usage makes the fiscal impact on welfare systems difficult to predict EC. An Economic Take on the Refugee 
Crisis: a macroeconomic Assessment for the EU. Institutional Paper 033 (July 2016) at 17. 
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of social capital.478 Social capital, defined here as “the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity 
inhering in one’s social networks”479 may lower transaction costs by reducing the uncertainty employers 
face while screening applicants (Ioannides & Loury, 2004; Smith, 2005), as well as make job searching 
more efficient for applicants (Mouw, 2003).480 For refugees, lack of social capital is frequently the result 
of arriving in a country without an extended social network. This absence may adversely affect sense of 
belonging, access to institutions, and impede landing higher paid and prestigious jobs (Lin, 2002).481 
While some refugees have connections from diaspora communities this rarely provides the same benefit 
as inter-ethnic connections (Lancee, 2012).482 In some cases, co-ethnic networks may even work to the 
determinant of over-qualified refugees, as their compatriots are more likely to be engaged in low-skilled 
employment.483 Socio-economic inequalities may then begin from the day of arrival. 
4.2.2 Mentoring and Social Capital 
Overcoming these disadvantages frequently necessitate not merely bridging inequalities grounded in 
historical and institutional circumstances (Mollenhorst et al., 2008), but actively promoting interactions 
with the host population (Verhaeghe et al., 2013).484 These interactions may in turn increase the flow of 
information, aid in job contacts (Scherger & Savage, 2010; Goldthorpe, 2007)485 and lead to higher wages 
(Edin et al., 2003).486 A structured mentoring program able to formatively assess the quality of 
                                                             
478 Friesen, M. R. (2011). Immigrants' integration and career development in the professional engineering workplace in the 
context of social and cultural capital. Engineering Studies, 3(2), 79-100. 
479 Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and policy 
framework. Theory and society, 27(2), p153. 
480Ioannides, Y. M., & Datcher Loury, L. (2004). Job information networks, neighborhood effects, and inequality. Journal of 
economic literature, 42(4), 1056-1093; Smith, S. S. (2005). “Don’t put my name on it”: Social capital activation and job-finding 
assistance among the black urban poor. American Journal of Sociology, 111(1), 1-57; Mouw, T. (2003). Social capital and 
finding a job: do contacts matter?. American sociological review, 868-898. 
481 This has been shown to be true to access the labour market even when controlling for levels of education and employment 
status (Verhaeghe et al., 2013 at 691). See also Kazemipur, A. (2006). The market value of friendship: Social networks of 
immigrants. Canadian Ethnic Studies, 38(2), 47. 
482 Lancee, B. (2012). The economic returns of bonding and bridging social capital for immigrant men in Germany. Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, 35(4), 664-683. 
483 Although in some cases, an ethnic network provides the support needed for growth. In these scenarios, mentor-mentee 
matches should strongly consider ethnicity as a criterion. Among many other studies, see Zou & Kim (2006). Also, several 
studies find a positive effect of migrant networks on employment and earnings (e.g., Aguilera, 2005), however, the effect seems 
to hold only for low positions (Kalter & Kogan, 2014).  Aguilera, M. B. (2005). The impact of social capital on the earnings of 
Puerto Rican migrants. The Sociological Quarterly, 46(4), 569-592; Kalter, F., & Kogan, I. (2014). Migrant networks and labor 
market integration of immigrants from the former Soviet Union in Germany. Social Forces, 92(4), 1435-1456. 
484 Mollenhorst, G., Völker, B., & Flap, H. (2008). Social contexts and personal relationships: The effect of meeting opportunities 
on similarity for relationships of different strength. Social Networks, 30(1), 60-68; Verhaeghe, P. P., Li, Y., & Van de Putte, B. 
(2013). Socio-economic and ethnic inequalities in social capital from the family among labour market entrants. European 
sociological review, 29(4), 683-694. 
485 This line of reasoning is often derived from rational action theory and involves the prestige or expected future reward from 
disseminating information. While not our specific case, there link is clear. Scherger, S., & Savage, M. (2010). Cultural 
transmission, educational attainment and social mobility. The Sociological Review, 58(3), 406-428; Goldthorpe, J. H. (2007). On 
sociology. 2. Illustration and retrospect. Stanford University Press. 
486 Cutler et al., (2008) finds the opposite effect for low education and low earning immigrants. Edin, P. A., Fredriksson, P., & 
Åslund, O. (2003). Ethnic Enclaves and the Economic Success of Immigrants-Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(329-357). 
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interactions and intercede where appropriate should increase the social capital of their mentees. These 
suggestions are in line with European Commission proposals that promote employment coaching and 
mentoring as active labour market policies to raise levels of social and knowledge capital.487  
Successful examples of this strategy have been job placement projects where mentors act as employment 
coaches such as the Dutch Council for Refugees’ (VluchtelingenWerk) Emplooi project. Guidance is 
provided both at the individual refugee as well as institutional level, where both companies and schools 
receive guidance and support. Emploi likewise promotes entering the workforce and has seen mentoring 
positively impact gainful employment for refugees. Such success stories are not infrequent. Upwardly 
Global, a San Francisco based nonprofit saw a 900% increase in the wages of 500 mentored participants, 
while Un Parain 1 Emploi, in France has helped hundreds of largely migrant populations land their first 
job.488 KVINFO in Denmark has found success breaking down cultural and labor market barriers and 
promoting gender equality with matches mentor-mentees based on similar educational and professional 
interest, while InCharge provides mentoring in Germany with a focus on provided individualized 
employment support. Often these programs overlap with apprenticeship programs, job-activation, and 
other employment-related schemes. Tellingly, several employment initiatives that use mentoring as their 
primary vehicle are centrally funding by governments worried about the impact of unemployment on 
social cohesion. The Parrainage program in France, in one example, focuses on youth employment and is 
partially funded by the French National Agency for Social Cohesion; Link2Work, an organization 
oriented towards youth unemployment, is funded by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment (Petrovic, 2015).489 
Based on its potential to foster social capital, frequently shown to improve labour market outcomes, the 
first hypothesis is formulated as follows:    
H1 Refugees who have been mentored will have a higher probability of employment than those who 
have not been mentored.  
 
4.2.3 The Role of Information in Educational Explanations 
A well-established interdisciplinary corpus of research has found that education is a strong determinant in 
successful labour market integration. Empirical evidence has pointed to education playing a significant 
role in migrant contribution to overall growth, societal prosperity, social cohesion, and inter-generational 
                                                             
487 European Commission, 033, July 2016 p27. 
488 Upwardly Global. ‘A look at skilled Immigrant workers in the U.S.’ (April 2013). Last accessed January 23, 2017 from 
https://www.upwardlyglobal.org/UpwardlyGlobalEconomicImpactReportApril2013.pdf. 
489 Petrovic, M. (2015). Mentoring practices in Europe and North America: strategies for improving immigrants' employment 
outcomes. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, p3. 
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occupational mobility (Woessmann, 2016).490 Particularly important for this study, mentoring has shown 
a positive effect on educational outcomes for disadvantaged and at-risk youth, a population subset 
underrepresented in the labor market (Rodríguez-Planas, 2012; Tolan et al., 2008).491 Many of these 
conclusions cascade from basic human capital theories that link education to earnings (e.g., Mincer 1974), 
or signal theory, where skills developed in the classroom transmit positive signals during job interviews 
conducted under imperfect information (Spence, 1973; Ermini et al., 2017).492  
Informational asymmetries play a formidable role in educational achievement. They impact how migrants 
navigate the education system, engage their child’s learning, and enable parent-teacher coordination, 
thereby playing an active role in their child’s achievement. Because parental support is often needed for 
success in the classroom, lack of first-hand knowledge, frequently a result of language capacity or 
insufficient diffusion of domain-specific knowledge (Kanno & Varguese, 2010) prevents equalization 
with the local population. To education’s positive impact on employment, an integration program needs to 
address the institutional, teacher input, family-level, and behavioral factors influencing educational 
achievement.  
4.2.4 Institutional Factors 
Institutional factors typically refer to tracking and resource allocation. Tracking − the separation of pupils 
by curriculum based on academic ability−often leads to negative educational outcomes (Borgna & 
Contini, 2014; Van de Werfhorst et al., 2010), and imparts a more significant role to family effects, 
particularly in systems with early tracking (Brunello & Checci, 2007; Parker et al., 2016; Schütz et al., 
2008).493In a landmark cross-country study, Crul and Schneider (2010) show that highly stratified systems 
                                                             
490 Woessmann (2016) argues that skills learned, as measured on math and science achievement tests, is “very closely linked” to 
long-term growth rates and accounts for nearly 75% of the cross-country variation in growth the past 50 years, at 7. However, 
others studies have found little or a negative effect. This may well be due to omitted variable bias derived from negative selection 
effects (Holmlund & Silva, 2014; Rodríguez-Planas, 2012). Bernstein, L., Rappaport, C. D., Olsho, L., Hunt, D., & Levin, M. 
(2009). Impact Evaluation of the US Department of Education's Student Mentoring Program. Final Report. NCEE 2009-
4047. National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance. Holmlund, H., & Silva, O. (2014). Targeting 
noncognitive skills to improve cognitive outcomes: evidence from a remedial education intervention. Journal of Human 
Capital, 8(2), 126-160; Woessmann, L. (2016). The economic case for education. Education Economics, 24(1). 
491 Rodríguez-Planas, N. (2012). Mentoring, educational services, and incentives to learn: What do we know about 
them?. Evaluation and program planning, 35(4), 481-490; Tolan, P., Henry, D., Schoeny, M., Bass, A., Lovegrove, P., & 
Nichols, E. (2013). Mentoring interventions to affect juvenile delinquency and associated problems: A systematic 
review. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 9(10). 
492 Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. Human Behavior & Social Institutions No. 2. Also, for a more recent 
link to immigrants, see: Borjas, G. J. (2014). Immigration economics. Harvard University Press; Spence, M. (1973). Job market 
signaling. The quarterly journal of Economics, 87(3), 355-374. For a recent example of how skills developed during graduate 
programs can empower labor market bias, see: Ermini, B., Papi, L., & Scaturro, F. (2017). An Analysis of the Determinants of 
Over-Education Among Italian Ph.D Graduates. Italian Economic Journal, 1-41. 
493 The effect was also found on countries with weaker pre-school networks. Borgna, C., & Contini, D. (2014). Migrant 
achievement penalties in western europe: do educational systems matter?. European Sociological Review, jcu067; Van de 
Werfhorst, H. G., & Mijs, J. J. (2010). Achievement inequality and the institutional structure of educational systems: A 
comparative perspective. Annual review of sociology, 36, 407-428; Brunello, G., & Checchi, D. (2007). Does school tracking 
affect equality of opportunity? New international evidence. Economic policy, 22(52), 782-861; Parker, P. D., Jerrim, J., Schoon, 
I., & Marsh, H. W. (2016). A Multination Study of Socioeconomic Inequality in Expectations for Progression to Higher 
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of tracking impact whether migrant groups receive tertiary education. Their research, using TIES (The 
Integration of Europe Second Generation) data, find that second generation Turks receive a college or 
university education in France (39.6%), Sweden (37.1%), the Netherlands (25.6%), but in Germany, a 
country with early tracking and close to impermeable mobility, only 3%.494Along similar lines, Alba & 
Foner (2014) and Alba & Hollaway (2013) suggest that Germany’s highly stratified system of tracking 
and the United States’ decentralized funding account for the two largest disadvantages for low status 
immigrant children.495 However, others have found lack of a significant effect on tracking (Fossati, 2011) 
or even a positive impact (Dronkers et al., 2012) depending on age, economic, marginalization, 
background, parental, education, and a host of other variables.496  
From an intervention point of view, more favorable institutional arrangements may facilitate educational 
achievement and its concomitant labor market empowerment. It may also result in less dependency on 
family-level factors (Schnell et al., 2015).497 Unfortunately, institutional changes such as centralized 
funding schemes producing a more equitable distribution of resources, or central examinations to 
attenuate the impact of tracking (Bol et al., 2014) are uncommon. And when they are implemented in 
whole or piecemeal, they often miss their target outcome.498 Highlighting this point is the fact that 
common interventions, such as increasing resources in schools with high minority populations do not get 
at the determinants of inequality: attenuating institutional inequality through spending has not proven to 
systematically raise international achievement scores (Woesmann, 2016), nor have native-immigrant 
achievement gaps been tempered by resources.499Mentoring then may compensate for educational 
inequalities that Member States are not willing to address structurally (i.e., removing early tracking) or 
that fail to yield results, by mitigating individual-level informational barriers adversely affecting 
educational achievement. Evidence for such speculation is present in Gordon et al. (2009) where 
                                                             
Education The Role of Between-School Tracking and Ability Stratification. American Educational Research Journal, 53(1), 6-
32; Schütz, G., Ursprung, H. W., & Wößmann, L. (2008). Education policy and equality of opportunity. Kyklos, 61(2), 279-308. 
494 The study tested the highest diploma of second-generation Turks who had a father with at maximum, a primary education. 
Crul, M., & Schneider, J. (2010). Comparative integration context theory: participation and belonging in new diverse European 
cities. Ethnic and racial studies, 33(7), 1249-1268. 
495 On the PISA ‘school taught skills’ indicator. 
496 Interestingly, Bernardi & Radl (2014) have found that when selection (e.g. tracking) takes place at an early age, the penalty of 
divorce on educational achievement increases 3%. 
497In their study, education systems which provide more favourable institutional arrangements render second-generation Turks 
less dependent on family factors and resources and ultimately lead to opportunities to advance in their higher education. Schnell, 
P., Fibbi, R., Crul, M., & Montero-Sieburth, M. (2015). Family involvement and educational success of the children of 
immigrants in Europe. Comparative perspectives. 
498 Bol, T., Witschge, J., Van de Werfhorst, H. G., & Dronkers, J. (2014). Curricular tracking and central examinations: 
Counterbalancing the impact of social background on student achievement in 36 countries. Social Forces. 
499 On a related point, simply restructuring existing resources more efficiently was shown in a study of ALMPs (active labour 
market programs) in Finland to increase earnings and reduce reliance on social benefits even when controlling for immigrant 
background (Sarvimäki, & Hämäläinen, 2016). Directing existing resources in an immigrant specific, individualized approach 
may benefit from ongoing information provided by mentors. 
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mentoring’s ability to mitigate structural discrimination and model pro-social behavior resulted in 
significantly higher achievement sores than their non-mentored peers.500 
4.2.5 Family-level and teacher input factors 
The inability for students and parents to communicate effectively with teachers is detrimental towards 
mitigating problematic behavior and scholastic inadequacy. Social relatedness, to include impacts of 
teacher input frequently predict academic motivation with particular salience to boys (Furrer & Skinner, 
2003), so that fostering teacher-student and parent-teacher engagement often positively impact emotion, 
behavior, and achievement (Fredricks et al., 2004; Skinner et al., 2008).501 Hughes (2007) details how a 
less supportive relationship between African American parents with teachers relative to Caucasian and 
Hispanic parents was a factor in lower educational achievement among African American students.502 
This has likewise been shown to be true with refugees in Australia whose difficulty communicating with 
teachers hampered their achievement (Joyce et al., 2010).503 
A similar trajectory exists for behavioral factors. Non-cognitive ‘soft skills’ such as motivation and 
personality characteristics often impact the educational success of migrants. Impatience, lack of self-
control, and time-inconsistent preferences (i.e., instant gratification) have been linked to school 
performance (Golsteyn et al., 2014; Cadena & Keys 2015) and may have intergenerational resonance on 
educational outcomes (Dohmen et al., 2012; Langenhof et al., 2016; Kosse & Pfeiffer, 2014; Gronqvist et 
al., 2010).504 These predictions are in line with results linking impatience and lack of self-control to 
misbehavior in time preference behavioral experiments (Sutter et al., 2013), as well as in line with the 
behavioral economics literature, which is glutted with studies revealing how present bias discounts future 
                                                             
500 But see Kilburg (2007) where a two-year investigation of 149 mentoring teams revealed insurmountable institutional berries 
such as time, apathy, and poor district-level coordination. Gordon, D. M., Iwamoto, D., Ward, N., Potts, R., & Boyd, E. (2009). 
Mentoring urban Black middle-school male students: Implications for academic achievement. The Journal of Negro 
Education, 78(3), 277. 
501 Furrer, C., & Skinner, E. (2003). Sense of relatedness as a factor in children's academic engagement and performance. Journal 
of educational psychology, 95(1), 148; Fredricks, J. A., Blumenfeld, P. C., & Paris, A. H. (2004). School engagement: Potential 
of the concept, state of the evidence. Review of educational research, 74(1), 87; Skinner, E., Furrer, C., Marchand, G., & 
Kindermann, T. (2008). Engagement and disaffection in the classroom: Part of a larger motivational dynamic?. Journal of 
educational psychology, 100(4), 765. 
502 Hughes, J., & Kwok, O. M. (2007). Influence of student-teacher and parent-teacher relationships on lower achieving readers' 
engagement and achievement in the primary grades. Journal of educational psychology, 99(1), 39. 
503 Joyce, A., Earnest, J., De Mori, G., & Silvagni, G. (2010). The experiences of students from refugee backgrounds at 
universities in Australia: Reflections on the social, emotional and practical challenges. Journal of Refugee Studies, 23, 82–97. 
504 But see, Anger (2012) who finds no socio-economic impact on intergenerational mobility. Golsteyn, B. H., Grönqvist, H., & 
Lindahl, L. (2014). Adolescent time preferences predict lifetime outcomes. The Economic Journal, 124(580), F745; Cadena, B. 
C., & Keys, B. J. (2015). Human capital and the lifetime costs of impatience. American Economic Journal: Economic 
Policy, 7(3), 127; Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2012). The intergenerational transmission of risk and trust 
attitudes. The Review of Economic Studies, 79(2), 645-677; Langenhof, M. R., Komdeur, J., & Oldehinkel, A. J. (2016). Effects 
of parenting quality on adolescents' personality resemblance to their parents. The TRAILS study. Journal of Adolescence, 51, 
163-175; Kosse, F., & Pfeiffer, F. (2013). Quasi-hyperbolic time preferences and their intergenerational transmission. Applied 
Economics Letters, 20(10), 985; Gronqvist, E., Ockert, B., & Vlachos, J. (2010). The intergenerational transmission of cognitive 
and non-cognitive abilities. 
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payoffs.505 While ignoring the large returns of education might also be due to informational asymmetries 
(Oreopoulous & Dunn, 2013; Jensen, 2010), in many cases they are likely impacted by self-control issues 
(Oeopoulpus 2007).506 If we recognize that soft skills play a significant role in achievement, then an 
education production model must include behavioral indicators (e.g., present bias, self-control, and peer-
group effects) alongside established school input factors such as class size and available resources.507  
What a successful intervention would then need to target are the psycho-emotional issues that adversely 
impact educational outcomes. Information plays an integral role in guiding the veracity of such support.  
Positive behavior support interventions in New Hampshire led to gains in mathematics achievement 
(Muscott et al., 2008) and instilling prosocial behavior has been linked to positive achievement outcomes 
among learners with behavioral of emotional problems (Rathvon, 2008; Tolan et al., 2014; DeWit et al., 
2016b; Meyerson 2013).508 Erdem et al., (2016) find that the emotional stability inculcated by a mentor to 
youth with behavioral problems is a critical factor in promoting positive youth development. Because the 
marginal costs for choosing a lower track, dropping out, or more generally, succumbing to present bias 
may adversely impact long-term human capital, an intervention employing an external commitment 
device might equalize the benefits of education or raise them above the marginal costs.509  
4.2.6 Mentoring and the role of information 
Mentoring has often shown an ability to positively impact informational asymmetries in educational 
institutions. Concrete examples have often come from mentoring programs providing tailored 
instrumental support that have targeted structural inequalities (i.e., differentiation in educational 
resources) and family-level informational asymmetries. One such program is SAMIE, which has 
                                                             
505 Sutter, M., Kocher, M. G., Glätzle-Rützler, D., & Trautmann, S. T. (2013). Impatience and uncertainty: Experimental 
decisions predict adolescents' field behavior. The American Economic Review, 103(1), 512. 
506 Testing this proposition is risky as endogeneity from institutional variables may likely in-classroom influence behavior. Peer 
group effects have been suggested by studies analyzing the impact of minority concentrations in schools, the salience and size of 
among groups, particularly those portrayed negatively (Alesina et al., 2016) as well as experimental papers, such as Adida et al., 
(2011) that show a bias towards Muslim immigrants by Christian participants as the number of Muslims in the experimental 
group increased; Oreopoulos, P. (2007). Do dropouts drop out too soon? Wealth, health and happiness from compulsory 
schooling. Journal of public Economics, 91(11), 2213-2229; Oreopoulos, P., & Dunn, R. (2013). Information and college access: 
Evidence from a randomized field experiment. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115(1), 3-26; Jensen, R. (2010). The 
(perceived) returns to education and the demand for schooling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(2). 
507 Extrinsic incentives, however, have met with mixed results in the literature. Positive impacts on attendance (Angrist et al., 
2006) for instance, have been stonewalled by mixed results on achievement (Bettinger et al., 2012; Angrist & Lavy, 2009). Peer 
group effects also figure into the overall education production (Antecol et al., 2016; Boucher et al., 2014; Socerdote, 2011) but 
see (Angrist, 2014). 
508 Muscott, H. S., Mann, E. L., & LeBrun, M. R. (2008). Positive behavioral interventions and supports in new hampshire effects 
of large-scale implementation of schoolwide positive behavior support on student discipline and academic achievement. Journal 
of positive behavior interventions, 10(3), 201; Rathvon, N. (2008). Effective school interventions: Evidence-based strategies for 
improving student outcomes. Guilford Press p23; Meyerson, D. A. (2013) Mentoring Youth with Emotional and Behavioral 
Problems: A Meta-Analytic Review" College of Science and Health Theses and Dissertations. 56 
p27.  https://via.library.depaul.edu/csh_etd/56. 
509 Moreover, because the success of extrinsic incentives has proven heterogeneous (Gneezy et al., 2011) it is uncertain, prime 
face why they should work particularly on refugees. Refugee characteristics i.e., (age, gender, institutional access) may be the 
mitigating factor in a successful mentoring intervention, a point explored in the second stage of the empirical design. 
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successfully targeted educational integration of unaccompanied minors in France. Rock Your Life, 
consisting of over 40 papers within Germany and Switzerland pair underprivileged youth and a college 
student for two years, aiming to navigate the rigid German education system and increasing social 
mobility: transmission of know-how between choices in the education system aids in avoiding hasty 
decisions over whether to choose a vocational or tertiary track (Buis, 2013).510 In another example, 
mentoring projects under the umbrella, European Network of Educational Support Projects (ENESP),511 
such as MentorprojectSKC and Junge Vorbilder have offered level-appropriate guidance often in 
educational settings. The Amsterdam based MentorprojectSKC, for instance, has forged strong 
collaborative ties with primary and secondary schools, focusing on preparing mentees socially and 
academically for transitions; Junge Vorbilder focuses on helping immigrant and low-income learners 
transition between lower (lower to upper secondary) academically through providing tertiary education 
matriculated mentors from immigrant families.  
As for adult education, a mentor that compliments job or language training programs may assist the 
mentee with host-country specific skills (i.e., knowledge gestures, linguistic cues, and societal 
expectations concerning behavior and dress) that have been shown to decrease the uncertainty 
interviewers encounter in the face of imperfect information (Stiglitz, 1975; Kogan, 2016).512 Mentoring 
may also decrease stress and increase quality of life for adult refugees having a concomitant impact on 
their employability.513While self-selection into these adult programs is naturally a concern, as is adverse 
selection (Aiyar, S. et al., 2016)514 the literature provides sufficient evidence for a net positive impact on 
adult refugees. Taking into account both the benefit to youth and adults, the second hypothesis is derived 
forthwith: 
H2: Refugees whose mentoring contains an educational component will positively impact the 
probability of employment. 
                                                             
510 This in light of studies showing that vocational tracks may have long-term drawback of slower adaptability to structural 
changes in the economy (Hanushek et al., 2016, p. 36). Buis, M. L. (2012). The composition of family background: The influence 
of the economic and cultural resources of both parents on the offspring's educational attainment in the Netherlands between 1939 
and 1991. European Sociological Review, jcs009.  
511Sirius. ‘Definition of Goals: Designing and Planning of Mentoring Projects. 2017. Last accessed January 6, 2017 from 
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512 And more generally, for the interaction of hiring and completion for education: Stiglitz, J. E. (1975). The theory of" 
screening," education, and the distribution of income. The American economic review, 65(3), 283-300; for immigrant-specific 
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514 Aiyar, S. et al., (2016). The refugee surge in Europe. Europe: Imfstaff Discussion Note (SDN/16/02); Also, transferability of 
skills might adversely impact the impact of education but not necessarily interact with the upskilling that mentoring might have 
on adult refugees. For a comprehensive look at the implications of transferability, see Chiswick, B. R., & Miller, P. W. (2009). 
The international transferability of immigrants’ human capital. Economics of Education Review, 28(2), 162-169. 
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4.2.7 Identity and Mentoring 
For over half a century the social-psychology cannon has drawn clear links between identity, society, and 
meaning (Fromm, 1955; Markus, 1977; Erikon; 1959).  On meso and individual levels, a strong sense of 
self promotes self-confidence, which may lead to positive labour market outcomes (Chen et al., 2017).515  
Yet in the context of integration, the link between identity and society takes upon an added dimension.  
Having a strong ethnic identity has been correlated with negative labour market outcomes particularly 
when there is neither assimilation nor integration with the dominant culture (Nekby & Rodin, 2010; 
Zimmermann & Constant, 2007).516 Others have found only a weak link between identifying with either 
host or country of origin and labour market outcomes (Dustman & Casey, 2010).  517 Tellingly, labour 
market policies aiming to employ non-Europeans into the EU have been found to vary depending on the 
potency of the immigrant’s identity (Bisin et al., 2011).518 
What is argued here is not that mentoring helps job seekers’ identification in the deeper sense of self-
identity, but through an ongoing process of being accepted into society. Being accepted is the initial layer 
of identification that continues along the migrant experience. 519 Psychological and sociocultural 
adaptation are impacted by a sense of belonging and critical to functioning within a new culture.  Of 
primary significance to the integration-identity nexus then is how interpersonal interactions and 
perceptions of discrimination impact identification. Over and over research has found a negative 
correlation between positive integration outcomes and discrimination (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009).520 
And per human capital theory, discrimination disincentivizes investing time learning a new language and 
specific job skills (Dancygier & Laitin, 2014) and may stunt the self-reflection necessary to either 
assimilate or integrate into society (Fokemma & Haas, 2015).
521
  
                                                             
515 But see Bisin et al., (2011) whose study using European Social Survey data found that a strong identity imparted negative 
labour market effects for both first and second-generation immigrants.  Bisin, A., Patacchini, E., Verdier, T., & Zenou, Y. (2011). 
Ethnic identity and labour market outcomes of immigrants in Europe. Economic Policy, 26(65), 57-92; Chen, W., Grove, W. A., 
& Hussey, A. (2017). The role of confidence and noncognitive skills for post-baccalaureate academic and labor market 
outcomes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 138, 10-29. 
516 Nekby, L., & Rödin, M. (2010). Acculturation identity and employment among second and middle generation 
immigrants. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(1), 42; Constant, A. F., & Zimmermann, K. F. (2008). Measuring ethnic 
identity and its impact on economic behavior. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2‐3), 424-433. 
517 Casey, T., & Dustmann, C. (2010). Immigrants’ identity, economic outcomes and the transmission of identity across 
generations. The Economic Journal, 120(542), F31-F51. 
518 Bisin, A., Patacchini, E., Verdier, T., & Zenou, Y. (2011). Ethnic identity and labour market outcomes of immigrants in 
Europe. Economic Policy, 26(65), 57-92. 
519 This differs qualitatively from the four stages (not processes) delineated in the acculturation literature within which 
acculturation transpires: marginalization from societal interaction as well as cultural maintenance; separation from the host 
culture whilst maintaining one’s cultural identity; assimilation, the unidirectional interaction with a new culture, and integration, 
balancing cultural maintenance with broader society (Berry et al., 2006). 
520 Jasinskaja‐Lahti, I., Liebkind, K., & Solheim, E. (2009). To identify or not to identify? National disidentification as an 
alternative reaction to perceived ethnic discrimination. Applied Psychology, 58(1), 105-128. 
521 Dancygier, R. M., & Laitin, D. D. (2014). Immigration into Europe: Economic discrimination, violence, and public 
policy. Annual Review of Political Science, 17, 43-64; Fokkema, T., & Haas, H. (2015). Pre‐and Post‐Migration Determinants of 
Socio‐Cultural Integration of African Immigrants in Italy and Spain. International Migration, 53(6), 3-26. 
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Mentoring is unusually helpful in this regard: because naturally occurring inter-ethnic contact is often 
affected by structural constraints, mentoring may bring refugees together in situations otherwise unlikely. 
Here we turn to the contact hypothesis, a sociological theory positing that diverse interactions reduce out-
group hostility most effectively when there is a cooperative environment among equals and promoted by 
authorities (Allport 1954; Bettencourt et al., 1992).522 If interactions lead to less discrimination, they may 
also incentivize many refugees to invest in location-specific capital. Yet here one must tread carefully. 
Interactions alone do not foster social capital. Prominent studies have concluded that ethnic diversity may 
even reduce social trust (Putnam, 2007) and that increased proximity is positively correlated with 
immigrant prejudice (Fetzer, 2000).523 Both findings are problematic since generalized trust is frequently 
a prerequisite for collective action and distributional equity (Levi, 1998).524 Optimistically, many studies 
that show a negative impact have relied on census data as a proxy for diversity (i.e., Alesina & La Ferrara, 
2002).525 And numerical diversity, while instructive of probabilities, does not inform the reader about the 
quality of the interactions.  
Research measuring the quality of interactions, on the other hand, has frequently shown positive results 
from immigrant-native interactions. Ellison et al., (2011) shows that contact with immigrants can lead to 
less punitive and more empathetic attitudes towards immigrants.526Atkinson (2018) discusses cases of 
mentoring refugees in Australia that led to shared goals and a new collective identity. Kanas and Van de 
Lippe (2011) find a positive effect of mentoring on employment in Germany when there is contact with 
Germans.527 Grey & Woodrick (2005) show that proximity with the native population may lead to an 
                                                             
522 Martinović (2013) in a study of inter-ethnic contact in the Netherlands finds that higher-educated native Dutch initiate contact 
less then higher-education immigrants, with education therefore being the most robust determinant of initiating inter-ethnic 
contact. If structural constraints are indeed more potent than preferences, as Martinović concludes, interventions might targe t 
opportunities to bring together groups that would otherwise not engage in a natural setting. These conclusions are particularly 
interesting in light of Volker et al., (2008) who find that immigrants, not native Dutch, have more ethnically homogenous social 
networks. This also raises the question over whether contact is preference-generated based on attitudinal determinants or 
spearheaded by sociodemographic characteristics such as education, age, relative size of outgroup. Allport, G. W. (1954). The 
nature of prejudice. Garden City, NY: Doubleday; Bettencourt, B. A., Brewer, M. B., Croak, M. R., & Miller, N. (1992). 
Cooperation and the reduction of intergroup bias: The role of reward structure and social orientation. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 28(4), 301-319. 
523 Putnam, R. D. (2007). E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty‐first century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize 
Lecture. Scandinavian political studies, 30(2), 137-174; Fetzer, J. S. (2000). Public attitudes toward immigration in the United 
States, France, and Germany. Cambridge University Press. 
524 Putnam’s work on ethnic diversity and trust has been debunked by: Abascal, M., & Baldassarri, D. (2015). Love thy neighbor? 
Ethnoracial diversity and trust reexamined. American Journal of Sociology, 121(3), 722-782; Levi, M. (1998) ‘A State of Trust’, 
in V. Braithwaite and M. Levi (eds), Trust and Governance. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 77–101. 
525 Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2002). Who trusts others?. Journal of public economics, 85(2), 208. 
526 Ellison, C. G., Shin, H., & Leal, D. L. (2011). The contact hypothesis and attitudes toward Latinos in the United States. Social 
Science Quarterly, 92(4), 938-958. 
527 Kanas, A., Van Tubergen, F., & Van der Lippe, T. (2011). The role of social contacts in the employment status of immigrants: 
A panel study of immigrants in Germany. International Sociology, 26(1), 95-122. As the authors note in their abstract, “The 
positive effect of having German contacts remains when social contacts are lagged, when host-country human capital is taken 
into account and also when unmeasured time-constant characteristics of immigrants are considered.” 
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inclusive environment for immigrants, while Okamoto & Ebert (2016) reveal how this is true in 
consonance with an increase in visibility, political and demographically.528 On the one hand this may 
mean that when environment promotes multicultural policies, individuals will be respective towards 
inclusionary attitudes, on the other, that political, institutional, and environmental (i.e., socialization) 
opportunities for multicultural interaction are needed to be in place for attitudinal shifts towards inclusion 
to transpire.529 
Mentoring typically fosters an introspective component through open-communication and trust with the 
mentor who guides alternate pathways to reflection and sustainable action. Ranging from existential 
questions such as ‘who am I,’ ‘who do I want to be,’ and ‘what is my place in society’ to the ability-
centered focus questions ‘what can I do,’ and ‘what do I want to be able to do’ (Voss et al., 2013) a 
mentee’s place in society is engaged.530 Answering these questions is of particular salience for refugees 
who enter society with less roots and more questions than natives. Clarifying one’s own place, under the 
guidance of a local mentor, provides a pathway to balance cultural identity with that of the host society.                   
This of course beckons the question: to what length of time mentoring would need to impact this process 
and labour market outcomes? It is not at all clear that a mentoring program of three months or even two 
years would be sufficient to acculturate a refugee, or, more specifically, affect her labour market status. 
On the other hand, the opposite is also true: addressing perceptions of discrimination through meaningful 
interpersonal contact might incentivize effort to invest in the human capital skills unique to a host nation 
(e.g., language, sector-specific job training). The process of ‘contact’ may clarify populist views against 
foreigners, potentially dispelling stereotypes formed from lack of contact with an out-group. This may 
include stereotypes about cultural practices, violence, and lifestyle. Proximity also allows for humanizing 
metrics through nuanced accounts made invisible by large-n statistics (e.g., migrant-native unemployment 
differentials). Mentoring frequently offers such opportunities when project designs incorporate inter-
ethnic group social activities such as sports, clubs, and informal gatherings. Giovani al Centro, in an 
example, one of ENESP’s projects, promotes intercultural friendships in Turin through providing 
afterschool support for teens. In another example, both the Austrian Mentoring for Migrants and Diversity 
                                                             
528 Grey, M. A., & Woodrick, A. C. (2005). Latinos have revitalized our community: Mexican migration and Anglo responses in 
Marshalltown, Iowa. New destinations: Mexican immigration in the United States, 6, 147; Okamoto, D., & Ebert, K. (2016). 
Group Boundaries, Immigrant Inclusion, and the Politics of Immigrant–Native Relations. American Behavioral Scientist, 60(2), 
224-250. 
529 It is also not clear, as the authors themselves note, if their results are generational or life cycle propelled. As the authors 
likewise admit, there are also concerns about self-selection (and therefore reverse causality) that plague such research designs, a 
point addressed in the empirical section. 
530 Vos et al. (2013). Met mentoring naar de top! Toekomst, ontwikkeling en perspetief (Groningen, Netherlands: Institute voor 
integratie en sociale weerbaarheid) as mentioned in Crul and Schneider (2014). Risk-taking, in the adolescent psychology 
literature is linked to a sense of isolation, which is why risky behavior increases in group settings where peer pressure is 
frequently present (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). The psychosocial support derived from unconditional acceptance, positive role 
modeling, and a strong emotional connection may mitigate these peer effects. 
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as Chance project has provided regular interpersonal contact with refugees seeking jobs or apprenticeship 
programs. So that, while institutional structures are frequently resistant to change, identity is non-static: it 
may be localized, shift form over time, and have an impact at all stages of the migrant’s job seeking. 
In consonance with policy advice from the literature suggesting that government programs should prevent 
isolation and engage immigrants to participate in meaningful interaction in the daily life of their host 
society (Berry et al., 2006) the third hypothesis is formed: 
H3 Mentoring which helps facilitate meaningful interpersonal interactions will positively impact the 
probability of a refugee’s employment. 
4.2.8 Summary of mentoring’s impact on the determinants and correlates of integration 
Rather than conceptualizing successful integration as solid-state building blocks, one leading off another, 
this chapter suggests that the correlates and determinants of integration interact with one another, 
impacted by non-static attitudes towards ascriptive features, migration policies, and inclusive signals from 
institutions. An intervention strategy must engage these interactive processes multi-directionally. Not 
only must it respond to host population concerns over an increasingly heterogeneous social lattice and 
increasing diverse political landscape, but also, address concerns of refugees. It must provide coherent 
pathways towards group membership. It must also navigate the labor market and educational institutions, 
along the way, providing the human support necessary to address residual effects from trauma and other 
obstacles refugees face when integrating into society (e.g., family-level inequalities, lack of domain-
specific knowledge, dearth of incentives to assimilate).  It must also have the capacity to coordinate 
institutions.  A mentoring program, if well-designed, will effectively do so. 
4.2.9 Types of Mentoring 
Although I hypothesize that mentoring as a monolithic indicator has a positive impact on integration, 
there exists an extensive body of literature disaggregating mentoring by attributes, typically including the 
respective ages of the mentor and mentee, the frequency of contact, language capacity of mentor, and type 
of mentoring (Casey & Dustmann, 2010).531 On the latter point, there are several subcategories of 
mentoring such as natural mentoring (formed without formal structure)532 and youth initiated mentoring; 
it may be that different types of mentors are needed during different life phases (Fruiht & Wray-Lake, 
                                                             
531 Casey, T., & Dustmann, C. (2010). Immigrants’ identity, economic outcomes and the transmission of identity across 
generations. The Economic Journal, 120(542). Also, in the not-immigrant literature age has a significant impact on the rapidity 
and receptivity. social and emotional impacts from interventions (Currie, 2001).Currie, J. (2001). Early childhood education 
programs. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 213-238. 
532 Nekby, L., & Rödin, M. (2010). Acculturation identity and employment among second and middle generation 
immigrants. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(1), 35-50; Zimmermann, L., Zimmermann, K. F., & Constant, A. (2007). 
Ethnic Self‐Identification of First‐Generation Immigrants. International Migration Review, 41(3), 769-781. 
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2013).533 While the psycho-emotional aspects of mentoring might benefit eventually from formal and 
informal mentors, integrating refugees would seemingly require a structured mentoring program to use its 
organizational abilities, industry know-how, and monitoring capacity to coordinate the institutional-level 
barriers that newcomers face.  As such, the level of organization and commitment needed to satisfy the 
first three hypotheses would intuitively require a structured program.  By that token, the final hypothesis 
is formed. Figure 20 displays the links between the conceptual frameeork and hypotheses.  
H4: Formal mentoring will have a more positive impact on the probability of a refugee’s 
employment than naturally occurring mentoring.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
533 Fruiht, V. M., & Wray-Lake, L. (2013). The role of mentor type and timing in predicting educational attainment. Journal of 
youth and adolescence, 42(9), 1459-1472. 
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4.3 Empirical Design & Results 
 
4.3.1 Sampling Strategy 
Data was collected from February 2017 to August 2017 in Greece, Italy, and Germany. These three 
locations were chosen due to their high concentration of Arabic-speaking refugees and the fact that 
each country had several functional mentoring programs targeting asylum seekers. Data collection 
was conducted in three places: mosques during Friday prayers, public parks, and outside a single 
metro station with high concentrations of migrants. The choice of Friday prayers was done to ease 
potential socio-economic bias. That is, it is possible, but by no means certain, that unemployed 
migrants would be more available to spend time in parks then go to a mandatory religious service. 
The Friday prayer (salat jumah) is the only religious service that is mandatory for all Muslims to 
attend regularly no matter what their labor market status. 534 The final sample consisted of 295 Arabic 
speaking humanitarian migrants of which 68 were mentored. Out of 306 individuals asked to 
participate in the survey, 9 declined, 8 of which were Kurdish with no other similar observable 
characteristics.     
4.3.2 Selection Effects   
Two issues pertaining to selection arose while conducting data collection. The first is self-selection 
into a mentoring program. Participants who already possessed the skills that employers deem valuable 
might have the initiative to participate in a mentoring intervention, or even the survey itself. As 
Kogan (2016) extrapolates 
The selection issue is an obvious challenge when gauging the effectiveness of integration 
policy instruments. Do policy interventions have a causal effect, or are effects driven by the 
self-selection of individuals with specific characteristics that are likely to correlate with the 
observed outcomes of the intervention policy measures?... Yet these favorable unobserved (in 
the data) characteristics might be the ones that employers observe during a job interview that 
lead to a job offer or better employment conditions. Reliance on labor market counseling, by 
contrast, might have negative connotations that individuals are not confident or resourceful 
enough to succeed in the labor market on their own.535 
 
                                                             
534 There are exceptions to this obligation, for example, menstruating women. Sadeghi, B. (2013). The logic of law making in 
Islam: Women and prayer in the legal tradition. Cambridge University Press. 
535 Kogan (n511) p340. 
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The lack of treatment and control groups may mean that, as per Kogan’s above comments, survey 
participants who were mentored had characteristics that made them more amendable to join and 
benefit from a mentoring program. Unfortunately, logistics and financing did not permit randomized 
clinical trials. The author thus acknowledges that results must be interpreted in light of potential 
selection effects into a mentoring program.  
The second selection issue stems from the sampling strategy. Because participants were not selected 
through randomized clinical trials, there may have been self-selection towards survey participation. 
Gathering participants from three distinct public arenas attempted to attenuate these selection effects.  
4.3.3 Data and Methodology 
Refugees provided data that captured their employment status, and a range of socio-demographic 
characteristics. They were also asked if they participated in a mentoring program, and if so, they 
received follow-up questions on the nature and quality of the mentoring program. 
In this study, the dependent variable in all analyses was a dichotomous employment status variable 
indicating whether a refugee is unemployed or employed. Four types of treatment were considered, 
namely, whether respondents participated in a mentoring program (yes; no), whether the mentoring 
program contained an educational component (no mentoring; mentoring with educational component; 
mentoring without education component), whether the mentor helped build meaningful friends (no 
mentoring; mentor helped make friends, mentor did not help make friends), and whether mentoring 
was formal or not naturally occurring (no mentoring; formal mentor; naturally occurring mentoring). 
Since it is unknown whether the refugees were randomly assigned to these treatments, a Coarsened 
Exact Matching (CEM) was employed, which is a matching technique used to estimate treatment 
effects and make causal inferences based on observational data (King and Nielsen 2016; King et al. 
2011).536 Because CEM is a reducing matching method, explained by Blackwell and his co-authors 
(2009) as “that the balance between the treated and control groups is chosen by ex ante user choice 
rather than discovered through the usual laborious process of checking after the fact, tweaking the 
method, and repeatedly re-estimating”537 imbalances in particular variables do not affect the 
                                                             
536 King, G., & Nielsen, R. (2016). Why propensity scores should not be used for matching. Copy at http://j. mp/1sexgVw 
Download Citation BibTex Tagged XML Download Paper, 378; King, G., Nielsen, R., Coberley, C., Pope, J. E., & Wells, A. 
(2011). Comparative effectiveness of matching methods for causal inference. Unpublished manuscript, 15. 
537 Blackwell, M., Iacus, S., King, G., & Porro, G. (2009). cem: Coarsened exact matching in Stata. The Stata Journal, 9(4), 
524. 
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imbalance of other variables.538 Moreover, CEM produces a balanced sample by pruning the data such 
that observations that cannot be exact matched are dropped from subsequent analyses. This helps 
estimate counterfactuals in the mentoring variables and is advantageous given the small sample of 
those mentored. 
The first step is to select a number of covariates on which to match the sample of treated and 
untreated respondents. This is necessarily to account for the possibility that refugees’ background 
characteristics affect both their probability of receiving mentoring and the probability of being 
employed. In other words, it accounts for selection into mentoring programs (given selected 
covariates), and therefore reduces endogeneity problems. CEM enables an approximation of a 
counterfactual for treated individuals, meaning an estimate of what the employment probability for 
treated individuals would have been if they had not received the treatment.  
Available covariates were gender (male; female), age (15-18; 19-22; 23-30; 31-40; 41-50; 51-65; 66-
100) educational background (completed graduate degree, completed undergraduate degree, some 
university, not finished high school; other), country of origin (Middle Eastern; African)539, religion 
(Muslim; Christian), legal status (waiting for determination; refugee status; no legal status), the time 
spent in the current country (< 6 months; 6-12 months; > 12 months), and the country of mentoring 
(Greece; Italy; Germany). Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, treatment variables and 
potential covariates are displayed in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
538 Ibid. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of respondent characteristics and mentoring programs 
 N %    N %  
Dependent Variable    Covariates   
Employment Status    Mentoring 
country 
  
   Unemployed 130 44.2
2 
    Greece 63 55.25 
   Employed 164 55.7
8 
    Italy 73 24.75 
Treatment Variables        Germany 59 20.00 
Mentoring    Gender   
   Not mentored 227 76.9
5 
    Female 83 28.14 
   Mentored 68 23.0
5 
    Male 212 71.86 
      With educational component 44 14.9
2 
 Age   
      Without educational 
component 
25 8.47     15-18 31 10.51 
      Me tor helped make friends 57 19.3
2 
    19-22 62 21.02 
      Mentor did not help make 
friends 
12 4.07     23-30 71 24.07 
      Mentoring occurred naturally 32 10.8
5 
    31-40 57 19.32 
      Formal mentor 36 12.2
0 
    41-50 47 15.93 
       51-65 21 7.12 
       66-100 6 2.03 
    Education   
    No Answer 59 20.07 
       Completed 
Graduate Degree 
43 14.63 
       Some 
University 
56 19.05 
       Not F nished 
High School 
46 15.65 
       Completed 
Undergrad 
Degree 
90 30.61 
    Country of origin   
       Middle Eastern 269 91.19 
       African 26 8.81 
    Religion   
       Muslim 268 90.85 
       Christian 27 9.15 
    Legal status   
       Waiting for 
determination 
100 33.90 
       Refugee status 124 42.03 
       No legal status 71 24.07 
    Months in country   
       < 6 months 134 45.58 
       6-12 months 80 27.21 
       > 12 months 80 27.21 
Note: N = 295 
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Chosen covariates were expected to be associated with both the outcome (i.e., employment) and the 
treatment (i.e., mentoring program). Based on the literature review, it was expected that educational 
background, legal status, and time spent in country to fulfil these criteria. After, a series of logistic 
regression analyses was performed predicting the probability of participating in the different types of 
mentoring programs based on the selected covariates (see Table 2). As expected, time spent in 
country consistently predicted participation in mentoring programs. Those who were in a country for 
longer generally had a higher probability of participation in a mentoring program. Legal status and 
educational background were less consistently related, at least according to conventional levels of 
significance. However, several coefficients were marginally significant, and the overall models 
explained between 9% and 13% of the variance in the probability of participating in the different 
mentoring programs. Given that participation in mentoring programs depended in part on these 
covariates, the sample can be considered unbalanced with regard to these relevant covariates.
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Table 2: Results of logistic regression analyses estimating the probability of entering different mentoring programs 
predicted by educational background, legal status, and months spent in the receiving country.540   
 
To reduce imbalance between the groups of treated and untreated refugees, exact matching was employed 
based on the selected covariates, namely educational background, legal status, and time spent in country. 
Since the balanced sample does not differ with regard to covariates –participation in a mentoring program 
                                                             
540 One participant left a category blank and so was excluded from the analysis. The changed n=295 to n=294.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
 Mentor Mentor 
without 
education 
Mentor 
with 
education 
Mentor 
did not 
help 
make 
friends 
Mentor 
did help 
make 
friends 
Mentor 
occurred 
naturally 
Mentor 
was 
formally 
assigned 
Education        
   Not Finished High 
School 
 
Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
   Completed Graduate 
Degree 
3.05 3.79* 0.61 2.60 3.17 2.04 2.97 
 (1.75) (2.46) (0.58) (1.62) (3.74) (1.58) (2.15) 
   Some University   1.83 2.29 0.53 2.07 0.78 2.37 1.14 
 (1.06) (1.51) (0.50) (1.28) (1.12) (1.78) (0.91) 
   Completed 
Undergraduate 
2.07 1.65 1.51 2.24 1.06 1.47 2.32 
 (1.08) (1.02) (1.07) (1.26) (1.32) (1.05) (1.56) 
   Other 2.04 0.78 2.71 1.62 3.86 3.49 0.75 
 (1.15) (0.58) (1.94) (1.01) (4.32) (2.52) (0.63) 
Legal status        
   Waiting for 
determination 
Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
   Refugee status 0.62 0.89 0.28* 0.62 0.72 0.86 0.50 
 (0.23) (0.39) (0.15) (0.25) (0.50) (0.42) (0.24) 
   No legal status 0.65 0.73 0.50 0.75 0.24 0.54 0.84 
 (0.29) (0.42) (0.32) (0.37) (0.26) (0.34) (0.49) 
In country for        
   < 6 months Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
   6-12 months 3.38** 4.38** 2.14 3.47** 1.68 2.48 3.37* 
 (1.41) (2.31) (1.27) (1.63) (1.24) (1.42) (1.84) 
   > 12 months 7.14*** 6.88*** 4.68** 9.45*** 0.65 9.83*** 2.79 
 (2.95) (3.52) (2.73) (4.27) (0.61) (5.23) (1.54) 
N 294 269 250 282 237 258 262 
pseudo R2 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.20 
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is the only difference between the two groups– it is unnecessary to control for covariates in subsequent 
analyses (King et al. 2011, 2016). Effect sizes of simple mean comparisons can be interpreted as average 
treatment effects on the treated. Covariates on which the sample was matched can, however, be included 
in order to show the effect of the covariates on the outcome of interest.  
4.3.4 Results  
A series of logistic regression analyses were performed on the balanced sample estimating average 
treatment effects on the treated with different mentoring programs as treatment and probability of 
employment as outcome. Results including estimates of the covariates are displayed in Table 3. Results 
that excluded covariates indeed produced the exact same pattern of results. 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Analyses Estimating Average Treatment Effects on the Treated with 
Different Mentoring Programs as Treatment and Probability of Employment as Outcome 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mentoring 2.50* 
(0.92) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mentoring with education  
 
2.70* 
(1.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mentoring without education  
 
 
 
2.60 
(1.42) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mentor helped make friends  
 
 
 
 
 
5.67*** 
(2.72) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mentor did not help make friends  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.33 
(0.23) 
 
 
 
 
Mentor was assigned  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.54* 
(1.84) 
 
 
Mentoring occurred naturally  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.62 
(0.80) 
Not Finished High School Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Completed Graduate Degree 1.41 
(0.84) 
1.51 
(0.94) 
2.37 
(2.49) 
1.35 
(0.88) 
1.71 
(2.05) 
0.52 
(0.43) 
3.30 
(2.32) 
Some University 1.32 
(0.81) 
1.15 
(0.74) 
8.75 
(11.12) 
1.66 
(1.14) 
0.59 
(0.97) 
0.64 
(0.50) 
1.98 
(1.82) 
Completed Undergraduate Degree 1.47 
(0.81) 
1.64 
(0.96) 
10.45* 
(9.63) 
1.74 
(0.99) 
2.25 
(4.09) 
0.81 
(0.63) 
2.79 
(1.73) 
Other 0.43 
(0.25) 
0.35 
(0.27) 
1.74 
(1.18) 
0.61 
(0.40) 
0.42 
(0.39) 
0.18* 
(0.14) 
0.76 
(0.60) 
Waiting for determination Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Refugee status 0.88 0.74 1.28 0.82 0.79 0.72 1.72 
144 
 
(0.38) (0.39) (0.76) (0.36) (1.18) (0.36) (1.37) 
No legal status 0.48 
(0.26) 
0.75 
(0.45) 
0.91 
(0.73) 
0.72 
(0.43) 
1.00 
(.) 
0.38 
(0.22) 
1.25 
(1.62) 
In country for < 6 months Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
In country for 6-12 months 1.48 
(0.76) 
2.30 
(1.48) 
0.78 
(0.49) 
1.82 
(1.12) 
2.66 
(2.49) 
1.71 
(1.00) 
1.06 
(0.93) 
In country for > 12 months 1.89 
(0.92) 
2.14 
(1.29) 
0.53 
(0.39) 
2.51 
(1.33) 
1.00 
(.) 
2.29 
(1.25) 
1.20 
(1.28) 
Observations 223 197 127 203 80 165 151 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.07 
Note: Coefficients presented are odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Regarding the first hypothesis (H1), evidence was found that mentoring has a significant and positive 
average treatment effect on the treated. Those who received mentoring were 2.5 times more likely to be 
employed compared to those who did not receive any mentoring (see Model 1, Table 3). Considering the 
second hypothesis (H2), results showed that mentoring with an educational component had a positive and 
significant effect on the probability of employment. Those who received mentoring with an educational 
component were 2.7 times more likely to be employed after receiving this treatment (see Model 2). Those 
who received mentoring without an educational component were not significantly more likely to be 
employed (Model 3). Even though the effect size was considerable, namely odds ratio = 2.60, the 
standard error was relatively high, suggesting that there was a lot variance with regard to the effectiveness 
of this mentoring strategy541. Overall, these results lend support to Hypothesis 2, suggesting that 
mentoring with an educational component is a more successful treatment than mentoring without an 
educational component. 
The third hypothesis (H3) suggested that mentoring that helps form meaningful social connections with 
locals will be more successful in improving employment status than mentoring that does not help make 
meaningful connections. The results suggest that this is the case. Refugees who participated in mentoring 
programs that did not help make local friends did not increase their chances of being employed (Model 5). 
However, mentoring programs that did help make local friends, showed significant increases in their 
employment probabilities. Their chance of being employed was 5.67 times larger after participating in a 
mentoring program that helped them make local friends (see Model 4).  
                                                             
541 This may also be due to the small sample size. 
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Finally, the fourth hypothesis (H4) predicted that mentors that were formally assigned would be more 
successful in improving their mentees’ employment status than mentors that naturally emerged. The 
results support this hypothesis by showing that programs where mentors were formally assigned 
improved the employment status of their mentees by 3.54. In contrast, mentoring that occurred naturally 
showed lower increases in employment probabilities, namely an increase by factor 1.62, which was not 
statistically significant.  
4.4 Discussion 
Based on its ability to bridge informational asymmetries and promote social cohesion, Chapter IV 
hypothesized that mentoring would have a positive impact on gainful employment. These predictions are 
derived from several strands of literature that show how increasing sense of belonging through building 
meaningful relationships increases cohesion, as well as from signal theory that shows how filling gaps in 
location-specific information may engender positive signals at job interviews thereby lowering that gap 
employers face in the screening process.  The results confirmed these predications. Respondents who 
were mentored showed an increased probability of being employed, and this was particularly the case 
when there was an educational component to the mentoring or when meaningful interpersonal 
connections were formed. While ‘educational component’ can refer to a gamut of mentoring-related 
aspects, post-questionnaire interviews suggest that for the large majority of respondents, mentors worked 
with teachers and school administrators to explain course content, pathways towards graduation, and help 
with homework.542 In short: knowledge of educational institutions, language capacity, and best practice 
learning habits. When the mentor was not assigned these results lost their significance.   
4.4.1 Intuitive Results?  
While previous research sets the stage for the predictions, it is not intuitive that mentoring would have a 
positive impact on labour market outcomes. So while studies applying big (Caliendo & Schmidl, 2016; 
Escudero, 2015)543 and country-specific data (Joona & Nekby, 2012; Saniter & Siedler, 2013)544  have 
revealed positive impacts on job search assistance, employment incentives, and labour market impacts 
from counseling, respectively, and while a positive effect was likewise documented with wage subsidy 
and language programs (Clausen et al., 2009), 545immigrant-individualized training with a language 
                                                             
542 See Appendix A for a sample of the interview questions. 
543 The most effective ALMP is Escudero’s analysis is start-up incentives with a disjuncture in program continuity having the 
strongest negative effect for labour market variables. Escudero, V. (2015). Are Active Labour Market Policies Effective in 
Activating and Integrating Low-Skilled Individuals?: An International Comparison. Working Paper No. 3, ILO, Geneva. 
544 Joona, P. A., & Nekby, L. (2012). Intensive coaching of new immigrants: an evaluation based on random program 
assignment. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(2), 575-600. Saniter, N., & Siedler, T. (2013). The effects of 
occupational knowledge: job information centers, educational choices, and labor market outcomes.  
545 Also, Clausen, J., Heinesen, E., Hummelgaard, H., Husted, L., & Rosholm, M. (2009). The effect of integration policies on the 
time until regular employment of newly arrived immigrants: Evidence from Denmark. Labour Economics, 16(4), 409-417; 
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component (Sarvimäki & Hämäläinen, 2016)546 and with high-skilled immigrants participating in training 
programs (Cohen-Goldner & Eckstein, 2010),547 these effect may very well depend on the type of training 
(Thomsen et al., 2013).548Often these studies have used data from the European Social Survey or 
Migration Integration Index (e.g., Hadjar & Bakes, 2013).549 Moreover, despite many papers showing 
positive effects other papers have found uncertainty in the integration policy-labour market outcome 
nexus (Bilgili et al., 2015).550Research has also found a negative impact on counseling and labor market 
training, due to negative signals from job search assistance (Kogan, 2016).551  On a meta level, a recent 
analysis of four Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) across Europe  – subsidized public sector 
employment, training, job search help, and wage subsidies – found that only wage subsidies showed an 
increase in employment rates among immigrants (Butschek & Walter, 2014).552 Related studies from the 
Labour Economics and Integration literature have reported inconclusive results of the impact of job 
training on labour market outcomes. The single study linking mentoring to labour market outcomes 
within the European Union concludes that mentoring aids in job retention (Gonçalves et al., 
2017).553Whether negative signals and adverse selection negate the positive effect from a proposed 
mentoring intervention remains open. 
4.4.2 Drawbacks 
While mentoring may aid integration on several fronts, nevertheless negative cases may arise. These 
include exposure to negative peer behavior and breaking bonds with parents (Rodriguez Plantas, 2014, 
2012; Spencer 2007). 554 Furthermore, in meta-analyses, at-risk youths have yielded tepid, albeit positive, 
                                                             
546 Sarvimäki, M., & Hämäläinen, K. (2016). Integrating immigrants: The impact of restructuring active labor market 
programs. Journal of Labor Economics, 34(2), 479-508. 
547 The paper tests a sample of women from the former Soviet Union who migrated to Israel. The effect was not pronounced for 
blue-collar occupations. Cohen-Goldner, S., & Eckstein, Z. (2010). Estimating the return to training and occupational experience: 
The case of female immigrants. Journal of Econometrics, 156(1), 86-105. 
548 The authors find that while job training didn’t improve labour market outcomes, aptitude tests had a positive effect on 
immigrants. Results were gender-dependent. Thomsen, S. L., Walter, T., & Aldashev, A. (2013). Short-term training programs 
for immigrants in the German welfare system: do effects differ from natives and why?. IZA Journal of Migration, 2(1), 24. 
549 Uses data from the European Social Survey and Migrant Integration Policy Index to test the gap between migrants and non-
migrants in terms of their Subjective Well-Being. Hadjar, A., & Backes, S. (2013). Migration background and subjective well-
being a multilevel analysis based on the European social survey. Comparative Sociology, 12(5), 645-676. 
550 Bilgili, Ö., Huddleston, T., & Joki, A. L. (2015). The Dynamics between Integration Policies and Outcomes: Synthesis of the 
Literature. The Migration Policy Group. 
551 Kogan (n511). 
552 Butschek, S., & Walter, T. (2014). What active labour market programmes work for immigrants in Europe? A meta-analysis 
of the evaluation literature. IZA Journal of Migration, 3(1), 48. But see Caliendo & Schmidl (2016) whose meta-analysis finds 
that job search assistance had significant positive effects for youths, while labour market training programs yielded mixed results, 
questioning, overall, the utility of ALMPs. Caliendo, M., & Schmidl, R. (2016). Youth unemployment and active labor market 
policies in Europe. IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 5(1), 1. 
553 Gonçalves, M., Farcas, D., Leitão, T., Giorgakis, G., Valeriu, S. F., Traian, M. P., & Kovacs, K. (2017). Evidence Review on 
Labour Market and Job Place Retention: Mentoring Pathways Towards Employment. Journal of Organisational Transformation 
& Social Change, 1-25. 
554 Rodríguez-Planas (n491). 
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results from mentoring. (Dubois et al., 2011; Rhodes, 2008). Since many refugees would likely fall into 
the at-risk category, at least initially, these findings are of some concern. 
A closer look suggests that the negligible or potentially negative effects may simply be a matter of 
mechanism design. Quality (Herrera, 2004),555 attitude (Karcher et al., 2010) and length of mentor 
commitment (Karcher, 2008) have all been shown to impact key outcomes.556Mitigating adverse effects 
may simply be a matter of how a mentoring program is formed. On the issue of commitment length, for 
example, Rodriguez-Plantas (2014) suggests that instances of statistically insignificant positive impact 
might be derived from early closures. Supporting this position is Zilberstein & Spencer (2014) as well as 
Grossman & Rhodes (2002), the latter finding that the positive impact of mentoring is significantly 
stronger if the mentor-mentee match lasts at least one year. Mechanism design, of course, must temper the 
underlying reasons for early termination.557  
Avoiding negative side effects requires addressing correlates of positive program-based mentoring during 
the mechanism design stage and adjusting for unexpected situations. These correlates include the role of 
parents (Taylor and Porcellini, 2013); family environment i.e., frequent mobility (Schlafer et al., 2009);558 
behavioral problems (Grossman & Rhodes, 2002); type of mentoring;559motivation for mentoring 
(Larsson et al., 2016; Kupersmidt & Rhodes, 2014; DeWit et al., 2016); frequency of contact (Raposa et 
al, 2016; Karcher et al., 2006) and ineffective mentor-mentee matches (Sue et al., 2014; Kupersmit et al., 
2017).560 Given the breadth of these variables, predicting how risks will attenuate positive effects of 
refugee mentorship programs will be difficult to generalize. Variation within each group, may undermine 
                                                             
555 But see Cavell et al., (2009).   
556 Duration was negatively impacted by elevated levels of mentee’s environmental stress. Karcher, M. J. (2008). The study of 
mentoring in the learning environment (SMILE): A randomized evaluation of the effectiveness of school-based 
mentoring. Prevention Science, 9(2), 99. 
557 Lack of enduring effects has also been shown in the mentoring literature and does not seem robustly effected by mechanism 
design. For labor market outcomes. However, this effect would have resonance in employee retention, not our outcome variable 
employment. See: Herrera, C., Grossman, J. B., Kauh, T. J., Feldman, A. F., & McMaken, J. (2007). Making a difference in 
schools: The Big Brothers Big Sisters school-based mentoring impact study. Public/Private Ventures. 
558 Shlafer, R. J., Poehlmann, J., Coffino, B., & Hanneman, A. (2009). Mentoring children with incarcerated parents: Implications 
for research, practice, and policy. Family relations, 58(5), 507-519. 
559 Youth Initiated Mentoring (YIM) where youths find their mentors from non-parental adults within their existing social 
framework, may expedite trust and augment the meaningfulness of the mentor-mentee relationship, particularly when both are of 
the same race (Schwartz et al., 2013). Though see Rhodes et al., 2003 for a different finding on the impact of race in matching 
procedures. However, YIM has been shown to show social support without augmenting social networks, educational ties, or 
opportunity structures (Abelev, 2009). Social leveraging may be better activated through high-resource mentors outside the 
mentee’s social network (Spencer et al., 2016). Although see Portes and Landolt (2000) who argue that reinforcing existing 
connections may prove more effective than forging new social bonds. Context may also prove critical: Spencer et al., (2013) 
analyze an intensive intervention program, NGYCP, and thus have only high-risk adolescents as their population. Furthermore, 
familiarity may allay initial tension and mistrust occasionally characteristic of matches from different social milieu (Spencer, 
2007). 
560 Also see: Pryce et al., 2013. Kupersmidt, J. B., Stump, K. N., Stelter, R. L., & Rhodes, J. E. (2017). Predictors of premature 
match closure in youth mentoring relationships. American journal of community psychology, 59(1-2), 32; Sue, J. L., Craig, W. 
M., Dunn, V., & Luca-Huger, T. (2014). The Active Ingredient: An Examination of the Mentoring Relationship. Do relationships 
matter? An examination of a school-based intergenerational mentoring program, 60.  
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traditional in-group/outgroup boundaries (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002), while specific environmental 
factors potentially alter the notion of monolithic positive mentoring covariates.561 The empirical analysis 
controls for gender, educational background, nationality, religion, legal status and duration of mentoring.  
4.5 Conclusion 
While the numbers of refugees reaching Europe has plummeted dramatically from 2015 and 2016 to 
2017, integration remains a central issue for EU Member States. This is true not only for those who host, 
but, because of the Single market and freedom of movement, all 28 States. It is critical for both the EU 
economy as well as intra-State social cohesion that refugees and those under subsidiary protection enter 
and remain in the labor market. This necessitates interventions that go beyond placement and targeted 
upskilling, but give guidance that is dynamic and proactive, targeting processes as they unfold.  
Chapter IV investigated whether mentoring in Greece, Italy, and Germany had a positive impact on the 
employment of Arabic speaking refugees. It hypothesized that mentoring would include location-specific 
capital needed to bridge informational asymmetries and send positive signals to employers, as well as 
foster the social capital and sense of belonging shown to positively affect labor market entry. The results 
confirm these predictions and place a burden of action on State and EU-level officials to further 
investigate whether mentoring could prove an effective intervention at the supranational level.  
 
Chapter V: Public Opinion and Integration: The Case of Germany 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Promoting social cohesion and facilitating labour market success for refugees has been a notable concern 
of several EU Member States. This has not only been true for refugee-hosting countries, such as the 
Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, but also States that host few refugees, such as Latvia and Poland. Intra-
EU labor mobility means that a single State’s integration policies are not insular and that ineffective 
integration within one EU State may spill over to neighboring countries. A similar implication can be said 
for the unique socio-political identity of States where refugees can be expected to obtain full citizenship 
rights (cf. infra, Miller, 2015).  
                                                             
561 Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation–state building, migration and the 
social sciences. Global networks, 2(4), 323. 
 
149 
 
Predicting the success of an integration programs has been difficult because of the complexity of 
measuring integration (Bernstein & DuBois, 2018).562 Integration consists not only of easily observable 
criteria, such as labor market participation (Bansak et al., 2018), but also of phenomena that are not easily 
measured, such as inter-group relations with the host community (Ager & Strang, 2008).563 We can, 
however, capture the host population’s perceptions of successful integration and whether a refugee 
integration program adequately addresses the host population’s needs. If it fails to do so, the host 
population may either put pressure on their elected officials to change policies or fail to positively engage 
the program. Identifying a successful integration program thus requires knowledge of which refugee 
characteristics are perceived by the host population to be amenable to successful integration, which are 
not, and how an integration program interfaces with the two. If a characteristic (i.e., education, country of 
origin) is more salient in making a refugee desirable than her participation in an integration program, then 
integration programs should concentrate on modulating the perception of the host population vis-à-vis 
said characteristic. In this way, testing characteristics that make a refugee more desirable or amendable to 
integration, provides a litmus test for forming integration interventions and tweaking existing ones.  
Chapter V again focuses on mentoring. While Chapter IV focused whether mentoring has had a positive 
impact on integration outcomes, Chapter V tests whether mentoring may lead to refugees being perceived 
as more ‘desirable’ by the host population. 564  The importance of desirability is twofold: research has 
drawn a link between integration policies and public perception. Public support for targeted integration 
programs frequently aids in achieving outcome measures; on the contrary, policies perceived to 
inadequately address local needs have frequently faltered from lack of local engagement (Bloemraad & 
De Graauw, 2012).565 Success of an EU or State-level integration program may therefore depend on 
whether the program can address key concerns of a population in the design phase. By knowing what 
attributes are more salient (e.g., “desirable”) to a particular population, and how those attributes interact 
with a particular integration program, a bespoke mechanism targeting local needs can be crafted.  
Unsurprisingly then, Chapter V orients its empirical lens on local needs. In practical terms this means 
measuring the individual and group-level characteristics that a refugee-hosting population perceives will 
promote integration, or on the flip side, foment perceptions of a threat. How individual-level immigrant 
                                                             
562 Bernstein, H., & DuBois, N. (2018). Bringing evidence to the refugee integration debate. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
https://www. urban. org/research/publication/bringing-evidence-refugee-integration-debate/view/full_report. 
563 Ager, A., & Strang, A. (2008). Understanding integration: A conceptual framework. Journal of refugee studies, 21(2), 166-
191; Bansak, K., Ferwerda, J., Hainmueller, J., Dillon, A., Hangartner, D., Lawrence, D., & Weinstein, J. (2018). Improving 
refugee integration through data-driven algorithmic assignment. Science, 359(6373), 325-329. 
564 Council of Europe (2017) Measuring Integration in Germany and Europe. Possibilities and Limits of Existing Integration 
Monitoring. Last accessed 23 July 2018 from 
<https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/migration/archives/documentation/Series_Community_Relations/Measurement_indicators_integratio
n_en.pdf>. 
565 Bloemraad & De Graauw (n19). 
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attributes interface with local population perception has been tested in several recent studies (Sobolewska 
et al., 2017; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015).566 In Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015), for instance, 
American’s opinions towards largely Mexican immigrants are tested using a conjoint design with the 
result that, regardless of most social background characteristics Americans prefer educated immigrants, 
preferably in more prestigious jobs and disdain those who entered the United States illegally or have no 
concrete plans to work.  
Advancing their scholarship, this analysis employs a conjoint causal interference tool applied to the case 
of Germany which is selected due to the high influx of immigrants from 2015 to 2017. The conjoint 
design places mentoring alongside ten outcome variables from the migration and labor market literature 
shown to impact the perception of the German population towards successful integration. It tests whether 
participating in a mentoring program has significant bearing on whether an immigrant is perceived as 
more ‘desirable’ for the German population. This design aims to answer whether mentoring will impact 
the perception of threat of native population, and, consequently, a mentoring integration program. 
The results show that in Germany, attributes suggesting employability such as language skills, education, 
and motivation to find a job make an immigrant more desirable. However, if the individual is enrolled in a 
mentoring program with a local mentor, the effect of education largely dissipates. The same phenomenon 
was found for religion and language abilities suggesting that a well-designed mentoring program is 
perceived as a mechanism able to mitigate many of the ‘less desirable’ characteristics.  
Added Value 
This chapter adds value to the literature in two ways. Firstly, it presents an argument for mentoring 
integration programs for refugees. While there have been calls for increased funding for Active Labour 
Market Policies (ALMPs) at the EU level (European Commission 2016), to the author’s knowledge there 
have been no studies using quantitative data from the host population’s point of view to advocate for a 
mentoring program.567 Secondly, very few studies have been able to empirically demonstrate which 
individual-level characteristics interact with a specific refugee integration policy. This has important 
implications on how a mentoring intervention is presented to the general population, as well as the 
location-specific characteristics that a program should target.  
Terminology   
                                                             
566 Hainmueller, J., & Hopkins, D. J. (2015). The hidden American immigration consensus: A conjoint analysis of attitudes 
toward immigrants. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 529-548. 
567 European Commission (2016c). Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals. (July 2016) 377 final. 
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Refugees are humanitarian immigrants who fall under the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention of 
persecuted. Determination of status often takes several months and may take years. In popular parlance, 
those awaiting status determination are often called asylum seekers. In addition, many humanitarian 
immigrants who are not afforded refugee status are given subsidiary status and remain in their host 
country. Integration is a concern for all types of humanitarian immigrants, whether being granted refugee 
status or not. This chapter therefore discusses and tests the desirability of immigrants, and controls for 
type (i.e., economic, humanitarian) in the analyses. To the author’s knowledge, there is no literature 
observing a significant difference on how refugees and non-refugee humanitarian migrants are perceived 
by the general public.  
5.2 Background Literature  
Public Opinion and Integration 
Public opinion is integral to how a mentoring integration program is designed and implemented. If EU 
populations observe that their politicians are not adequately representing their integration preferences they 
may vote with their feet, forcing politicians to more closely align policymaking with constituent demands.  
An extensive body of research, frequently falling under the tutelage of policy responsiveness theory, has 
tried gauging the causal direction of policy and domestic public opinion (Arnold and Franklin, 2012; 
Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006).568 Does the local population influence its elected officials to the extent that 
the officials will represent their interests at the supranational level? Or do officials accept supranational 
policies without regard to their constituents’ preferences, irrespective of electoral turnover?  
Recent evidence suggests that public opinion exacts significant leverage in crafting integration policy 
outcomes. In Sweden, Germany, and Austria, for example, local populations advocating for labor market 
integration has been a driver in forming policies to reduce the inflow of unauthorized migrants, while 
simultaneously, increasing spending for integration programs (European Parliament, 2018).569 In 
Germany, local perception that refugee credentials were not being effectively evaluated catalyzed 
programs to evaluate credential and upskill, such as Perspectives for Refugees. Local efforts were 
likewise instrumental in promulgating legislation to ease refugee gains in the German labor market: the 
Integration Law of 2016 placed a moratorium on EU or German national job hiring preference to bolster 
refugee employment.570 Across the channel, Sobolewska and co-authors (2017) show that attitudes 
                                                             
568 Arnold, C., & Franklin, M. N. (2012). Introduction: Issue congruence and political responsiveness. West European 
Politics, 35(6), 1217-1225; Lahav, G., & Guiraudon, V. (2006). Actors and venues in immigration control: Closing the gap 
between political demands and policy outcomes. West European Politics, 29(2), 201-223. 
569 European Parliament. (2018). Integration of Refugees into Germany, Austria, and Sweden: a Comparative Analysis. 
IP/A/EMPL/2016-23 January 2018.  
570 ILO. Integrationsgesetz. Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I, 2016-08-05, vol. 39, pp. 1939-1949. Last accessed February 25, 2019 from 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=104000&p_count=16&p_classification=01. 
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towards Muslims in the UK, particularly notions of gender equality, impacted whether an individual was 
predicted to successfully integrate and had subsequent policy implications.571 At a macro level, utilitarian 
and identity-based concerns by EU Member States over enlarging the EU has precipitated discussion over 
whether and how integration will unfold (Toshkov, 2017).572 Several studies (i.e., Arnold and Franklin, 
2012) have explored this link between public opinion and integration policies using the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The MIPEX consists of 167 indicators in 38 countries and helps 
evaluate how governments are going about integrating migrants and what future policies might be 
effective.573 Results have frequently shown that public calls for restrictive policies have been echoed by 
policymakers and resulted in restrictive immigration policies (Ruedin et al., 2015; Ford et al., 2015).574  
It is noteworthy that research has also found the opposite. Morales & Ruedin (2015) and Odman & Bale, 
(2015) show that while public opinion has become increasingly restrictive or favored the status quo, 
corresponding immigration policies tend to be increasingly lenient. This disconnect between policy and 
public opinion has likewise been noted in several empirical studies (Akkerman, 2015; Brady & Finnegan, 
2014; Huddleston et al., 2011; Bale et al., 2010 ).575 Esses et al., (2017) argues that generally speaking, 
links between local population perception, their demands on their elected officials, and subsequent 
integration policies cannot be considered causal.576 Whether a causal link exists seems to depend on type 
of immigrant, the specific host population, and exogenous shocks. 
So, whilst contradicting studies have found both a significant effect from democratic responsiveness (e.g., 
Wlezien and Soroka 2012), as well as skepticism over the ability of public opinion to maneuver 
calculating politicians (Lax and Phillips, 2012), and whilst generalizable conclusions appear dubious at 
                                                             
571 Sobolewska, M., Galandini, S., & Lessard-Phillips, L. (2017). The public view of immigrant integration: multidimensional 
and consensual. Evidence from survey experiments in the UK and the Netherlands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies, 43(1), 58-79. 
572 Toshkov, D. D. (2017). The impact of the Eastern enlargement on the decision-making capacity of the European 
Union. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(2), 177-196. 
573 MIPEX (2018) Last Accessed 15 May 2018 from http://www.mipex.eu/what-is-mipex. 
574 Ruedin, D., Alberti, C., & D'Amato, G. (2015). Immigration and integration policy in Switzerland, 1848 to 2014. Swiss 
Political Science Review, 21(1), 5-22; Ford, R., Jennings, W., & Somerville, W. (2015). Public opinion, responsiveness and 
constraint: Britain's three immigration policy regimes. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(9), 1391-1411. 
575Morales, L., Pilet, J. B., & Ruedin, D. (2015). The gap between public preferences and policies on immigration: A comparative 
examination of the effect of politicisation on policy congruence. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(9), 1495-1516; 
Odmalm, P., & Bale, T. (2015). Immigration into the mainstream: Conflicting ideological streams, strategic reasoning and party 
competition. Acta Politica, 50(4), 365-378. Brady, D., & Finnigan, R. (2014). Does immigration undermine public support for 
social policy?. American Sociological Review, 79(1), 17-42; Huddleston, T., Niessen, J., Chaoimh, E. N., & White, E. 
(2011). Migrant integration policy index III. British Council; Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel, A., Luther, K. R., & Sitter, 
N. (2010). If you can't beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical 
right in Western Europe. Political studies, 58(3), 410-426; Akkerman, T. (2015). Immigration policy and electoral competition in 
Western Europe: A fine-grained analysis of party positions over the past two decades. Party Politics, 21(1), 54-67. 
576 Esses, V. M., Hamilton, L. K., & Gaucher, D. (2017). The global refugee crisis: empirical evidence and policy implications 
for improving public attitudes and facilitating refugee resettlement. Social Issues and Policy Review, 11(1), 78-123. 
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best (Bølstad, 2015)577 it simply may be that the role of domestic politics in EU decision making is 
situational dependent. Supporting a context-contingent view is Wratil (2015) who finds that national 
governments adopting EU-level policies that reflect domestic public opinion depends on electoral 
incentives, particularly upcoming elections in majoritarian systems. Dellmuth & Chambers (2015, 2018) 
find support for EU integration policies impacted not by distributional policies (e.g., whether a particular 
domestic audience receives EU funds), but whether they are predisposed to EU integration and can 
interpret political messages signaling economic solidarity.578 In such cases, if EU policies are not 
perceived as representing the needs of Member States a democratic deficit appears, and policy alignment 
might be merely coincidental (Follesdal and Hix, 2006).579 
Salience and accessibility also affect the policymaking-public opinion nexus. Some issues are simply not 
perceived by the vast majority of the population as critical, and access to information, particularly ways  
the public voice concern over misaligned policy, may not be transparent. Nevertheless, while some 
studies have questioned the salience of EU-level policymaking to the general public (Lax and Phillips 
2009, 2012) or difficulty obtaining clear information on who to lobby (Enikolopov et al., 2011; Snyder 
and Strömberg 2008) refugee-related issues are highly politicized, visible, and not remotely in the realm 
of nebulous or technocratic-relegated information.580Given the wide visibility and polarizing capacity of 
integration-themed policies, public opinion is instrumental in the ability for national government bodies 
to invest in, and successfully implement a mentoring mechanism. Unfortunately, due to lack of sufficient 
data, this analysis is unable to measure democratic responsiveness to a particular integration policy. It is, 
however, able to measure the role of perceived threat and suggest how a population might react to a 
mentoring integration program. 
5.2.1 The Role of Perceived Threat 
Operating under the evidence-based premise that public opinion often bears significant weight on 
domestic and supranational immigration policies, the next step in crafting a mentoring integration 
program is to elucidate the roots of public opinion and address their concerns. Whether, for instance, 
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166; Bølstad, J. (2015). Dynamics of European integration: Public opinion in the core and periphery. European Union 
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580 Lax, J. R., & Phillips, J. H. (2009). Gay rights in the states: Public opinion and policy responsiveness. American Political 
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biases related to religion, education, employability, and ethnicity are more salient than the predicted 
success of an integration program. If biases outweigh the predicted benefit, then those biases should be 
systematically addressed at the initial phase and formatively adapted. For example, if a particular religion 
makes an immigrant less desirable to a specific population, even taking into account participation in a 
mentoring integration program, then a mentoring program in that location must target intervention 
measures proven to reduce bias in that faith. Practically speaking, this may entail interfaith social groups, 
mediation, or workplace counseling.581 
 
Immigrant “desirability” is directly linked to perceived threat. Perception is distinct from actual threats, 
with the former being more significant in prejudicial attitude formation (Rosenstein, 2008).  582 Perception, 
of course, is filtered through cognitive mechanisms− heuristics, prior biases, conceptions of national or 
local identity, to name a few, and are subject to environmental effects.583  The underlying reasons for 
threat formation are manifold:  group-level power struggles driven by resource scarcity or prestige (Ethnic 
Competition Theory), a group’s positive social identity formed through out-group competition (Social 
Identity Theory) or a combination of group and contextual factors (Ethnic Composition Theory).  584 What 
is most salient for this analysis is how an integration mechanism interfaces ex ante with perceptions of 
threat. 585 That is, if attribute x leads to humanitarian migrant y being perceived as undesirable, will 
intervention z mitigate the negative effects of x? 
 
Type of integration program has been shown to impact the perception of group threat. Contact theory, in 
one example hypothesizing positive outcomes from meaningful interpersonal contact.586 Programs that 
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583 In turn, anti-immigrant cognitive biases are frequently catalyzed by media framing (Watson & Riffe, 2013; Hopkins, 2010; 
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585 This is distinct, of course, from opinions about immigration itself. Meuleman, B. (2011). Perceived economic threat and anti-
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Psychology, 38(6), 922-934. 
586 Callens, M. S. (2015). Integration policies and public opinion: in conflict or in harmony? (No. 2015-02). LISER, 8.  
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have an extensive interpersonal component should mitigate prejudices (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Wagner 
et al., 2006). And this is in fact frequently the case.587 Inclusive programs, particularly those with an 
extensive interpersonal component have been shown to mitigate prejudices (Meuleman, 2011). Moreover, 
meta-analysis of the literature has found that inclusive integration policies are correlated with lower 
perceived threat by the host population and that intergroup norms frequently drive a population’s attitude 
towards immigrants (Callens, 2015).588 In one such study, Schlueter et al., (2013) using Eurobarometer 
and European Value Survey data find that permissive policies were associated with decreased perception 
of immigrant threat among the general population.589 These results have been supported by case studies, 
suggesting that intergroup norms drive a population’s attitude towards immigrants (Callens & Meuleman, 
2017).590 It may then be that “Integration policies seem to establish the norms of how intergroup relations 
should be and therefore will regulate public opinion.”591  
Nevertheless, other studies have found considerable variation in the impact of policy on group threat. 
Using MIPEX overall score data, not a particular policy strand, Dinsen & Hoogue (2010) find that 
integration policies fail to positively impact immigrants’ trust in the host population nor foster national 
pride in their host country (Reekens & Wright, 2013).592The lack of uniform results for many contextual 
factors (i.e., labour market, religion) guiding perception of immigrant threat may be driven by shifts in the 
labor market, crime, or large-scale national-level shocks (Legewie, 2013).593 In an attempt to disentangle 
contextual factors, this analysis focuses on two domains underpinning discriminatory perceptions in the 
recent literature: labour market and sociocultural factors. If labour markets concerns take prominence 
over sociocultural concerns, then attributes related to employability −education, years employed, even 
profession under certain circumstances− should prove salient in choice of immigrant. However, if 
sociocultural concerns are more salient among the general population then issues pertaining to religion, 
ethnicity, and country of origin will be more salient.  
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588 Callens 2015 (n586). 
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No matter which domain proves more prominent, public opinion may be critical not only for the initial 
acceptance of a policy but its continued support.594 In the case of mentoring refugees, this requires 
knowing what issues are most important to the local population and addressing them in the program 
design. Below the specific case of Germany is discussed and linked to relevant literature from the Labour 
Economics, Sociology, and Acculturation cannons to form this study’s hypotheses. 
5.2.2 The German Case 
Germany has granted refugee, subsidiary, or humanitarian status to over a million applicants from 2015 to 
2018 with hundreds of thousands of applications still pending.595The legal basis for asylum in German is 
the 1951 GRC, as well as the German Basic Law (Article 16a) which allows for asylum on the grounds of 
political persecution.596Several recent pieces of domestic legislation have aimed to more efficiently 
streamline the asylum process. The Residence Act of 2005 enabled “structural integration measures” and 
“channels” for labour market grounded migration, while ten years later, in 2015, with Syrians fleeing civil 
war in mass numbers, Germany suspended the Dublin Regulation by enacting its sovereignty clause and 
over a million refugees were permitted to enter German territory. Despite the fact the number of asylum 
seekers has drastically subsided from its 2015 levels, integration continues to be a major division point in 
German society. 
Broadly speaking, German society seems to be of two minds. Some worry that refugees will be unable to 
integrate and will form so-called parallel societies, where education, labor and culture are resistant to full 
societal integration (Mueller, 2006).597 Others within German society are more optimistic about the 
settling-in process. They see refugees a part of an answer to an aging society, or value humanitarian 
considerations over integration concerns. On the former point, Deutsche Bank and IMF studies both 
suggest that successful integration into the labor market could greatly offset looming age-related 
demographic problems (Aiyar et al., 2016; Deutsche Bank, 2015).598  
                                                             
594 Unfortunately, research is unclear whether an integration policy must already be successfully ensconced to change the general  
population’s attitudes towards specific immigrant attributes (i.e., religion, ethnicity, education), or whether attitudes impact the 
choice of integration mechanism. It would seem that there is evidence for both directions (Callens & Meuleman, 2016). Callens, 
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595 BAMF. Annual Asylum Report. (2018) Last accessed February 27, 2018 from 
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Foreseeing divisions within German society, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) has 
initiated a series of integration programs to address concerns over humanitarian migrants adapting to 
German society. Many (Volkshochschulen) have focused on adult language learning and civics for 
refugees. Legal barriers to integration have likewise been addressed. The Integration Act of 2016 allows 
rejected asylum seekers temporary residency to complete their vocational upskilling programs. There 
have also been a number of regional initiatives i.e., in North Rhine-Westphalia, as well as private-public 
efforts.599 Nonetheless, statistically speaking, labour market interventions and other large-scale integration 
programs have had limited success in Germany. The One Euro program, for instance, a German 
government subsidized labor endeavor aimed at providing practical work experience and language skills, 
has had less than 5,000 out of the set goal of 1000,000 refugees employed as of January 2017.  
5.3 Mentoring in Germany                                       
Mentoring has been employed in Germany for many years including initiatives specifically for mentoring 
refugees. Mentoring programs within Germany have cooperated with federal and state-level governments, 
as well as private job consulting actors. InCharge, for example, focuses on mentoring refugees with a 
focus on gaining long-term employment. For 12 weeks, InCharge recommends one hour a week to guide 
refugees through the German labor market, often in a field of the mentor’s expertise.600 People Support 
People (Menschen stärken Menschen) another federally-supported program (10 million Euro in fiscal year 
2018) seeks to forge durable interpersonal connections. In another example, Refugees on Rails helps get 
tech equipment and train refugees in the art of computer programing with a look towards Germany’s 
projection of needs for high-skilled tech labor, while Junge Akademie, a TU Munich directed program, 
tandems with another organization, Buddies for Refugees to help talented refugee students. Start with a 
Friend, operating in in Berlin and nine other German cities matches ‘tandem partners’ with the hope of 
integrating refugees into the community and promoting social cohesion. Dozens of other mentoring 
projects have gained funding and are up and running in Germany, often with success (Bardin 2017; Lange 
et al., 2017). 601    
Several studies support the positive impact of mentoring in Germany. Schlimbach (2010) finds a positive 
impact on employment in Germany from mentoring high school students,602 while Kontos (2003) 
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concludes that mentoring in Germany aids in self-employment, particularly entrepreneurial schemes. 
These results are in consonance with the broader European literature.603The OECD has also chimed in 
recently. A 2017 study entitled Finding their Way: labour market integration of refugees in Germany 
finds that mentoring does have a positive effect on labour market integration but has not been used 
widely.604 The study proceeds to discuss several effective ‘mentoring for refugees’ projects in Germany, 
including Land in Brandenburg. It must be noted that while the OECD study notes the effectiveness of 
mentoring initiatives geared towards language learning and navigating the German bureaucracy, it also 
reiterates the need for larger-scale mentoring programs aimed at employment.605 
The German population has likewise been receptive to initiatives open to all EU States, such as Ment, 
which promotes entrepreneurship through mentoring. Germans are then likely to be familiar with some 
type of mentoring initiative, whether as a participant, word of mouth, or through media. While this may 
be confused with broader integration programs, such as Flüchtlingsintegrationsmaßnahmen, a four-year 
initiative running until 2020 that aids refugees in finding temporary employment, the distinctions in 
popular media are often clearly delineated.606Moreover, even without expert knowledge, there is some 
degree of implicit understanding that exposure with native speakers may reasonably lead to higher levels 
of linguistic proficiency (Long, 1996) and acculturation (Rotich, 2011).607 Mentoring may also covey 
effort to integrate and trainability, that latter which, as per signal theory, has been shown to increase the 
perception of employability (Di Stasio, 2014).608 As such, the baseline hypothesis argues that 
participating in a mentoring program will make an individual more desirable.  
H1 Mentoring will make an immigrant more desirable than an unmentored immigrant. 
The question then turns to attributes that make an immigrant more or less desirable, and how those 
attributes are impacted by participation in a mentoring program. 
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5.3.1 Labour Market  
In the Economics literature, perceived threat has been shown to affect labor market access (Schlueter et 
al., 2013).609 Realistic conflict theory (alternatively, group conflict theory) predicts that rational 
individuals will feel threatened by competition for scarce resources (Scheepers, 2002).610 However, to 
maintain its pay-as-you-go pension system, Germany desperately needs workers (Horn and Schweppe 
2015).611 It is no surprise then that for Germans, labor market participation is cited in 2016 Integration 
Barometer data as the most critical criterion to be integrated in German society (Expert Council, 2016), a 
point at odds with competition theory.612  
Factors perceived to expedite gainful employment should therefore make a migrant more desirable 
(Bleakly & Chin, 2004).613 These are ‘education’, ‘ability to speak German’, ‘and having plans for work’ 
(Dumont et al., 2016). 614To highlight the enabling role of education, language, and motivation, we also 
consider job experience. On the surface, job experience, while frequently signaling the ability to function 
in a particular occupation does not necessarily translate well into the German setting. Recent literature has 
shown that even asylum seekers with prior professional experience have required upskilling (Degler 
Liebig, and Senner, 2017) and additional licensure (Klingler & Marckmann, 2016).615 It is therefore 
unclear whether having job experience would make a migrant more likely to integrate into the labor 
market.  
H2: Higher levels of education, concrete plans to find employment, pronounced motivation for 
employment, and having a command of the German language make an immigrant more desirable. 
Now the analysis turns to the mitigating effects that mentoring could have upon labour market attributes. 
With regard to education, mentoring should improve desirability in one of two ways. First, many refugees 
are of university age or have chosen to return to school. Mentoring has often positively impacted 
educational outcomes, including for at-risk populations by bridging location-specific informational 
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asymmetries or providing emotional support (Rodríguez-Planas, 2012)616. Secondly, lack of institutional 
knowledge gained at the school level may impact linguistic cues and behavioral expectations, both shown 
to affect uncertainty that interviewers face (Kogan, 2016).617 Participation in a mentoring program is 
likely to allay these institutional effects.  
The second attribute whose interaction is tested is German language acquisition. Mentoring programs 
(infra: ‘Mentoring in Germany’) have revealed consistent increases in German language proficiency. In 
turn, this would afford immigrants with increased opportunities to navigate the German labor market. 
Language levels should therefore be positively affected by participation in a mentoring program. 
The third attribute tested, work experience, while not salient to migrant desirability without mentoring, 
should, based on social capital theories, be significant with mentoring.  Social capital, the information, 
trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in social structures, suggests that as a refugee is mentored, the 
mentee will guide and support them, frequently to include those with location-specific information. Such 
interactions have been shown to increase wages by facilitating job contacts, and increasing information 
flow (Scherger & Savage, 2010).618 Mentoring programs in Germany, such as InCharge, have often 
succeeded in providing individualized support through building off a refugee’s prior experience. Social 
capital may in turn lead to prior job experiencing becoming valuable.    
H2a: Mentoring will mitigate the desirability difference of education and job experience.  
 
5.3.2 Social Cohesion and National Identity 
Recent studies have often downplayed the significance of individual-level economic explanations. 
Semyonov and colleagues (2004), for instance, studying the correlates of discriminatory attitudes towards 
foreigners in Germany, find that perceived size of the minority group is more significant in forming 
discriminatory attitudes about crime, housing, and employment than specific job-related concerns.619 
Tsukamoto and Fiske (2018) find that vulnerability to perceived value is related prejudice.620 While 
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) find that sociotropic concerns about cultural impact are more 
pronounced than economic factors in forming attitudes about immigrants; ethnicity and religion, in their 
study are often more potent catalysts towards forming discriminatory attitudes than job type or 
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education.621  Other studies have found a largely complementary role between non-economic and 
economic factors (Facchini, et al., 2013). 622 
Like many EU States, in Germany, labor market needs and humanitarian norms are countered by 
concerns over national identity. The recent surge in right-wing parties (e.g., AfD) are strongly grounded 
in fears that foreigners will upend German society and national identity. From where then do socio-
cultural fears stem? Interestingly, a wealth of data, such as the 2016 Integration barometer, reveal that 
Germans found inter not intra-ethnic contact as generating optimism about coexistence, positive 
integration and breaking down prejudices (Expert Council, 2016).623  So, while Gorodzeisky and 
Semyonov (2015) have shown that racial prejudice increases negative attitudes towards immigrants, in the 
case of Germany, race and ethnicity are not salient markers.624 
While ascribed features such as race should not be salient, this study hypothesizes that religion will. 
Evidence for bias against persecuted Muslims comes from Gerhards and colleagues (2016) who assess 
this prejudice as a projection of general concern that refugees will threaten German culture and core 
values. 625  Their data reveals that respondents who felt that refugees undermine German’s cultural and 
core values opposed admitting persecuted Muslims.626 Along similar lines, religion has been cited as a 
primary determinant in threat perception in several German federal states (Renner et al. 2018).  627 Other 
studies have shown that the German population are able to distinguish between ethnicity and religion 
when forming attitudes about migrants (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017).  
H3A Being a Muslim will make an immigrant less desirable than other religions. 
The is also an expected significant effect based on the immigrant’s gender. This is because the bias 
against Muslims is in many cases grounded in their perceived attitude towards women (Bruneau et al., 
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2018) and homophobia in Muslim men (Reese & Jonas, 2014).628 Some of this bias may be related to the 
marital status of these men. Plener et al. (2017), for instance, discuss the possibility that German prejudice 
over accepting additional unaccompanied minors is founded on concerns about male refugees sexually 
harassing Germans.629 Events such as the Cologne 2015 New Year’s Eve assault frequently articulated the 
Muslim male in predatory language, often suggesting further similar problems. These major events act as 
shocks to the system and have been shown to negatively impact public perception of immigrants 
(Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017). Von Hermanni and Neumann (2018) support these conclusions. In 
their study evaluating attitudes towards immigrants, participants from Dresden who perceived refuges as 
threatening depended largely on the respondent’s fear of refugee-related criminal activities.630 While this 
Chapter’s dataset does not provide for insight into whether a male immigrant is married or 
unaccompanied, it is able to use the above studies to form a hypothesis at the intersection of religion and 
gender. Accordingly, bias against Muslims should be lower in Muslim women than in Muslim men.    
H3B Being a Muslim man will make an immigrant less desirable than being a Muslim woman. 
Mentoring could allay some amount of undesirability faced by Muslim refugees, irrespective of gender. 
This is because ingroup-out group interactions promoted by authorities have been shown to reduce 
hostility (Bettencourt et al., 1992) and foster empathy Ellison et al., (2011).631 This is true of religion, as 
well. In a recent study by Kanas and colleagues (2017) interreligious friendships between Christians and 
Muslims reduced negative attitudes towards the outgroup.632 However, in their study, casual contact 
increased negative outgroup hostilities suggesting that the quality of interaction mediates the outcome of 
contact. Mentoring, in this regard, has been shown to promote meaningful interactions that impact 
interfaith understanding and mutuality between religions (Griffiths et al., 2009).633 
                                                             
628 Bruneau, E., Kteily, N., & Laustsen, L. (2018). The unique effects of blatant dehumanization on attitudes and behavior 
towards Muslim refugees during the European ‘refugee crisis’ across four countries. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 48(5), 645-662; Reese, G., Steffens, M. C., & Jonas, K. J. (2014). Religious affiliation and attitudes towards gay 
men: On the mediating role of masculinity threat. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 24(4), 340-355. 
629 Plener, P. L., Groschwitz, R. C., Brähler, E., Sukale, T., & Fegert, J. M. (2017). Unaccompanied refugee minors in Germany: 
attitudes of the general population towards a vulnerable group. European child & adolescent psychiatry, 26(6), 739. See also 
Bielicki (2018) for a discussion on the German media and portraying predatory activities of male refugees. Also: Bielicki, J.  
(2018). Cologne's New Year's Eve Sexual Assaults: The Turning Point in German Media Coverage. In Refugee News, Refugee 
Politics (pp. 184-190). Routledge. 
630 von Hermanni, H., & Neumann, R. (2018). ‘Refugees welcome? ‘The interplay between perceived threats and general 
concerns on the acceptance of refugees–a factorial survey approach in Germany. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 1-26. 
631 Bettencourt, B. A., Brewer, M. B., Croak, M. R., & Miller, N. (1992). Cooperation and the reduction of intergroup bias: The 
role of reward structure and social orientation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 28(4), 301; Ellison 2011 (n526). 
632 Kanas, A., Scheepers, P., & Sterkens, C. (2017). Positive and negative contact and attitudes towards the religious out-group: 
Testing the contact hypothesis in conflict and non-conflict regions of Indonesia and the Philippines. Social science research, 63, 
95-110. 
633 Griffiths, M., Sawrikar, P., & Muir, K. (2009). Culturally appropriate mentoring for Horn of African young people in 
Australia. Youth Studies Australia, 28(2), 32. 
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H3c Mentoring will reduce the undesirable effect of being Muslim. 
Here, the German voter is disaggregated in order to form the final sub-hypothesis. In recent years, 
Germany –like many other Western countries – has experienced a rise of far-right politics. In Germany, 
there are regional variations in the support for anti-Muslim agendas, such as those of the far-right party 
AfD, which was formed specifically as a reaction to the influx of Muslim and Arabic-speaking refugees. 
In the 2017 national elections, support for AfD was about twice as large in Eastern German federal states 
(i.e., states that belonged to the former German Democratic Republic) compared to Western federal states. 
In this analysis, regional variations in Muslim desirability are expected to depend on concentration of 
AfD support. 
H3D Being a Muslim will make a migrant less desirable in federal states with high AfD support 
compared to states with low AfD support. 
Because religion and country of origin intersect, in our empirical analyses we also explore to what extent 
country of origin relates to migrant desirability. On the one hand, being from a predominantly Muslim 
country might make migrants less desirable because people might use country of origin as a proxy for 
religion (e.g., most Syrians are Muslims). On the other hand, in this study, respondents receive 
information on both the migrant’s country of origin and religion (e.g., migrant is from Syria and a 
Christian), which means that respondents do not need to infer religion from country of origin. Given these 
contrasting predictions, the analyses of country of origin remain exploratory. However, including country 
of origin enable a more rigorous test of Hypotheses H3A-C, because it is possible to distinguish immigrant 
desirability that is driven by preferences for specific religions from preferences for specific countries of 
origin. 
5.3.3 Norm-driven attributes 
Mentoring programs, and integration programs more generally, target not only humanitarian migrants, but 
those who have come for family reunification or economic reasons. Research from the Political 
Psychology canon has explored whether type of migrant leads to immigration-related prejudice (Ryan 
2017).634 Often, economic migrants are perceived as coming ‘illegally’ or for ‘illegitimate’ non-
humanitarian reasons. A similar conclusion has come from economic-oriented studies measuring public 
attitude towards illegal and legal migration (Hatton 2017).635 Mentoring programs that have mixed 
participants might not make a refugee more desirable unless it is clear that the mentee is an actual refugee 
                                                             
634 Ryan, T. J. (2017). No compromise: Political consequences of moralized attitudes. American Journal of Political 
Science, 61(2), 409-423. 
635 Hatton, T. (2017). Public Opinion on Immigration in Europe: Preference versus Salience (No. 10838). Institute for the Study 
of Labor (IZA). 
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or asylum seeker. In other words, humanitarian migrants with a clear moral-grounded reason for entering 
Germany should allay some of the negative effects experienced by purely economic migrants. In support 
of this is data from the March 2016, German Socio-Economic Panel’s (SOEP) ‘Barometer of Public 
Opinion on Refugees in Germany revealing that while norm commitments to international law are high: 
over 80 percent of respondents wanted to offer safe haven to those fleeing persecution.636  
H4: Being a humanitarian immigrant will increase desirability over an economic immigrant. 
 
5.4 Methods and Results 
Methods 
The empirical design is a choice-based conjoint design inspired by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015). It 
measures the opinions of the German host population towards the characteristics of potential immigrants 
by presenting multiple characteristics which must be judged aggregately. Hainmueller, Hangartner, and 
Yamamoto (2015) find that conjoint designs may closely align structural effects with real-world 
preferences.637 The conjoint analysis in this paper aims to tease out perceptions of the host population 
towards mentoring as an integration mechanism and reveal which migrant attributes are most salient for 
the local population.  
 
Research Design 
Ten attributes are included, each with several levels (e.g., gender is an attribute, and levels within the 
attribute of gender are “male” and “female”). The first eight levels are verbatim from Hainmueller and 
Hopkins (2015):  (1) country of origin ("Sudan", "Afghanistan", "Syria", "Eritrea", "Nigeria", "Pakistan", 
"Serbia", "Kosovo"); (2) gender ("male", "female"); prior visits to Europe (“never”, “once as a tourist”, 
“many times as a tourist”, “business trips”; (3) employment ("waiter", "construction worker", "teacher", 
"doctor" "IT", "gardener", "student") (4) language capacity ("broken German", "tried German but was 
unable to speak", "fluent German", "used interpreter") (5) education ("no formal", "finished 4th grade"," 
finished 8th grade", "high school", "university or college", "doctorate") (6) reason for migrating 
("humanitarian", "family reunion", "economic", "seek better job") (7) employment plans ("contract with 
employer", "interviews with employer", "will look for work", "no plans to look for work"); (8) job 
experience ("none","1-2 years", "3-5 years","5+ years")  Two additional attributes (9) religion ("Atheist", 
                                                             
636 DIW. German Socio-Economic Panel’s (SOEP) ‘Barometer of Public Opinion on Refugees.  28 April 2017. 
637 Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2015). Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-
world behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(8), 2398. 
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"Muslim", "Christ", "Other") and (10) will participate in a mentoring program with a local mentor ("no", 
"yes") are also included. 
Randomization and Sampling 
The conjoint design was distributed through the online survey tool platform Qualtrics. Respondents were 
recruited randomly through social media, accounting for geographic basis. Migrant profiles were 
randomly generated given a range of restrictions to make the migrant profiles more realistic.  638 
Respondents were presented two randomly generated migrant profiles at a time, and asked the following 
question “If it was up to you, which of the two migrants should be allowed to live in your municipality?” 
Each respondent went through five of these selection tasks, meaning that they saw a total of ten migrant 
profiles. After each choice, the respondent had to rate both Migrant 1 and Migrant 2 on a sliding scale of 
one to seven.639 The final data set consisted of 3,610 migrant profiles rated by 361 respondents.  Nine 
respondents did not fill out the entire conjoint resulting in their answers being excluded. The final sample 
for analysis consisted of 352 respondents. Descriptive statistics of respondents are displayed in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
638 The restrictions fell under two categories. The first ensured that respondents would be presented with realistic choices. So 
professions that required education (doctors, teachers, IT workers) were barred from being matched with levels of education 
below a college degree. The same was true for job experience: the aforementioned professions could not have ‘no work 
experience’. The second category was aimed to disentangle religion from race. No Serbs could be Muslim and no Kosovars could 
be Christian.  
639 The exact questions are as follows: “Bitte stufen sie Migrant 1 auf einer Skala von 1 bis ein.1 bedeutet, dass Migrant 1 
definitiv inDeutschland akzeptiert warden sollte, und 7, dass Migrant 1 definitiv abgelehnt warden sollte.”; “Bitte stufen sie 
Migrant 2 auf einer Skala von 1 bis ein.1 bedeutet, dass Migrant 2 definitiv inDeutschland akzeptiert warden sollte, und 7, dass 
Migrant 1 definitiv abgelehnt warden sollte.” 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
 Respondent Attribute Frequencies 
 
Respondent Attribute Frequencies 
Gender   Migration background  
  Woman 226    Both parents German 329 
  Man 142    Not both parents German 39 
Age (years)   Religion  
   18-22 46     Atheist 155 
   23-30 114     Christ 156 
   31-40 96     Muslim 14 
   41-55 88     Other 43 
   56-70 22  Education  
   71+ 20     No secondary education 33 
Nationality      Secondary education 148 
   German 334     Completed Bachelors 91 
   EU-citizen 24     Completed Masters 92 
   No EU-citizen  10  Employment  
Federal state of residence      Full-time 255 
   Baden-Württemberg 39     Part-time 79 
   Bavaria 89     Unemployed 33 
   Berlin 20     Other 10 
   Brandenburg 23  Job  
   Bremen 4     IT 32 
   Hamburg 5     Construction worker 3 
   Hesse 37     Doctor 12 
   Mecklenburg West. Pomerania 9     Student 95 
   Lower Saxony 19     Teacher 18 
   North Rhine-Westphalia 58     Waiter 5 
   Rhineland-Palatinate 9     Unemployed 8 
   Saarland 10     Other 195 
   Saxony 19    
   Saxony-Anhalt 15    
   Schleswig Holstein 17    
   Thuringia 4    
Note: N = 352
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5.5 Results 
The data were analyzed in R using the conjoint-package (version 2.0.6) which was specifically written to 
estimate Average Marginal Component-specific Effects (AMCE) and Average Component Interaction 
Effects (ACIE) in conjoint experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto, 2014).  640 AMCE refer to 
the main effects of different attribute levels on the probability of being selected as a migrant who is 
granted permission to live in the respondent’s municipality. ACIE refer to interaction effects between 
immigrant attributes and interaction effects between migrant attributes and respondent characteristics. As 
in regular logistic regression analyses, the effects of categorical variables are interpreted against a 
reference attribute level. The results are presented in Figures 21 and 22. Figure 1 displays the probability 
of being selected as the preferred migrant to live in the respondent’s municipality predicted by migrant 
attributes. The dots represent point estimates of the probability of being selected compared to the 
respective reference category. The bars around the dots represent 95% confidence intervals. If error bars 
do not overlap, then the estimated probabilities are significantly different. 
Mentoring 
The first hypothesis stated that a mentored immigrant is more desirable than an unmentored immigrant 
(H1). Support was found for this hypothesis. Those who will participate in a mentoring program with a 
local had a 5.13% higher probability of being selected compared to those who will not receive mentoring 
(see Figure 21). 
Discrimination Based on Employability 
The second hypothesis stated that characteristics redolent of employability (education, work plans, 
language skills) would make an immigrant more desirable. This was confirmed. Compared to those who 
did not have any formal education, those who had a high school degree were 22.47% more likely, those 
who had a university or college degree were 31.38% more likely, and those with a doctorate degree were 
28.63% more likely to be chosen. The difference between no formal education and having finished either 
4th or 8th grade was not statistically significant. 
Similar results were found for work plans and language skills. Compared to those who already have a 
contract with an employer, those who had no concrete working prospects were less likely to be chosen. 
Those who already had a contract with an employer were 9.73% more likely to be selected than those 
who only had interviews with an employer, and 11.47% more likely than those who will look for work. 
Those who had no plans to look for work were the least likely to be chosen, namely 14.35% less likely 
                                                             
640 Hainmueller et al. (2015) (n637).  
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than those who already had a contract, however, this effect was not statistically significant. The large 95% 
confidence interval around the point estimate of those who had no plans to look for work suggests that 
there was a lot of variation with regard to whether no plans to look for work made an immigrant less 
desirable. On the language front, compared to those who used an interpreter, broken German speakers 
were 9.23% more likely to be chosen, and those who spoke fluent German were 17.87% more likely to be 
chosen. There was no statistically significant difference between those who spoke with an interpreter and 
those who tried speaking German but were unable to. 
The analysis further explored another characteristic, job experience, that suggests employability. Results 
show that those who had 1-2 years, 3-5 years, or more than 5 years of experience were not more desirable 
compared to those who have no job experience. This is in line with Eurobarometer opinion polls and 
reports about the German labor market showing upskilling has typically been required for most refugees 
regardless of their previous experience. If training would be expected, then additional work experience 
should have a negligible effect, and this might explain the null finding.  
Discrimination Based on Religion and Origin 
With regard to religious discrimination, findings reveal that religious refugees were generally less 
desirable than atheist refugees. In line with H3A, Muslims were the least desirable, namely 5.5% less 
desirable compared Atheists, other religious refugees were 4.88% less desirable. Christians were 3.12% 
less desirable than Atheists, however this effect was not significant.  Further, the analysis then tested 
whether being a Muslim male makes a migrant less desirable than being a Muslim female (H3B). To this 
end, an interaction term was added for the interaction between gender and religion. Results are presented 
in Table 5 (Model 1). Similar to the previous analysis, a significant and negative main effect of being 
Muslim was found. Moreover, being a man makes a refugee 9.2% less desirable than being a woman. 
However, none of the interaction effects between gender and religion were significant. This suggests that 
even though being male or Muslim is seen as less desirable, there is no additional penalty for being both. 
Finally, it was tested whether being a Muslim makes a migrant less desirable in federal states with high 
AfD support compared to states with low AfD support (H3C). Based on the results of the 2017 federal 
elections in Germany, the analysis compared federal states that showed the most support for the right-
wing political party AfD (above 12%) to federal states with medium support (8-12%) and federal states 
with low support (below 8%). These cut-off points were selected to create categories that are relatively 
even in size.  Results are presented in Table 5 (Model 2). Religion of refugees did not play a role in states 
with low support for AfD. In states with medium support for AfD, Muslim refugees were 13.6% less 
169 
 
likely to be selected compared to Atheists. And in states with high support for AfD, Muslims were 15.4% 
less likely to be selected compared to Atheists. These results lend support to Hypothesis H3C.  
Table 5: Interaction Effects of Religion and Gender (Model 1) and Interaction effects between Religion and Support for Far-Right Political Party 
AfD (Model 2) 
 Model 1 
(testing H3B) 
Model 2 
(testing H3C) 
Ref: Woman   
Man -.092*** 
(.018) 
 
Ref: Atheist   
Christian -.033 
(.023) 
-.031 
(.023) 
Muslim -.054* 
(.026) 
-.056* 
(.027) 
Other -.049* 
(.023) 
-.049* 
(.022) 
Man x Christian .034 
(.044) 
 
Man x Muslim -.003 
(.05) 
 
Man x Other .063 
(.046) 
 
Low AfD support x 
Christian 
 -.023 
(.038) 
Low AfD support x 
Muslim 
 -.009 
(.042) 
Low AfD support x 
Other 
 .007 
(.035) 
Medium AfD support x 
Christian 
 -.012 
(.038) 
Medium AfD support x 
Muslim 
 -.080+ 
(.044) 
Medium AfD support x 
Other 
 -.095** 
(.037) 
High AfD support x 
Christian 
 -.094+ 
(.053) 
High AfD support x 
Muslim 
 -.098+ 
(.058) 
High AfD support x 
Other 
 -.070 
(.047) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models presented are adjusted for main effects of all 
remaining refugee attributes. 
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Exploratory Analyses 
Considering the exploratory analyses, no evidence was found that being from a non-European country 
was related to immigrant desirability (figure 21). Specifically, the desirability of immigrants from Serbia 
did not differ from the desirability of immigrants from Afghanistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan and 
Syria. Similarly, immigrants from these non-European countries were not less desirable than migrants 
from Kosovo and Serbia. This was likewise the case when interacting country of origin with AfD vote by 
federal states. To test whether there was racial discrimination, the analysis compared the combined effect 
of being from Serbia or Kosovo to the combined effect of the African and Arabic country and found no 
evidence of racial discrimination.  
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Figure 21: Probability of Being Chosen as the Preferred Migrant predicted by Migrant Attributes 
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Discrimination Based on Norms 
Next, the analysis tested whether being a humanitarian migrant increased desirability over being an 
economic migrant (H4). Those who came for humanitarian reasons were 22.99% more likely to be chosen 
than those who came to seek a better job. Those who came for economic reasons were not statistically 
different in their desirability compared to humanitarian immigrants. However, it is worth noting the large 
confidence intervals for those who came for economic reasons, which again suggests that there was little 
consensus among respondents as to whether refugees who come for economic reasons are desirable. 
Mentoring Interaction Effects 
Finally, to what extent the effects of other migrant attributes could be mitigated by mentoring was tested. 
To this end, mentoring was interacted with all other migrant characteristics. Figure 22 displays the results 
in a graph. While the main effects showed several significant benefits of employability, interacting 
mentoring with these characteristics revealed a different picture. Many characteristics pointing to 
employability were no longer beneficial once immigrants participated in mentoring programs (H2a). 
Specifically, desirability was no longer different for immigrants with different education or language 
levels. Immigrants with no pronounced motivation for employment were no longer at a disadvantage if 
they also participated in a mentoring program. Surprisingly, among those who received mentoring, having 
no plans to look for work made migrants 61% more desirable compared to having a contract with an 
employer. This counter-intuitive finding is discussed in the discussion section. 
Finally, whether mentoring made a Muslim immigrant more desirable (H3c) was tested. While Muslims 
were previously shown to less desirable than immigrants of other religions, this pattern was reversed for 
Muslim immigrants who participated in a mentoring program. Among mentored respondents, they were 
the most desirable religious group, namely 13% more desirable than atheists. Among those mentored, 
none of the other religious groups significantly differed from one another. 
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Figure 22: Interaction Effects of Migrant Attributes and Participation in a Mentoring Program on  
     Probability of Being Preferred for Admission 
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5.6 Discussion & Conclusion 
The aim of Chapter V was to test how particular immigrant attributes interfaced with the German 
population’s notion of a desirable immigrant. It also tested whether participation in a mentoring 
intervention tempered the effects of these attributes.641 The results confirmed several predictions from the 
literature, while falsifying others. 
Confirming the labor market hypothesis, Germans’ concerns to integrate immigrants into the labor market 
(represented by language, education, and work plans) was a decisive factor in desirability, and consistent 
with public opinion polls and recent scholarship (e.g., Heckman 2016), characteristics redolent of 
employability were valued. However, work experience did not resonate in the German market where 
upskilling was common among even qualified and experienced refugees. 642 Mentoring, as expected, 
mitigated the effects of language, and education, but not work plans. The first two are attributed to the 
informational symmetries that mentoring helps bridge, as well as the social capital it fosters. Why work 
plans were not affected –immigrants who had plans to work did no better when mentored– may be due to 
negative signaling of a motivated work still needed to participate in a state-sponsored integration 
initiative. Signal Theory suggest that willingness to enter into employment skills-enhancing initiatives, 
and more generally, integration programs, transmits positive signals to employers conducting interviews 
under imperfect information (Ermini et al., 2017). However, respondents might be skeptical over whether 
somebody already possessing the necessary qualifications and motivation would need additional human 
resources. 
These aforementioned results suggest that a mentoring intervention in Germany might focus on inter-
specialization matching to allay the negative signaling effect, and boost domain-specific social capital. 
Such programs have already proved successful on a local level.  Sales Force and Buddy Force, for 
example, have documented success in matching refugees to with mentors in the same area of 
employment.643  
                                                             
641 While there is not a flawless link between public perception of desirability and ability to integrate, the two are connected by a 
clear logical thread. Populations hosting refugees, typically perceive integration as of primary importance; therefore, refugees 
who are perceived to integrate better are perceived as more desirable. Still, there is no one-to-one link between desirability and 
integration and so any firm statements connecting the two should be met cautiously. 
642 Heckmann, F. (2016). Understanding the Creation of Public Consensus: Migration and integration in Germany, 2005 to 2015. 
Migration Policy Institute. 
643 Salesforce. Refugee Integration. Last accessed 21 June 2017 from http://www.salesforce.org/get-little-help-friends-
buddyforce-helps-refugees-integrate-german-society/. 
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In the domain of social cohesion and national identity, there were no significant differences in the 
desirability of migrants coming from non-European countries compared to European countries. This was 
to be expected given that the history of parallel societies in Germany, and more generally, failure to 
integrate, has not been related to race (Funk 2016). 644 On the other hand, religion was a salient marker: 
Muslims were less likely to be deemed desirable. The bias against Muslims was especially prominent in 
Federal States with high concentrations of far-right voters.  This may mean that, rather than focus on 
allaying the concern of the German population over ascribed markers, focusing on inter-religious mentor-
mentee matches or local interfaith would be more effective. Inter-faith mentoring has shown notable 
success in Australia, for instance, Iftiin, a program between Somali Muslims and Jewish civil society; 
other instances of culturally appropriate mentoring have proven successful (Griffiths, 2009).645 A similar 
paradigm might be applied in Germany, particularly in areas of high AfD concentration. 
5.7 Limitations and Future Research 
As with most preference-based questionnaires, external validity is a concern. Even the best-crafted 
conjoint experiment remains a measure of stated preferences. This limits the findings in two ways: first, it 
is unclear to what extent the stated preferences translate to actual, observable behaviors. Research shows 
that attitudes do not directly translate to behaviors in part because behaviours are often contextually 
dependent, meaning that respondents might very well behave differently in another context (i.e., in their 
own neighbourhood instead of a survey).646 With anticipatory predictions, this analysis does not test for 
the type of contact, which may be critical towards whether an intervention will yield positive results 
(Barlow et al. 2012).647 Second, this study is unable to account for social desirability.  Since respondents’ 
choices have no real-life consequences, it is unclear to what extent respondents adjusted their stated 
preferences to align more with a socially desirable answer. Especially in the context of Germany’s recent 
refugee influx, German respondents may have felt the pressure to reproduce the image of Germany as a 
welcoming country. 
Lastly, competition threat theory suggests that workers will discriminate against immigrants who share 
the same profession. However, while labor competition was computed in an exploratory analysis, Chapter 
V avoided forming a hypothesis for several reasons. Not only is the support for labor competition highly 
                                                             
644 Funk, N. (2016). A spectre in Germany: refugees, a ‘welcome culture’ and an ‘integration politics’. Journal of Global 
Ethics, 12(3), 289-299. 
645 Griffiths (n633). 
646 Paolini, S., Harwood, J., & Rubin, M. (2010). Negative intergroup contact makes group memberships salient: Explaining why 
intergroup conflict endures. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(12), 1723-1738. 
647 Barlow, F. K., Paolini, S., Pedersen, A., Hornsey, M. J., Radke, H. R., Harwood, J., ... & Sibley, C. G. (2012). The contact 
caveat: Negative contact predicts increased prejudice more than positive contact predicts reduced prejudice. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(12), 1629-1643. 
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controversial in the literature, but whence applied to the German case, no generalizable hypothesis is 
evident. Germany has a relatively low unemployment rate (3.6% in 2017) suggesting that competition 
might not be generalizable across professions. Tidbits gleaned from the labor market literature are 
likewise unhelpful. For example, that higher educated graduates entering the market for analytical jobs in 
Germany have experienced a decline in employment shares, as well as a decline in starting wages and 
wage growth for those with higher education (Reinhold and Thomsen, 2017) does not translate into IT 
workers discriminating or challenging migrants for IT jobs.648 Secondly,  immigrants receive 15% lower 
wages than Germans with an explained gap of only 5% (Ohlert et al., 2016).649 This may mean that higher 
earnings employees won’t be threatened with low wage earners. On the other hand, it could also mean 
that glutted professions will feel increased competition from being undercut by low salary earning 
migrants.650 The literature likewise reveals a wide variance between specific groups (Murillo‐Huertas and 
Simón, 2017; Lehmer and Ludsteck, 2011; Bartolucci, 2014), wage settings, and relationships with firm 
profits. 651 
As expected, the exploratory analysis did not uncover any systematic evidence of threat between 
professions. For example, compared to IT specialists, construction workers, gardeners, students and 
waiters were seen as less desirable. In order to explore to what extent, the effect of a migrant’s job 
depends on a respondent’s job, interaction effects were estimated between migrant and respondent jobs. 
Respondents who were IT specialists themselves, did not have a preference for IT specialists over other 
professions, and they did not display a preference for any other migrant job. The same was true for 
respondents who were construction workers. Respondents who were doctors, found migrant doctors 
significantly less desirable than IT specialists who were the reference group. Respondents who reported to 
work in the job category “other” significantly disliked construction workers and waiters over IT 
specialists. Those respondents who were waiters, significantly preferred migrant doctors and teachers. 
Unemployed respondents preferred migrant students and teachers. Respondents who were students 
                                                             
648 University graduates from both regular and applied science institutions (Fachhochschul), as opposed to those with 
vocational and apprenticeship training as well as those without formal qualifications. Reinhold, M., & Thomsen, S. (2017). 
The changing situation of labor market entrants in Germany. Journal for Labour Market Research, 50(1), 161.  
649 Ohlert, C., Beblo, M., & Wolf, E. (2016). Competition, Collective Bargaining, and Immigrant Wage Gaps Within German 
Establishments. Wage Inequality in Germany and the Role of Organisations, 87. 
650 In fact, Becker’s assertion that increased competition reduces wage differentials (Becker 1971) has been supported in several  
recent studies (Ludsteck, 2014; Schäfer & Gottschall, 2015; Berson, 2016) with the implication that the labor market competition 
hypothesis might be location specific. 
651 Murillo‐Huertas, I. P., & Simón, H. (2017). Immigrant Relative Wages at the Great Recession: Evidence with Matched 
Employer‐Employee Data for Spain. Bulletin of Economic Research, 69(1), 77-107; Lehmer, F., & Ludsteck, J. (2011). The 
immigrant wage gap in Germany: Are East Europeans worse off?. International migration review, 45(4), 872-906; Bartolucci, C. 
(2014). Understanding the native–immigrant wage gap using matched employer-employee data: evidence from Germany. ILR 
Review, 67(4), 1166-1202. 
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significantly disliked migrant doctors, as well as migrant construction workers and waiters. In short, no 
robust trend supported by the literature was found. 
The lack of intra-specialization competition is a critical component in the mentoring integration narrative. 
It allows for domain-specific knowledge to be passed on through an integration program without 
excessive risk of a backlash. The lack of competition is attributed to two pathways. The first, that 
migrants earn significantly less than their German counterparts. So, where there are no location-specific 
occupational shortages migrants would intuitively be welcome to contribute to the ailing pension system. 
This would especially be the case if the migrant was an asylum seeker. The second pathway was type of 
migrant. Whether an asylum seeker, family member, or economic migrant impacted on whether a migrant 
was desirable based on occupation. This suggests that in most situations, humanitarian norms take 
precedence over labour competition concerns and that a mentoring program should focus on the norm-
based side of the integration mechanism. 
This leads to the normative point of scale. Who is to be responsible for ensuring that a mentoring integration 
program is successful? Is guardianship a State-level responsibility? Supranational? Should a sub-regional 
level entity oversee implementation? Or is it simply a matter of States transposing EU directives without 
oversight? Lack of clarity presents a dilemma: despite integration remaining a national competency, intra-
EU labour mobility means ineffective integration within one EU State may spill over to neighboring 
countries.  Moreover, in addition to accounting for spillovers, a successful mentoring program would need 
to address the main barriers towards effectiveness: lack of steady resources (Fernandes-Alcantara, 2017), 
ineffective program design (i.e., training, matching) (Crisp, 2009), barriers to institutional access (Givens 
et al., 2005) and lack of mentor commitment (Strauss et al., 2013). 652   
Taking into account the potential for negative spillovers, the abovementioned barriers to successful 
implementation, Chapter V argues for a mentoring integration effort coordinated at the supranational 
level. Supranational coordination will help ensure consistent funding,653 Union-wide measurable 
outcomes, and the ability to tie integration into refugee intake strategies at the supranational level. Still, a 
such an approach validated at the theoretical level through a fiscal federalism reading of internalizing 
                                                             
652 Fernandes-Alcantara, A. (2017) Congressional Research Service. 7-5700; Vulnerable Youth: Federal Mentoring Programs and 
Issues. Girves, J. E., Zepeda, Y., & Gwathmey, J. K. (2005). Mentoring in a post‐affirmative action world. Journal of Social 
Issues, 61(3), 449-479; Crisp, G. (2009). Conceptualization and initial validation of the College Student Mentoring Scale 
(CSMS). Journal of College Student Development, 50(2), 177-194; Straus, S. E., Johnson, M. O., Marquez, C., & Feldman, M. 
D. (2013). Characteristics of successful and failed mentoring relationships: a qualitative study across two academic health 
centers. Academic medicine: journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges, 88(1), 82.  
653 Article 79(4) TFEU allows for incentives and support at the European level for integration programs, which will allow for 
preplanned budgets, less reliance on individual project managers or subject to less external interference. Lack of funding at the 
national level has emasculated several integration programs i.e. the Dutch Common Integration Agenda. 
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spillovers from ineffective integration (Genschel, P., & Jachtenfuchs, 2018) is not without its drawbacks. 
One of the central criticisms of supranational-driven initiatives has been insensitivities to local 
preferences. 654 This has been shown in a number of studies, notably, Besley & Coate (2003) and suggests 
a de-centralized, not centralized approach.655 Top-down directives transposed nationally could miss on-
the-ground institutional knowledge and information about preferences, both critical to addressing 
location-specific integration needs. Within a Brussels-driven mentoring initiative, considerable latitude 
must therefore be provided at national, regional, and local levels. Rather than harmonization the needs 
and perceptions of the host population must be satiated.  
In the context of tailoring a supranational-directed initiative, countering the location-specific private 
information that frequently plagues centralized distribution of goods, requires accounting for the 
perception of the host population that a mentoring program will help make a refugee integrate 
successfully and which immigrant traits are more or less amendable to integration in that particular area. 
However, given that not all the attributes improved when interacting with mentoring (i.e., reasons for 
migration) mechanism design may have tailor each integration program country or region-specifically.  
5.8 Conclusion 
While the Political Economy literature provides a wealth of research analyzing the ex ante decision-making 
process for allocating centralized goods and services, before designing a centralized integration mechanism, 
public opinion should be considered. Public opinion has become increasingly important to how 
policymakers address migration policy. Perception of which traits make a migrant more likely to integrate 
may impact choice of policy and its implementation. In this study, a mentoring intervention using local 
mentors and location-specific information shows the capacity to sway public opinion towards making a 
migrant more desirable. States and refugees must transpire within local institutions and program 
entrepreneurship must address the diversity of needs of heterogeneous target populations. 656 This will allow 
the EU to move beyond soft coordination without overreaching its competencies or micro-managing 
implementation. 
 
                                                             
654 Genschel, P., & Jachtenfuchs, M. (2018). From market integration to core state powers: the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis 
and integration theory. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(1), 178-196. 
655 Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy 
approach. Journal of public economics, 87(12), 2611-2637. 
656 A well-designed mentorship program will allow the EU to move beyond soft coordination without overreaching its 
competencies or micro-managing implementation.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 
There are no quick fixes. No snake elixirs or miracle cures that will stop the flows of refugees to Europe. 
Being a systemic problem, persecution requires addressing roots: poverty as a root of war, intolerance as a 
root of violence, smuggling routes, and an increasingly sophisticated migration. While many EU Member 
States have slowly adapted to address these roots, future crisis with new actors and different innovative 
ways to reach Europe are very real possibilities. The European Union needs to be prepared for shocks to 
its asylum system. It was woefully unprepared for surges in asylum seekers from the Syrian civil war, 
unrest in the East African Horn, and fallout from conflict in North Africa.  
Despite EU governments taking meaningful and significant measures to improve their asylum systems 
future surges may still overwhelm intake centers, labour markets, and lead to negative public opinion. As 
we have seen, public opinion frequently nudges local politicians to make reforms at the national and 
supranational level. This includes deterring or outright refusing to host those in need of protection. These 
decisions threaten to break with international human rights law norms and narrow the scope of protection 
for those fleeing persecution.  
Returning to the research question posed at the introduction: how can institutional solutions to refugee 
allocation and integration bring social and economic forces into equilibrium with the law? The first 
institutional solution offered involved allocation. In order to maximize social welfare, EU States must 
have control over how many individuals are absorbed into on their territory. Assigning costs and benefits 
to protection guides allocation and is part of their sovereign preference. Subsumed beneath the word 
sovereignty are a gamut of economic, cultural and societal concerns that may prevent States from 
maximizing their social welfare if they cannot limit the amount of asylum seekers entering their territory. 
The answer then lies in a mechanism able to account for how States perceive the costs and benefits of 
protection, yet does lead to a suboptimal level of protection. 
The institutional solution offered by this dissertation to efficiently allocate protection was an EU-OIC 
protection market. The market mechanism enables EU States to protect without hosting greater than their 
preferences dictate. Such a mechanism disincentivizes freeriding, misrepresenting preferences for hosting, 
or making claimant determinations stricter: the so-called race to the bottom in asylum claim standards. 
While the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation may seem to many as an unreliable partner −in the past 
they have proven inconsistent in peacekeeping operations and calls for unconditional non-violence− still, 
the OIC counts as its Member States the majority of refugee-producing and refugee-transiting countries. 
Its inclusion provides an opportunity for Global South actors to coordinate asylum applications, effectuate 
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lower transaction costs, increase deterrent measures, and increase safety for those preparing perilous land 
and seaborne journeys.  
Refugee transfers may be efficient from an economic point of view, but there remain multi-layered 
concerns about its legality. Quality of protection, reifying human beings, and monitoring safety and 
dignity count as the primary human rights issues. Potential transaction costs associated with legal 
challenges could make such a market unfeasible. Chapter III addressed these challenges through both 
refugee law and case law involving human dignity. Its legal analysis revealed that the key to preventing 
dignity-grounded violations weighs heavily in the design mechanism phase. Firstly, autonomy must be 
provided to refugees insofar as it is possible. In particular, this applies to the matching mechanism. EU 
and OIC States whose domestic laws debilitate the autonomy of those adhering to a particular social, 
religious, or ethical stream of belief should be given priority to be matched to States where actualizing 
such tenets is permissible. 
Secondly, intensity, intent, and balancing individual with societal rights also play a major factor in 
ensuring that the dignity of refugees is not violated. This means that restrictions on exercising autonomy 
are clearly articulated is the language of inclusiveness. Perceptions of exclusion due to ascribed 
characteristics such as race or religion are likely to be successfully challenged. It is thus important that 
limitations are framed as societal prescriptions not curbing individual rights. Yet framing does not speak 
to balancing: in issues when individual rights have come in conflict with State rights, courts have often 
afforded a wide margin of appreciation (i.e., S.A.S.). It may be that how limitations on exercising 
individual autonomy are articulating and providing options to exercise that autonomy in a non-traditional 
manner, satisfy due diligence concerns. 
A market is one solution to reach an optimal level of protection. Yet a market deals primarily with 
allocation. Effective integration measures are likewise critical to lower the perceived costs of hosting. 
Less costly hosting may reasonably lead to increasing the number of refugees protected within one’s own 
borders. Mentoring, Chapters IV and V argued, could be one such effective integration strategy and lower 
the cost of hosting. Chapter V empirically tested this proposition among Arab-speaking refugees in Italy, 
Germany, and Greece. The results were overwhelmingly positive for labour market participation: 
mentoring does aid in promoting gainful employment because of its impact on negative signaling, 
language upskilling, access to location-specific institutional knowledge, and meaningful interpersonal 
connections. However, as Chapter V revealed, different EU countries may have very different location-
specific needs. Even within Germany, different Länder had varying perceptions on how religion, 
education, and job experience impacted immigrant desirability. Even if a mentoring program is forged at 
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the EU level and monitored through harmonized instruments, it must be adapted at the sub-regional level. 
Mentor-mentee matches must address local labour market trends, fears, and bigotry. 
That brings us to the question of feasibility. Is an EU-OIC market-based mechanism for protection or an 
EU centralized mentoring intervention feasible? Any answer to this question is of course subjective. Still, 
one must consider the status quo. As of August 2018, asylum seeker inflows have drastically reduced 
from their 2014-2016 numbers. Bilateral treaties with Jordan and to some extent Turkey have proven 
fruitful. The New York Declaration appeared to be a major step forward for protecting refugees, at least 
on paper. From this point of view, a major overhaul in the asylum system, one that includes 57 other 
nations would not seem in the EU’s best interest.  
Still, there are other points to consider, the most important of which are long-term considerations. The 
‘crisis’ of 2014-2016 transpired not only because of the Syrian Civil War and easier access to Europe, but 
because the Union failed to prepare itself for potential crises. Myopic asylum procedures looked at current 
figures and short-term projections without adequate consideration of external shocks. The instability in 
many Global South countries means that a crisis could easily erupt in the near future. Egypt, for instance, 
with a population of over 90 million, is just across the Mediterranean. Consequently, the viability of an 
OIC-EU collaboration may largely depend on how farseeing policymakers are in Brussels and their 
willingness to calculate long-term risks. 
In contrast to a full-scale market mechanism, a centralized mentoring program would not require such 
acute risk assessment skills. Mentoring programs have already been funded by Brussels and at the State 
level. Many have proven successful. Addressing their shortcomings through centralized funding and 
oversight is feasible and could be realized. The key, aside from run of the mill coordination issues, is 
solid empirics to support an EU-wide mentoring program. To this end, both Chapters IV and V aimed to 
provide robust scholarship. Both studies contained original datasets collected by the author. The first 
dataset, of Arab-speaking refugee outcomes, the second, a randomized sample from the German 
population. Both add fodder to a centralized mentoring program, one able to address location-specific 
needs but also increase accountability and coordinate inter-jurisdictional externalities. Indeed, the two 
empirical studies constitute not only a contribution to the literature, but to policy as well. 
While the empirical sections, Chapters IV and V contribute to the literature on Integration, Acculturation, 
and Law and Economics, Part II to the Market-Based literature, and Part III to the Refugee Law canon, all 
four have their limitations. The OIC-EU proposal can’t anticipate non-dyadic costs such as security that 
figures into quota prices. Further, the willingness and capacity of the OIC to reign in some of its members 
who are considered to perpetrate or implicitly accept human rights violations is unknown. Would, for 
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example, refugees be forced to share their sexual identity with authorities in order not to be sent to a 
country where homosexuality is explicitly or implicitly persecuted? These questions remain unknown and 
constitute a limitation to the study. Moving forward, The Legality of Refugee Transfers, displays several 
limits. Though the study seeks to take an evolutionary approach and predict future law, whether margin of 
appreciation would be granted by the ECtHR to EU States in areas of a refugee’s identity, or her spatial 
dislocation through unreciprocated transfers to third-party States remains unknown. 
Naturally, the two empirical studies likewise have limitations. The relatively small n of the Arabic-
speaking refugee dataset makes drawing robust conclusions difficult. Though the study attempted to 
mitigate this through Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) to approximate the counterfactual of individuals 
treated, CEM may not have been entirely accurate or have sufficiently counteracted the effects of the 
small sample. The conjoint design, though with several thousand observations, is also lower in number 
compared to studies with a similar empirical design (i.e., Hainmeuller and Hopkins, 2015). To appreciate 
location-specific differences, more participants from Germany’s Länder would need to be included. 
Unfortunately, the sample distribution by Federal State is currently imbalanced. 
Still, despite these limitations this dissertation makes a number of contributions to the literature and 
policy circles. To seal the cracks mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are a number of suggestions 
for future research. Foremost, more empirical work should be done to assess the impact that mentoring 
has on refuges in different EU locations. DIW Berlin is currently conducting a controlled study that tests 
the effects of mentoring on a host of labor market and socio-cultural indicators. More studies are needed. 
More studies are also needed to assess the impact of a wide variety of integration policies on host 
populations.  
That the law is out of step with social and economic forces is not necessarily a bad thing for Europe. It 
shows how far the European Community has agreed to limit their sovereignty in the name of human 
rights. That’s a good thing. Now it’s time to find solutions that bring these laws in line with State 
interests, solutions that sacrifice neither the extraordinary developments in international law over the past 
seventy years nor the right of European citizens to decide the trajectory of their unique communities 
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Appendix A: Immigrant Questionnaire and Interview  
 
Dates: February-May 2017  
Interviewer: Akiva Weiss 
Locations: Athens, Chania, Rhodes, Palermo, Hamburg, Bremen 
Language: English/Arabic.  
 
Instructions 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this important survey measuring the impact of mentoring on 
asylum seekers and refugees. The project will be completed in 3 months and aims to better inform EU 
policy makers about the needs of refugees. This questionnaire is completely confidential. It will be 
entered into a database along with thousands of other respondents. Thank you. 
 
 
Questions: 
Have you been mentored? 
Was a mentor assigned or did mentoring occur naturally? 
Was the mentor male or female? 
What was the duration of the mentorship? 
Was the mentor from the same social group/ethnic community as you? 
Did the mentor speak Arabic? 
 
On a scale from 1-7: 
Did the mentor help you make business contacts outside of your community/social group? 
Did the mentor help you make meaningful friends from the native host population? 
Did the mentor help you navigate public institutions? 
Did the mentor provide emotional support? 
Did the mentor help you with family problems? 
Did the mentor help you with educational support? 
Did your employment status change during the mentoring relationship?  
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Did the mentor impact that change?              If so: (a) positively or (b) negatively 
 
About You: 
Gender 
Nationality 
Time in Country 
Religion 
Family Members in country 
Current Occupation 
Former Occupation (in your home country) 
 
Please circle only one: 
Legal Status: (a) refugee (b) temporary protection status (c) waiting for decision (d) no status (e) citizen 
Labor market status: (a) full-time employment (b) part-time employment (c) unemployed 
Education Level: (a) not finished high school (b) some university (c) completed undergraduate degree  (d) 
completed graduate degree   
    
I just have a few more questions to ask. 
Feel free to answer them in as much or as little detail as you’re comfortable. 
1. If your mentor helped you make meaningful friendships can you describe them: for example,  
their age, personality, social standing? 
2. Do you think you would have made friends with them without the mentor’s help? 
3. Did you visit any of their places of work? 
4. Did you visit any of their homes? 
5. Did they visit your home? 
6. If you had a mentor help you with education in which ways did he or she help? 
7. Did they visit the schools? 
8. Did they meet with teachers or administrators? 
9. Did the mentor help you more with immediate concerns like homework and course content or 
longer-term aspects like graduation? 
10. Did your mentor try and link your education with future employment opportunities? 
11. If your mentor helped you with learning the local language, in which way did he or she help? 
12. Have you ever gone out for a meal with your mentor? 
13. If so, please tell me about the place. 
14. Did your mentor speak Arabic? If not, was he or she interesting in learning Arabic? 
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